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Abstract 
The mandatory and voluntary carbon markets have both developed around the increasing 
trade of carbon offsets. In order to add legitimacy to an otherwise intangible commodity there 
has been a rise in the development of third party carbon certification standards, particularly in 
the voluntary market. These standards aim to provide independent, third party certification to 
projects that are developed specifically to generate and sell carbon offsets. South Africa has 
the opportunity to engage with these markets, but current participation in and certification of 
projects is sluggish. These projects have not taken off mainly due to the high transaction costs 
and lag times surrounding the current certification of projects’, complex baseline 
methodologies, accounting uncertainty and the often bureaucratic systems surrounding the 
current voluntary carbon certification standards and methodologies.  
In order to overcome these pitfalls this project aimed to address these challenges through 
initiating the development of a preliminary South African voluntary carbon standard. This 
was done by: a) undertaking a critical assessment of the development of current carbon 
markets, with a particular focus on voluntary markets and third party certification, b) 
critically analysing the current voluntary carbon certification standards for best practices, 
pitfalls and weaknesses. To provide a better understanding of the historical development of 
voluntary certification standards, various established certification standards were evaluated, 
including the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC), Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and 
ISO 14000 standards. This analysis focussed on the challenges they faced in acceptance and 
in particular how they have managed to operationalize sustainable development within the 
certification process.  
In order to explicitly ensure the incorporation of a sustainable development assessment of 
projects under the proposed standard, an expert workshop was held with 14 experts from a 
wide variety of disciplines. These experts identified the crucial sustainable development 
challenges facing South Africa. They identified 12 sub-themes and 44 indicators that could be 
used to measure and incorporate sustainable development indicators into the certification 
process. These were then further developed through using the ‘Input – Output – Outcome – 
Impact’ framework model which allowed the indicators to be organised and understood and 
thus practical. 
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The analysis of the voluntary certification standards and the development of the sustainable 
development indicator framework were ultimately incorporated into the development of the 
proposed South African voluntary carbon standard. The key approach to this standard is the 
incorporation and focus of the proposed standard to ensuring the generation of net SD 
benefits and placing them at the same level as carbon within the project design and 
development, validation and verification process. The full and effective integration of these 
has been missing within current fully fledged voluntary carbon standards, as they often rely 
on a mixture of project design standards to achieve this. Offering the inclusion of all 
components into one standard, specifically designed for South Africa, will not only assure SD 
credentials but also increase transparency and understanding, and reduce costs. 
This thesis allowed for the development of innovative new ideas and process focussed 
specifically at including and mainstreaming South Africa’s developmental challenges into the 
certification process. This is the hoped that the standard will effectively certify South African 
based landscape restoration projects, but also decrease costs and increase efficiencies in order 
to encourage the development of these projects. This preliminary standard not only aims to 
incorporate and address all the issues identified but also has the end goal of acting as the 
basis for future debate and development surrounding a potential South African voluntary 
carbon certification standard. 
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1.1. Introduction 
Climate change is seen as one of the most potentially devastating phenomena facing the globe 
today (IPCC, 2007). The evidence surrounding climate change is well documented by a 
steadily growing body of peer reviewed scientific literature, which is substantiated by rises in 
mean global air and ocean temperatures, rising sea levels, melting glaciers and abnormal 
climatic events (IPCC, 2007) and consistently cites anthropogenic sources, especially the 
increasing combustion of non-renewable fossil fuels and widespread land degradation, as the 
leading causes (IPCC, 2007). Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG), 
especially carbon dioxide (CO2), have been identified as the leading causes and accelerants of 
global climate change (Kerr, 2007) and this evidenced that since the industrial revolution 
GHG emissions have been steadily increasing (Grubb et al., 1999). Current CO2 levels in the 
atmosphere are at their highest levels recorded in 420 000 years, with CO2 rising to 392 ppm 
in May 2010 (CO2now.org, 2010). This has led to growing concern surrounding the potential 
devastating consequences of global warming and the subsequent risks of dramatic climate 
change events.   
This problem has become entrenched within the global economic system as traditionally 
ecosystems goods and services have been seen as a public good and thus their value to the 
overall economic system has been neglected (Hunt, 2008). In particular the costs of the 
unabated release of CO2, and other GHGs, into the atmosphere. To counter this phenomenon 
there has been a process of developing a market system in the trade of ecosystem goods and 
services. Crucial to this process is valuing and demonstrating the value of ecosystem goods 
and services to livelihoods and wellbeing of all humanity. This has transformed itself into 
concept of markets for ecosystem service (MES) or payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
frameworks (Wunder, 2005; Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008). These are key policy steps 
and development where a monetary value can be placed on ecosystem goods and services the 
through that reach and influence the appropriate policy development, government regulation 
and economic decision. 
1.2. Climate Change and the New Carbon Economy  
In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol (KP) became the overarching international policy tool designed 
to facilitate the stemming and reduction of global GHG emissions, with the goals of 
establishing viable PES markets at its heart. This was an important step as Lal (2002) states 
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that due to the pervasiveness of the GHG problem, international policy was, and still is, vital 
to the regulation of emissions. The KP has become the centre point around which 
environmental diplomacy and country specific climate change policy is formulated (Tangen 
and Hasselknippe, 2005). The KP specifically drives the use and implementation of market-
based mechanisms and incentives to reduce atmospheric concentration of GHGs. 
Mechanisms that exist within the protocol include the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and emissions reduction trading (Niesten et al., 2002). The 
agreement aims to reduce overall GHG emissions by 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012 
(Grubb et al., 1999). This is achieved by instituting GHG emissions reductions goals, for all 
Annex 1 (developed) countries. Where countries or institutions are able to reduce emissions 
over their targets, each ton of CO2e equals one carbon credit that can be traded on the market 
(Galatowitsch, 2009). Under the rules of the CDM, developing countries who manage to 
reduce their GHG emissions or sequester CO2 also qualify for carbon credits which can be 
sold onto the market (Galatowitsch, 2009). These allows for Annex 1 countries that are 
unable to meet their targets, or choose to continue to pollute, to meet their obligations 
through funding GHG reduction projects in developing countries and claim the credits 
produced from these projects.  
1.3. The Development of the Carbon Markets 
This has seen the rise of a number of new, innovative approaches to market development. In 
particular the continued development and refinement of the mandatory market, governed by 
the KP and the concurrent development of a voluntary market and third party certification 
systems. These aim to guide and add credibility to the offsets purchased in the previously 
informal markets (Galatowitsch, 2009).  This market has seen the development of a wide 
variety of standards, which compete for market share (Merger and Pistorius, 2011). This is 
inherently based on their differing components, but also about the perception of quality and 
legitimacy of buyers about the offsets certified. One of the voluntary markets main goals it to 
open the market to a wider range of participants through decreasing costs and increasing 
efficiency within the certification process (Galatowitsch, 2009).  
1.4. South African Context for the Study 
Along with the rest of the world, South Africa is starting to see the potential of land based bio 
sequestration carbon offsetting projects as means to realise both climate change mitigation 
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objectives but also encourage sustainable development. There have been a number of 
initiatives started in recent years that aim to generate funding through selling the associated 
project’s carbon credits in the market. These have mainly taken place in the informal carbon 
markets, or the selling of non-quantified offsets, through NGOs and projects such as Food 
and Trees for Africa (www.trees.co.za) and Elemental Equity (www.elemental equity.org). 
The main reason for the informal route of these projects is the prohibitive barriers to entry for 
small scale projects to gain certification, especially in terms of high levels of bureaucracy and 
the associated costs.  
Even projects of a larger scale such as the Subtropical Thicket Restoration Project (STRP) 
have struggled to overcome the challenges currently associated with carbon certification. The 
STRP is the first, large scale bio sequestration project within South Africa and aims to 
become a practical example of a bio sequestration offset project. It was initiated in 2004 on 
public land within the Eastern Cape with the  main aim is to restore degraded sub-tropical 
thicket, with the explicit aim to fund this through the generation and sale of voluntary carbon 
credits. This project forms part of the South African governments’ Working for Woodlands 
initiative and has the potential to contribute large amounts of employment opportunities. 
1.5. Aim of Thesis 
It is within this sphere that this study is situated. It is motivated by the increasing 
development of country specific, ‘embedded’ standards in large developing countries such as 
China and Brazil that have focussed on the certification of country specific Land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF) carbon offsetting projects. These initiatives have only 
recently gained marked success, particularly in Brazil. They have facilitated the creation of a 
new voluntary carbon standard that encourages the certification of local projects through 
reducing the current barriers to certification. This allows for projects to obtain certification 
quickly and create an internal voluntary carbon market where the loop between supply and 
demand is closed. These standards have also been lauded for their inclusion of sustainable 
development benefits that are focussed at addressing their country specific developmental 
challenges (Peters-Stanley et al, 2011).  
South Africa has the opportunity to capitalise on this development. The development of a 
country specific voluntary carbon standard has become the cornerstone of these markets. 
While the countries already mentioned are much larger in GDP terms they are proving that it 
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is possible to both a) develop a local carbon market, and b) ensure sustainable development. 
The introduction of the South African Carbon Tax in 2012 discussion document has 
explicitly incorporated the potential to develop a local South Africa offset market (South 
African Revenue Service, 2012), but the terms have not been defined yet. This therefore is 
the perfect opportunity to debate within South Africa around the development of a potential 
country specific or regional carbon market and the associated carbon standards to be used 
within the scheme. While the development of a South African specific voluntary carbon 
standard is not the only option, it is one that cannot be ignored due to similar successes in 
other developing countries.   Its potential to encourage the flow of funding to local 
sustainable development projects is something South Africa desperately needs. 
Accordingly the focus of this study is the development of a proposed South African voluntary 
carbon standard as a starting point for the potential development of an operational South 
African Voluntary Carbon Standard to guide the development of this new market. This 
proposed standard is designed to specifically certify South African landscape restoration 
projects, with a direct emphasis on incorporating, mainstreaming and ensuring the generation 
of SD benefits from projects certified. This is emphasized for a number of reasons: 1) 
landscape restoration projects have been neglected in current certification standards in favour 
of afforestation or reforestation (A/R) projects, 2) they are historically the most difficult and 
costly to certify and as such have been neglected in developing countries, and 3) they offer 
potentially high levels of SD benefits.  
1.6. Vision of Thesis 
The vision of the proposed South African voluntary carbon standard (Box 1.1) sets out the 
final aim of this thesis. While this vision is used to guide the development of this thesis, it has 
to be stated that this thesis cannot aim to comprehensively address all of these in this one 
academic process. This thesis has the overarching aim to generate ideas and proposals for a 
South African specific landscape restoration carbon standard that will act as a starting point 
for any future developments.  
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1) Provide transparency and credibility to the South African voluntary carbon market by 
establishing the proposed standard as a rigorous standard for GHG removals. 
2) Provide a trusted mark of assurance and credibility that the offsets purchased are real, 
reliable, additional and permanent. 
3) Stimulate the South African carbon market through reducing transaction costs and 
ensuring a transparent and efficient certification process with increased innovation 
and the reduction of complexity within the certification process. 
4) Develop a certification process that aims to incorporate and address South Africa’s 
developmental challenges, especially poverty alleviation, water provision and 
biodiversity protection.  
5) Ensure that projects have net environmental and social benefits and that these are 
effectively incorporated, monitored and reported on. 
 
1.7. Structure of Thesis 
This vision (Box 1.1) will serve to guide the development and structure of this thesis and the 
proposed content of the developed standard. In order to achieve this it is necessary to 
structure the thesis in three distinct parts (Figure 1.1):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.1.: Vision of Standard  
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Part 1 comprises of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 with the key objectives of: 
 Gaining a greater understanding of the carbon market developments and the key role 
players (Chapter 2); 
 Analysing the best practices amongst current voluntary carbon certification standards 
(Chapter 3); and 
 Understanding and analysing the development of voluntary certification systems in 
other markets, such as forestry, in order to learn lessons for the development of a 
voluntary carbon standard (Chapter 4). 
Figure 1.1: Thesis Structure 
Part 1: 
Identifying the Lessons to 
the Learnt in Certification 
Design 
Chapter 1: General 
Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature 
Review 
Chapter 3: Analysis of 
Current Voluntary 
Carbon Standards 
Chapter 4: Review of 
Existing Certification 
Standards 
Chapter 5: 
Development of an SD 
Indicator Framework 
Chapter 6: Development of 
a proposed South African 
Voluntary Carbon Standard 
Part 2: 
Development of a Preliminary 
Carbon Standard for South African 
Landscape Restoration Projects 
Part 3: 
General 
Conclusion 
Chapter 7: General Discussion, 
Research Implications and 
Conclusion 
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To achieve this, Chapter 2 will provide an in-depth literature review of the current thoughts 
and developments surrounding environmental markets and the inclusion of sustainable 
development. This will focus on their historical development and the current debates 
surrounding land based carbon offsetting initiatives and the potential within South Africa. 
Chapter 3 analyses the existing voluntary carbon standards focus on conducting a critical 
analysis of the current voluntary carbon standards for current market best practices and 
pitfalls of when designing a voluntary carbon certification process. This is then 
complimented in Chapter 4 by a critical analysis of the development and the lessons to be 
learnt from other current voluntary environmental certification systems (such as the FSC, 
MSC and ISO 14000 systems). There is a particular focus on if the standards have managed 
to successfully certify projects and add to the assurance of sustainable development benefits. 
Part 2 comprises of Chapter 5 and 6, which develops a South African specific SD assessment 
framework. This involves in an assessment of South Africa’s developmental challenges and 
the development of indicators and a framework that can be used to address these. The aim of 
this chapter is to: 
 Develop a preliminary list of SD indicators that can ensure the incorporation of SD 
consideration into the proposed South Africa voluntary carbon standard. 
Chapter 6 combines all the lessons, ideas and processes developed in the previous sections in 
the development of a proposed South African voluntary carbon standard. This chapter sets 
out the proposed principles and processes that a South African landscape restoration project 
would have to abide by or undertake in order to obtain certification under the standard. The 
explicit aim within the chapter is to develop new and innovative processes that are tailored to 
a landscape restoration project in a South African context but that have a focus on efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness in order to reduce the barriers to entry into the market for these 
projects.  
Part 3 includes Chapter 7 and serves the function of concluding the entire thesis and 
attempting to illustrate what is required to potentially operationalize the proposed standard in 
the future. 
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2.1. Purpose of Chapter 
The concept of payment for ecosystem services, in particular that of the carbon markets, 
requires an analysis for this thesis. This chapter aims to fulfil this by conducting an extensive 
literature review surrounding the main topics of payment for ecosystem services, carbon 
markets and landscape restoration projects. 
2.2. Development of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
The PES method is becoming ever more important and prominent in order to highlight and 
place a value on the ecosystem goods and services provided to humanity (Gomez – 
Baggethun et al., 2010). It is an area of study that can effectively mainstream the concept of 
ecosystem functioning, and the vital goods and services they provide, into the dominant 
global market based economy. The origins of the PES concept arose in the late 1970s 
(Westman, 1977; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981) as the “framing of beneficial ecosystem 
functioning as services so as to increase public awareness in biodiversity conservation” 
(Gomez – Baggethun et al., 2010). Economists argue that the true values of ecosystem 
services are not captured in current market prices due to their nature of them being positive 
externalities or public goods (Corbera et al., 2007). As a result of this their true value is not 
accounted for by economic actors, and thus they are not incorporated into decision making 
processes and as such there are no incentives for conservation (Corbera et al., 2007). Markets 
for ecosystem services have been suggested and developed as effective and efficient 
strategies to internalise the externality into decision making processes, and thus create 
economic opportunities for resource managers while enhancing resource management and 
reducing rural poverty (Corbera et al., 2007). PES schemes are expected to provide an 
equitable distribution of their economic and social benefits, while being more effective than 
government led conservation schemes due to their economic considerations (Pagiola et al., 
2005). 
The interest in mainstreaming ecosystem services into the global economy has been evident 
in the rapid rise of literature dealing with issues such as the effective valuation of ecosystem 
services (Costanza and Daly, 1992; Daily et al., 1997), the most effective mechanism for 
pricing ecosystem services, and the addition of the concept into the policy making agenda. 
The paper by Costanza et al. (1997) “The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural 
capital” caught the imagination of policy makers and the public by placing an explicit value 
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of US$ 33 trillion per annum on the contribution of the world’s ecosystem services to human 
livelihoods. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) process allowed for the idea of 
ecosystem services to become firmly entrenched in the policy formulation agenda. This has 
spurred a rapid growth in the identification and development of market based mechanisms 
that can be used to place an accurate price on ecosystem services. Ecosystems services that 
have been actively valuated in monetary terms range from carbon sequestration and 
watershed services to biodiversity conservation and landscape beauty (Pagiola, 2008). This 
has allowed the concept of ecosystem services to transcend the academic arena into areas of 
policy development, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private and financial 
institutions (Gomez – Baggethun et al., 2010). However Peterson et al. (2010) notices that 
this has prompted a move of the concept away from that of increasing debate on conservation 
issues to one of a commoditisation of vital ecosystem functioning with an increased emphasis 
on cash generation within new market driven economies.  
Redford and Adams (2009) point out that PES schemes are being developed, adopted and 
implemented at a rapid rate. However these are often combined with a lack of critical debate 
surrounding their true purpose, potential application and gaps within the successful 
development of a market. This has caused the development of ecosystem service 
marketplaces to evolve on a separate path divergent from which the concept was originally 
formulated. Many critics have raised concerns regarding the utilitarian framing of ecosystem 
functioning and the way that humans relate to and perceive nature might be negatively 
affected in the long run (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). Proponents of PES schemes argue that 
the degradation of ecosystems can be alleviated through the transference of funds from 
‘consumers’ of the ecosystems service to ‘providers’ of the service. This will establish a new 
‘urban – rural’ compact which can both restore and preserve ecosystem functioning while 
alleviating poverty (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). This approach highlights the idealistic, neo-
classical economic situation of a willing buyer-willing seller scenario of a defined, 
quantifiable commodity. It does however exclude the complexity associated with PES 
schemes that operate under different principles, with ill-defined ecosystem services or 
inefficient provision levels (Muradian, et al., 2010). To address the myriad of criticisms 
surrounding the conceptual ideal of PES schemes it is vital to work within current economic, 
political and social systems to establish a framework that effectively places ecosystems and 
their functioning at the forefront of policy making, social consciousness and economic 
decision making. This in turn will allow for the preservation, restoration and continued 
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benefits to be accrued from the Earth’s vital life support systems, while contributing to the 
upliftment of rural economies and communities. 
2.3. PES Market Development 
Recent years have seen the emergence of the ‘big three’ PES markets worldwide, namely 
climate change mitigation (carbon), watershed services and biodiversity. The largest of these, 
that carbon market, has been accelerated by the threat of climate change and has become the 
market for the buying and selling of carbon credits to mitigate CO2 emissions, measured in 
metric tonnes of CO2equivalents (mtCO2e). This has allowed for large CO2 emitters to reduce 
or mitigate their emission through either buying or selling carbon credits. This market has 
split into two distinct paths, namely the mandatory and voluntary carbon markets. The 
mandatory market is governed by the Kyoto Protocol (KP), while the voluntary market has 
developed mainly as a result of corporate social responsibility funding of projects. The 
market for carbon has been developing since the 1990s with the first voluntary reforestation 
program of 50 million trees in Guatemala undertaken by a large American power company, 
Applied Energy Services (AES) (Galatowitsch, 2009). This project was devised as a way to 
offset harmful emissions from a newly constructed coal fired power plant, and won 
regulatory approval. AES became the first official investor in the carbon market and 
highlighted the vital role that markets could play in generating financing for reducing carbon 
emissions and facilitating the rise of the ‘new carbon economy’. 
2.4. Sustainable Development and the New Carbon Economy 
There has been much debate whether the rise of the new carbon economy will bring about a 
concurrent rise in meeting sustainable development goals. The clean development mechanism 
(CDM) has the double objective of assisting Annex 1 countries to meet their emissions 
reduction targets and to contribute to sustainable development within the host country (Sutter 
and Parreno, 2007). However Sutter (2003) identified a trade-off between these two 
objectives as cost-efficient emissions reduction practices are in direct conflict to sustainable 
development (SD) objectives. This is reaffirmed within the Marrakech Accord that states that 
“it is the host Party’s prerogative to confirm whether the CDM project activity assists it in 
achieving sustainable development” (Boyd and Schipper, 2002). This has led to formulation 
of The Designated National Authorities (DNA), whose role is to recommend CDM projects 
to the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) and develop their own criteria for SD for CDM 
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projects in their own countries (Sutter and Parreno, 2007). This freedom could serve as a 
perverse incentive for non-Annex 1 countries to set lower or weaker SD criteria to attract 
investment from Annex 1 countries, and thus defeat the objectives of incorporating SD 
considerations. Olsen (2007) argues that the absence of international SD standards is going to 
cause the move towards the most cost efficient project and not the most beneficial project. 
Adger et al. (2001) found that the implementation of global environmental policies, such as 
the development of carbon markets, have great difficulties in incorporating local ecological 
and social realities, particularly at a local scale. Brown and Corbera (2003) argue that this is a 
result of carbon markets being forced into existence and not spontaneously emerging, this 
they argue might result in changes to local level rights, such as property rights. Bond et al. 
(2007) identify a form of “carbon colonialism” where land is expropriated from communities 
in developing countries to plant monocultures purely to offset carbon emissions from 
developed countries, subsequently contributing to biodiversity destruction, livelihood loss 
and access to water. Historically the CDM has tended towards low – cost, high volume 
projects such as methane gas capture or hydro fluorocarbon (HFC) destruction projects which 
have very few benefits for local livelihoods and biodiversity. The bureaucratic process of 
getting projects approved has driven small, community based projects out of the CDM, and 
allowed for the majority of projects being situated in the larger developing economies of 
China and India (Cosbey et al., 2005). The carbon market however does have the potential to 
contribute to sustainable development goals, through the development of projects that 
incorporate and respect the ecological and social systems in which they are situated.  
The concurrent rise of the voluntary carbon market has gone some way to address the 
concerns generated from the CDM and sustainable development. The theoretical lack of 
bureaucracy within the voluntary market allows for increased investment in smaller scale, 
community based projects with their associated the co-benefits, such as increased biodiversity 
or job creation (Taiyab, 2005).. The new carbon economy is a mechanism that can be used to 
engage and mobilise the private sector to gain capital for smaller scale projects and thereby 
channel it towards SD and environmentally friendly activities (Brown and Corbera, 2003), 
such as landscape restoration projects. This is substantiated by Galatowitsch (2009) who 
argues that carbon trading has become much more than just a business transaction, by 
investing in projects with popular appeal the company will be recognised for their social and 
environmental responsibility. This funding could be used to support forestry and biodiversity 
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protection or restoration activities, as well as bringing a variety of sustainable development 
co-benefits such as diversifying rural economies and promoting sustainable resource 
management.  
2.5. Carbon Markets – Mandatory and Voluntary 
Currently, investors or Annex 1 countries can purchase offset reduction certificates through 
two markets, the mandatory and voluntary market. In 2009 the entire carbon market 
(mandatory and voluntary) was valued at around US$136 billion (Hamilton et al., 2009) and 
has increased decreased to US$ 14.9 billion in 2010 but still with 95% of trade taking place 
within the mandatory market. While the voluntary market is relatively small it still resulted in 
a market value of US$705 million in 2008 (Hamilton et al., 2009). However, in 2009 the 
voluntary carbon market was dramatically affected by the global economic recession and this 
led to a decline in the total value of voluntary credits to US$415 million (Hamilton et al., 
2010). The trading year of 2010 has seen a rebound by corporate social responsibility buyers 
after reclaiming their money from the recession to US$ 424 million (Peters-Stanley et al., 
2011). This is still some way behind the record trading volume of US$705 million recorded 
in 2008 (Hamilton et al, 2009). However, average credit prices fell slightly from US$6.5/t 
CO2e in 2009 to US $6/t CO2e. 
Within the mandatory market, under the CDM, demand is driven by compliance buyers from 
developed countries, in particular Europe, purchasing certified emissions reductions (CERs) 
from developing countries as offsets (Galatowitsch, 2009). CERs are the unit of emission 
reduction measurement issued by the CDM for emissions reductions achieved by a CDM 
project that have been verified by a third party designate operational entity (DOE). The 
majority of emissions reduction projects currently registered under the CDM result from 
energy industries (renewable/non-renewable energy) (62%) and waste handling and disposal 
projects (17.5%) (UNFCCC, 2010a). A similar trend is visible in the voluntary markets with 
the majority of voluntary offsets coming from renewable energy projects with a 51% market 
share; mostly from hydropower (32%), wind energy (15%) and biomass energy (3%) 
(Hamilton et al., 2009). Asian countries have been dominating carbon markets (Figure 1.1) 
with projects within the Asia/Pacific region accounting for 76% of all registered CDM 
projects up until 2010 (1692 of 2216), China and India alone account for 61% of these. On 
the voluntary market Asia once again dominates and was a source for 45% voluntary 
emissions reductions (VERs) of offset certificates traded in the over-the-counter market 
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(OTC), the largest VER market (Hamilton et al., 2009). A VER is the generic unit of 
emissions reduction measurement that has been assigned to a project that has been 
successfully certified under a voluntary carbon standard. 
Figure 2.1. CDM projects by host country (UNFCCC, 2010a) 
The general approach to carbon credit trading in all markets is on a project by project basis 
and it is up to the seller to verify the stability and permanence of the emissions reduction 
(Galatowitsch, 2009), this is mainly achieved through attaining independent, third party, 
project certification. Certification occurs in the in the mandatory market via abiding by the 
principles and criteria within the CDM. While in the voluntary market certification is 
obtained by complying with the criteria outlined in the varying independent certification 
bodies. The carbon credits may then be sold to investors in two ways, 1) they may be sold 
directly in the OTC market; or 2) on to intermediate parties, such as brokers, aggregators or 
retailers which can then be sold on formalised markets, or the regulated markets (in terms of 
the CERs) such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
2.6. Mandatory Markets  
2.6.1. Kyoto Mechanisms 
The KP includes the CDM and JI as flexible mechanisms to offset GHG emissions from 
Annex 1 countries. All developed countries, with the exception of the United States of 
India  
23% 
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5% 
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8% 
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25% 
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America (USA), have ratified the KP (Olsen, 2007). The majority of developing countries 
have also ratified it as they hope to be able to host CDM projects and capture the associated 
benefits attached to the projects (Sutter and Pareno, 2007). The primary CDM market, or the 
direct purchase of CERs from on the ground projects market, was responsible for 404 Mt 
CO2e and the secondary CDM market accounted for 1055 Mt CO2e in 2010 (Linacre et al, 
2011). To achieve CDM certification and thus participate within the mandatory market 
stringent guidelines and processes relating to the full life cycle of the project have to be met 
(Galatowitsch, 2009). As a result it is often a barrier of entry for many smaller projects or 
ones that exist within developing countries. 
2.6.2. European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS is the largest multi-national emissions trading scheme in the world and is major 
pillar of the Europe’s climate change policy as it is linked to their Kyoto targets (Watanabe 
and Robinson, 2005). National emissions caps have been set by the EU member states which 
are in accordance with their Kyoto obligations. Each large CO2 emitter is allocated an 
assigned emissions amount and they must monitor and report their annual CO2 emissions. 
Their annual emissions are compared against their assigned amount and they must return an 
amount of emissions reduction certificates that are equivalent to their CO2 emissions that 
year. The EU ETS offers three mechanisms to trade and reassign credits: 1) in the private 
market between operators, 2) the OTC market and 3) trading on the spot market such as the 
European Climate Exchange. Currently the EU ETS does not include VERs and only 
recognises the use of regulated carbon credits from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) certified projects in the form of CERs (Watanabe 
and Robinson, 2005). All 27 European Union (EU) member states and three non EU 
countries (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) are regulated by the EU ETS. All the 
companies with significant emissions within these countries are capped. In Phase 1, more 
than 12,000 installations were regulated and this accounted for 40% of all EU GHG 
emissions. This has made the EU ETS the most active and largest market for carbon credits, 
and was responsible for offsetting 6, 326 Mt CO2e in 2009 (Hamilton et al., 2010). In 2010 
The EU ETS continued to grow, reaching US$119.8 billion worth of trades (Linacre et al., 
2011). 
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2.5.3. Compliance trading outside the Kyoto Protocol 
There are a number of binding cap and trade systems that follow similar models to the KP or 
EU ETS but are not specifically aligned to it. These take the form of regional cap and trade 
schemes that are aimed at reducing GHG emissions from specific sectors or industries, 
mainly the energy sector.  
The largest one of these is these is the Regional Green House Gas Initiative (RGGI) which is 
a multi-state regional cap and trade program for the power sector in the Northeast USA. The 
RGGI began in 2009 and was the first mandatory cap and trade system to regulate GHG 
emissions in the USA and is currently responsible for offsetting 71.5 Mt CO2e of GHGs 
(Hamilton et al., 2010). Other cap and trade programs that have developed include the New 
South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, the Alberta Specified Gas Emitters 
Regulation, and the Western Climate Initiative. As these markets are regional specific they 
are relatively small with RGGI being the largest of them all, followed by the New South 
Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme which accounts for offsetting 30.8 Mt CO2e 
(Hamilton et al., 2010) 
2.7. Voluntary Markets 
The AES deal was the initiator of the development of the voluntary carbon market. The 
voluntary market has grown as a result of private organisations participating in GHG 
mitigation and seeing carbon trading as much more than a business deal (Galatowitsch, 
2009). The voluntary carbon market however has only been formally recognised since 2005. 
Despite being relatively new these projects have come to be recognised for their marketing 
potential due to the social and environmental benefits that are often related to offsetting 
GHGs (Galatowitsch, 2009). Buyers of VERs are generally organisations, governments, 
individuals and other entities and this is done not just for regulatory compliance but is driven 
by corporate social responsibility initiatives and personal behaviour (Curran and Shackleton, 
2009). This has caused the demand for projects have proven SD to be in high demand. As the 
voluntary market has begun to grow it has split into two distinct paths: the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) and the over-the-counter (OTC) market (Hamilton et al., 2009).  
2.7.1. Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
The CCX was an offset market in North America that encourages participants to voluntarily 
sign up, but once affiliated they face legally binding emissions reduction targets (Sandor et 
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al., 2002). These members could then meet their targets by: 1) cutting their emissions 
internally; 2) trading emission allowances with other CCX members; or 3) purchasing offsets 
generated under the CCX offset program. This market was worth US$ 306.7 million or 69.2 
Mt CO2e in 2008 but due to the recession experienced a 73% decline in prices, and coupled 
with a reduced volume of offsets within the market this led to an 84% reduction in the overall 
value of the CCX (Hamilton et al., 2010).This has led to the closure of the formal CCX and 
has led to a gap in transaction volumes. It is predicated this could be as high as 30Mt 
CO2e/year and is partly responsible for the lower average price experienced in the voluntary 
market for 2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). 
2.7.2. Over–the–Counter market (OTC) 
The OTC market includes all transactions that occur on a project by project basis, between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller (Galatowitsch, 2009). The OTC market has become the 
largest voluntary market in terms of monetary value of US$ 396.7 million or 56% of the 
voluntary market in 2008 at an average of US$ 7.34 /t CO2e. In 2009 however the OTC 
market fell slightly to a value of US$ 326 million, while still maintaining a price premium per 
credit over the CCX of 81% (Hamilton et al., 2010). In 2010 there was a rebound to US$414 
million and the trading of 128 Mt CO2e (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011), making it the largest 
source of trading within the voluntary markets. 
The voluntary market does not abide by any legally binding caps, therefore any institution, 
business or individual can offset their GHG emissions. This has allowed a large variety of 
organisations and projects to sell VERs under their own systems and under a variety of 
conditions (Peskett et al., 2007). This has led to a number of criticisms of VERs due to their 
lack of transparency and uniformity. This has in turn caused uncertainty in the market; due to 
potential investors unsure that their investment will yield credits of a high standard 
(Galatowitsch, 2009). To prove legitimacy of projects a number of tools have been 
developed. These take the form of carbon standards that independently certify and verify that 
emissions reductions are real, reliable and permanent and thus provide the much needed 
additional information to potential investors surrounding the offsets that they purchase.  
2.8. The Voluntary Carbon Market and Voluntary Carbon Standards 
The rise of the voluntary market and the resulting voluntary certification systems has the 
overarching goal of opening up the carbon market to a wider range of participants and 
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reducing the transaction costs of complying with the strict CDM regulations (Hunt, 2008). 
Voluntary carbon standards are developed by independent organisations that compile their 
own criteria, indicators and measurements for emissions reduction practices. This however 
does not imply that a certified VER is in any way less effective than a CER.  
The lack of regulation within voluntary markets has led to the rapid growth of differing 
standards developed by different organisations. Third party verification is increasingly being 
seen as vital to the legitimacy of projects; this has led to over 90% of voluntary offset 
projects being certified to a third party standard (Hamilton et al., 2010). All these standards 
however use a different mechanism to demonstrate that offset projects are real, reliable and 
permanent. As a result there is a massive discrepancy between the qualities of offsets, both in 
terms of GHG offsets and sustainable development benefits (Merger and Williams, 2008). 
Sustainable development co - benefits are no longer being seen as vital to offset standards, as 
the focus has become one of supplying cheap credits. Standards are now being distinguished 
between minimum standard offsets versus ‘gourmet’ offsets, or those which follow strict 
standards of additionality and sustainable development co-benefits (Peskett et al., 2007; 
Galatowitsch, 2009).  This has led to credits with certified sustainable development benefits 
being seen as extraordinary and a premium, rather than all standards abiding by the principles 
around which the carbon market was originally envisioned and developed. 
The concept of additionality has become the most fundamental and disputed area of 
developing a reliable carbon offset standard from a GHG perspective (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
The concept of additionality asks the question: “would the project have occurred, holding all 
else constant, if the activity was not implemented as an offset project?” (Kollmuss et al., 
2008). If the answer is “yes” then the project is not additional. The argument is that investing 
in an offset project that would have happened anyway causes the emissions to have not been 
neutralised but the investor has merely subsidised an activity that would have happened 
anyway (Kollmuss et al., 2008). Additionality forms an integral part of reliability of a 
project’s offsetting credentials due to it forming part of ensuring the environmental integrity 
of projects. Additionality is however incredibly difficult to measure and determine in 
practice, this has led to the varied methods, and discrepancies between standards, in 
attempting to determine the additionality of projects’. 
Social and environmental impact procedures also vary widely among standards. Many have 
been criticised for their focus on purely offsetting GHGs while neglecting SD co-benefits, or 
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even for harming social or ecological systems (Peskett et al., 2007). Standards have been 
criticised for ignoring impacts to endangered species, water quality and soil loss 
(Galatowitsch, 2009), or social factors such as loss of access to land by rural communities 
and loss of income from displaced employment (Peskett et al., 2007). Differences within the 
voluntary market are further exacerbated by the motivations of project developers and 
implementers. There are those that focus purely on developing projects that represent GHG 
offsets that can be sold for a profit in the market and then those that aim at providing SD co-
benefits that strengthen livelihoods and restore ecosystem functioning.   
There are currently sixteen recognised independent standards covering the voluntary market 
(Hamilton et al., 2009). The standards differ in three main ways, 1) the primary objective of 
the standard, 2) the structure and assessment process and 3) scope, as standards can apply to 
all manner of emissions reduction practices. Furthermore some standards focus only on 
certain project types, from energy efficiency to renewable energy, methane/carbon capture 
and storage and Land-use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) projects (Kollmuss et 
al., 2008). The standards all differ in terms of structure and the inclusion of the three 
components of 1) GHG accounting standards; 2) monitoring, verification and certification 
standards; and 3) registration and enforcement standards. This allows standards to be 
separated into five categories: full-fledged carbon standards, project design standards, offset 
standard screen, offset accounting protocols and other standards types (Kollmuss et al., 
2008). The seventeen standards can be seen in Table 2.1. 
2.8.1. Fully fledged carbon standards 
These standards include all three components of a carbon offset standard. They include 
rigorous methods for accounting for GHG reductions. The standards detail the criteria, 
indicators and measurements that allow for a process of monitoring, validating, verifying and 
certifying of a project’s stated GHG reduction and, if included in the standard, their 
contribution to sustainable development. They also record and ensure the registration of all 
offsets associated with projects so as to avoid the double counting of offsets. Examples of 
such standards include the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and Gold Standard (GS). 
2.8.2. Project Design Standards 
These standards aim to guide project developers in the initial design stage of the project. 
These aim to set out what projects need to do in order to achieve certification surround a 
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particular aspect, mainly sustainable development. Often these relate to the processes and 
actions that need to be taken into account to ensure that the project meets sustainable 
development criteria. The example of this type of standard is the Climate, Community and 
Biodiversity Standard (CCBS). This often needs to be combined with a full-fledged carbon 
standard (e.g. VCS) to obtain certification and access to a registry (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
2.8.3. Offset Standard Screens 
The Voluntary Offset Standard (VOS) is currently the only offset standard screen. It works 
by accepting projects that were implemented under other standards’ procedures and 
guidelines. Currently the VOS accepts projects under the Gold Standard (GS) VER and 
projects that employ CDM methodology, but are implemented within countries that are not 
signatories to the KP (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
2.8.4. Offset Accounting Protocols 
These standards provide the procedure that purely accounts for GHG reductions from offset 
projects.  They have specific rules for reviewing, validating and registering offset projects but 
they do not define eligibility criteria. Often fully fledged standards are based on these 
protocols, such as the VCS which uses the ISO-14064 GHG methodologies. 
2.8.5. Other Standard Types  
This accounts for all the standards that do not fit into the above categories. These are often 
the smaller standards that are project specific. Examples include Plan Vivo and Brazils Mata 
Viva (BMV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Fully Fledged 
Carbon Standards 
Project Design 
Standards 
Offset Standard 
Screens 
Offset 
Accounting 
Protocols 
Other Standard 
Types 
Gold Standard 
(GS) 
Climate, 
Community and 
Biodiversity 
Standard (CCBS) 
Voluntary Offset 
Standard (VOS) 
ISO 14064 Plan Vivo  
Verified Carbon 
Standard (VCS) 
SocialCarbon 
(SC) 
Green-e 
WRI WBCSD / 
GHG Protocol 
Mata Viva 
(BMV) 
VER+     
Climate Action 
Reserve (CAR) 
    
American Carbon 
Registry (ACR) 
    
CarbonFix      
Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX) 
    
Panda Standard      
 
Of the sixteen existing standards/protocols, ten explicitly aim at incorporating co-benefits 
from projects into the certification process (Hamilton et al., 2009). These include four fully 
fledged standards (GS, ACR and CarbonFix and Panda Standard), the two project design 
standards (CCBS and SocialCarbon) as well as the Plan Vivo and BMV standards. This is in 
spite of purchasers of VERs indicating that their main reasons for purchasing carbon credits 
is for public relations/branding and corporate social responsibility programs (Kollmuss et al., 
Table 2.1. Voluntary Carbon Standards and their Classifications 
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2008). To achieve this purchasers’ seek projects that are certified providers of SD co-
benefits; this has made standards such as CCBS highly desirable in the market (Neef et al., 
2010).   
This rapid development of third party standards and the contrasting criteria of each has 
introduced complexity into the market for both potential project developers and investors 
(Peskett et al., 2007, Merger and Pistorius, 2011). The difference between the standards has 
sometimes called into question the quality and legitimacy of some offsets, and as yet there is 
no single prevailing set of industry best practices (Galatowitsch, 2009). This has damaged 
confidence within the voluntary market as investors and project developers are unsure of 
which standard will provide them with the most accepted and recognised certification 
procedure and thus either the highest price or guaranteed generation of offsets (Merger and 
Williams, 2008). 
The lack of universally accepted standards for project eligibility, accounting for offsets, 
verification and monitoring have led to calls for a reduction in the number of standards 
currently used (Peskett et al., 2007). It is hoped that market forces will cause this to happen as 
purchasers will naturally exhibit their preferences for certain standards. Peskett et al. (2007) 
urges caution in restricting the design and implementation of new standards as offsetting 
GHG emissions requires new innovative process and technologies that will require market 
adaptation and understanding. It is this that could lead to slower market growth and hence 
reduction of GHGs but in the future it will lead to projects with greater GHG reduction 
capabilities and increased sustainable development benefits. 
2.9. Landscape Restoration and the Voluntary Carbon Market 
The KP explicitly aims to facilitate the restoration of degraded forests as landscape level 
restoration has a high potential to achieve both poverty alleviation and biodiversity 
restoration (Lamb et al., 2005). However LULUCF projects have been lacking in CDM 
markets; prior to 2009 the CDM only had one registered Afforestation /Reforestation (A/R) 
project, whereas in 2009 nine new projects were registered (Neef et al., 2010). This can be 
seen as a discouraging failure of the CDM as it had only approved ten projects out of 2236 by 
2010. LULUCF projects have also been the perennial under-achievers in the voluntary 
markets, and they have seen a decline in popularity over the last few years from having a 
26% market share in 2006, 16% in 2007 and 11% in 2008 (Hamilton et al., 2010). This is 
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despite the fact that corporate buyers of VERs have a highly positive attitude towards forest 
carbon offsets (Neef et al., 2010). However, 2010 saw a dramatic rebound in the popularity of 
LULUCF based credits with the development of new methodologies and projects around 
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), accounting for 46% 
of transactions in the voluntary OTC market (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011).  
There is increasing evidence that land based sequestration and conservation initiatives have 
one of the greatest potential for CO2 mitigation then other projects such as methane gas 
capture or hydrofluorocarbon-23 (HFC) destruction (Righelato and Spracklen, 2007). 
Locking up carbon through bio-sequestration initiatives in the Earth’s terrestrial biosphere is 
as seen as one of the most immediate options available to offset GHG emissions (Malhi et al., 
2002).  
 
Figure 2.2. The potential of various land management activities to increase the carbon sink of 
forestry or agriculture practices (Malhi et al., 2002). 
Landscape restoration and afforestation practices have the potential to contribute to 28% of 
LULUCF’s contribution to GHG mitigation and this potential is beginning to be increasingly 
recognised (Figure 1.2) (Malhi et al., 2002, Galatowitsch, 2009). It is argued however that the 
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managed absorption of CO2  in forests must be used over the next few decades, but it has be 
done in combination with increased use of technology, efficient energy use and new forms of 
energy supply to achieve a true reduction in global GHG emissions. There have been 
conflicting arguments around the effectiveness of different projects with Lackner (2003) 
arguing that in the short term the most effective way of combating GHG emissions is through 
the use and development of existing technologies, while Lal (2002) argues that bio-
sequestration initiatives have a significant role to play in the development of the new carbon 
economy. This has been highlighted by Pearce (2001) and Sathaye and Andrasko (2007) who 
state that carbon sequestration is the most valuable ecological service provided by forests.     
There is increasing political will, motivation and commitment surrounding LULUCF projects 
and the acknowledgement of the need to halt deforestation. The political will and potential 
increase in land based offset projects is highlighted in the prominence they are playing in 
current policy documents and discussions, for example the Copenhagen Accord states:  
“We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest 
degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests 
and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the 
immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the 
mobilization of financial resources from developed countries”. (UNFCCC, 2010b) 
They still however face a number of challenges to certification and the historical reasons for 
failure of LULUCF are both varied, but similar within both markets and serve as significant 
barriers to investment, they are: 1) high transaction costs and lag times surrounding the 
generation of credits (Marais et al., 2007; Galatowitsch, 2009); 2) complex baseline and 
monitoring methodologies and accounting uncertainty (Peskett et al., 2007); 3) bureaucratic 
and complex stakeholder interactions (Marais et al., 2007, Neef at al., 2010) and 4) the risk of 
investing in developing countries (Neef et al., 2010). 
2.10. Afforestation/ Reforestation, Landscape Restoration and Voluntary Carbon Standards 
The drive to increase investment in carbon forestry activities and the increasing uncertainty 
surrounding legitimacy of projects has called into question both the CDM certification and 
the voluntary certifications processes. Universally accepted standards for project 
methodologies, additionality, carbon accounting, verification and monitoring do not exist 
(Galatowitsch, 2009). The CDM sets out its own procedures that were developed during 
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Kyoto negotiations. These relate to the entire life cycle of the project and include key 
documents that have to be completed, such as a Project Design Document (PDD) that 
requires social and environmental impacts of the project to be assessed (Peskett et al., 2007). 
The certification procedures within the voluntary market are more variable due to the lack of 
a single regulatory body. As mentioned earlier, the standards vary between trading 
mechanisms as well as their own procedures for assuring the quality of offsets provided, both 
in terms of their potential to mitigate GHG emissions and their sustainable development 
criteria (Pesket et al., 2007).   
The Forest Carbon Offsetting Report 2010 by Neef et al. (2010) highlights the importance of 
carbon standards to investors, with 89% of market participants indicating that carbon 
standards play an important factor when purchasing forest carbon offsets (Neef et al., 2010). 
This is corroborated by Peskett et al. (2007) who state that clear standards for carbon 
offsetting can increase confidence in carbon markets and assist buyers in making purchasing 
decisions while helping to guarantee development benefits. 
Organisations developing standards have recognised this and as such twelve of the offset 
standards make LULUCF projects eligible for certification, these are the CCBS, VCS, CAR, 
ACR, CarbonFix, Plan Vivo, Social Carbon, VER+, CCX, Panda Standard, Mata Viva and 
VOS. There are a number of these that have been designed to focus specifically on A/R 
projects, the four most widely used are CarbonFix, Plan Vivo, CCBS and VCS Agriculture, 
Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) standards (Merger and Williams, 2008). However these 
standards have been severely lacking in the number of projects certified, credits registered 
and traded. CCBS has validated the highest number of projects with 21, and has 26 projects 
currently undergoing validation (www.climate-standards.org) making the CCBS the most 
popular project design standard, but as CCBS is only a project design standards there is no 
registration process. In contrast fully fledged carbon standards have been woefully behind in 
developing, registering and generating carbon credits from A/R activities. The largest fully 
fledged standard for A/R activities is currently Plan Vivo with ten projects at various stages 
of registration, with only four registered projects currently generating tradable carbon credits 
(www.planvivo.org). CarbonFix currently only has six projects certified or undergoing 
certification, with only one registered. VCS AFOLU has been a dramatically late starter and 
the first AFOLU project methodology was only accepted by the VCS board in May 2010, and 
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as VCS is the most popular standard for voluntary carbon offsets this has severely hampered 
the growth of the market. 
The potential of landscape restoration projects to sequester carbon has been widely reported 
and discussed (see section 2.9). Corbera et al. (2009) conducted a study into PES systems 
within Mexico which are specifically focused on payments for carbon, biodiversity and agro-
forestry and it was found that rural people benefited financially, forests had been restored and 
institutional capital has increased. In contrast restoration on private land in developed 
countries has been found to not be viable with the sole funding source being the carbon 
market (Hunt, 2008). The reason for this could be that investors prefer projects located within 
developing countries to achieve compliance with KP regulations (CDM) or pre-compliance 
with future climate legislation. Project location has emerged as a key factor in determining 
the purchasing of A/R carbon offsets, developing regions of the world such as South America 
and Africa have emerged as highly desirable locations for investment in forestry carbon 
projects (Neef et al., 2010).  
The lack of involvement of developing countries within voluntary markets, specifically with 
regards to A/R and landscape restoration project development, is a result of the significant 
barriers to entry for small scale community projects (Galatowitsch, 2009). These are 
specifically related to the costs involved in obtaining certification for carbon offsetting 
projects and the risks associated with investing in developing countries. The average costs of 
obtaining CDM certification is estimated to be between US$ 40,000 to US$ 300,000 in 2006 
(UNDP, 2006) and in current South African Rand prices (US$1: R8) that would be between 
R320, 000 to R2, 4 million, not accounting for inflation. Small scale projects usually incur 
costs of between US$ 40,000 to US$ 90,000 within the CDM process (UNDP, 2006). One of 
the most popular voluntary standards, CCBS, adds up to R32,000 - R64,000 (US$ 4,000 – 
US$ 8,000) on top of CDM costs (Peskett et al., 2007). Lopes (2009) found that the costs 
vary little between standards and the determining cost factor in most projects is the scale of 
the project. Combine these with the significant investments required to develop the project 
adds large financial barriers for a project.  
Balderas Torres et al. (2009) examined the factors that affect total sequestration costs at the 
Scolel Te carbon forestation project, Mexico and attempted to cost the actual price involved 
in implementing sequestration projects. Reported A/R implementation costs typically range 
from US$ 1 to US$ 8 per ton of C (which is equivalent to 3.67 t CO2e) (Balderas Torres et 
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al., 2009). Richards and Stokes (2004) highlighted that these values are difficult to compare 
due to inconsistencies in methodologies and assumptions. Balderas Torres et al. (2009) state 
that the voluntary markets have the ability to incorporate rural areas in the carbon market 
much more effectively as a result of their lower transaction costs. They also prefer ex-ante 
carbon accounting methods in the voluntary markets, where all of the carbon offsets are 
awarded at the initiation of the project based on anticipated future carbon sequestration and 
storage (Galatowitsch, 2009). Ex-ante credits are preferred as they allow for upfront funding 
to be generated and provide essential capital to project developers/ communities to ensure the 
development and success of the project (Galatowitsch, 2009).  
REDD projects have been suggested as a potential alternative mechanism that can be used to 
halt the degradation of landscapes (Laurance, 2008). This is as a result of REDD requiring a 
change of mind sets and behaviour to halt landscape degradation. This has been put forward 
as a lot more cost effective than landscape scale restoration which requires large amounts of 
capital investment and labour (Olander et al., 2008). REDD projects also offer the 
opportunity for incorporating co-benefits into the process, thus making them appealing to 
investors, these have been dubbed REDD-plus projects. REDD activities are currently not 
recognised under CDM activities; however there is extensive lobbying and debate on their 
incorporation into a new global climate deal (Neef et al., 2010). This has led to the voluntary 
markets emergence as the area for the development of REDD/plus projects and trading. This 
is evident in the fact that the major role players in voluntary certification are releasing REDD 
project guidelines, such as CCBS (www.climate-standards.org), and the proposed VCS 
REDD guidelines (www.v-c-s.org). REDD is often seen as being in competition with other 
offset activities, but this does not need to be, it should be seen as another effective initiative 
that can be used in conjunction with other biophysical and technological angles that can be 
used to reduce and minimise the levels of GHG in the atmosphere. 
Many of the current voluntary standards have pioneered the development of forestry based 
(both A/R and REDD+) projects due to the lack of acceptance and continued bureaucracy 
within the CDM and large compliance markets such as the EU ETS. They have been 
instrumental in developing new approaches to counter the oft seen stumbling blocks to 
forestry certification such as additionality testing, permanence mechanisms and co-benefit 
assessment methodologies. It has to be argued that for a LULUCF based project to be truly 
sustainable they should aspire to be as environmentally and socially ethical as possible. It’s 
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within this distinction that this thesis sees the question between A/R versus landscape 
restoration.  
Within this thesis it is acknowledged that A/R projects comprise the wide spread planting of 
trees on land that was once was, or has never been forest. It is these commercial forestry 
plantations and the evidence of various project failures (Bond et al., 2007) that has served to 
distort the true goals of land based bio-sequestration projects. It is for this reason that it is 
proposed within this thesis that the development of a proposed South African voluntary 
carbon standard serves to move away from A/R project definition. It will rather focus on 
developing a standard that aims to guide and certify landscape restoration projects within 
South Africa. This moves LULUCF carbon offsets and certification standards away from the 
industrial, commercial notion of monoculture plantations to the development of projects that 
contribute directly to sustainable development through restoring the functioning of 
ecosystems in an environmentally and socially ethical way. 
2.11. South Africa and the Carbon Market  
Africa, as a continent, only makes up 2% of the world carbon market for both regulated and 
voluntary markets (Filou, 2009). The opportunities associated with participating within the 
carbon market have not yet been capitalised on by African carbon project developers. As 
discussed earlier, the lack of implementing experience and the highly bureaucratic, costly 
system of the CDM process has served as a barrier to participation and thus Africa relies on 
the voluntary carbon market for access to carbon funding (Jindal et al., 2008). This is evident 
in that 46% of the current carbon projects in Africa are forestry based, and thus far forestry 
projects have been mostly excluded from regulated markets (Filou, 2009). However there has 
been an unequal distribution of voluntary carbon bio-sequestration initiatives as the majority 
of projects are based in Latin America or Asia (Jindal et al., 2008).)There are also fewer 
forestry based carbon projects in Africa than in any other developing regions of the world 
(Jindal et al., 2008).  
South Africa is the leading carbon offsetting projects developer on the continent, accounting 
for 49% of registered African CDM projects. This however is an insignificant amount as 
South Africa’s participation in the world carbon markets accounts for only 1%. This is 
evident in the protracted process of obtaining CDM certification for projects. There have 
been 136 projects submitted to South Africa’s DNA and only 17 have so far been registered 
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by the CDM executive board but only 4 of these have been granted CERs for trade 
(Department of Minerals and Energy, 2010). These projects range from energy efficiency 
projects, e.g. the Kuyasa Low-Cost Urban Housing Energy Project, to nitrous oxide 
abatement schemes, e.g. the Sasol Nitrous Oxide Abatement Project, but to date not one 
LULUCF project has been submitted to the DNA (Department of Energy, 2011). Ethiopia has 
become the first country within Africa to register a large-scale forestry project with the CDM 
and this is encouraging as LULUCF activities are pivotal to increasing Africa’s share in the 
carbon market (Jindal et al., 2008). This is also encouraging as mentioned earlier that  
forestry credits tend to be highly desirable on the market due to their potential for the 
inclusion of sustainable development benefits and this coupled with Africa’s desirable 
location for carbon investors forces the average price up to between US$5 – US$10 per 
tCO2e (Neef et al., 2010).    
The World Bank has become a major funder of African forestry projects through its 
BioCarbon fund, which is a $91m facility dedicated to carbon sequestration initiatives 
through forests and agro-ecosystems (World Bank, 2010). Engelbrecht et al. (2004) estimate 
that South Africa has the realistic potential to bio sequestrate 3 778 gigatonnes of CO2 over a 
30 year period but South Africa has so far failed to capitalise on this. The potential exists 
within South Africa for land based projects and coupled with the desirability of LULUCF 
projects to investors, high prices and the substantial sustainable development benefits, 
restoration initiatives should be at the forefront of South African carbon offsetting projects.   
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3.1. Introduction 
3.1.1. Purpose of Chapter 
This chapter aims to gain a better understanding of the current voluntary carbon standards 
within the market. In particular there is an emphasis on the analysis of what constitutes a 
voluntary carbon standard. This is then used to conduct an analysis on selected standards for 
current market best practice and the lessons to be learnt. This is useful as the development of 
a proposed voluntary carbon standard for South Africa has the advantage of being able to 
learn from the existing market best practices. These can then be tailored to the local South 
African context to achieve the development of standard that ensures offsets are real, reliable 
and permanent.  
3.1.2. Introduction 
Ecosystem Marketplace, a leading carbon market watchdog states that “carbon standards are 
the cornerstone of any carbon market, because they define all the actions and outputs that 
constitute a bona fide emission reduction” (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2010). Chapter 2 
(section 2.8) highlighted the complexity that has arisen as a result of the 16 competing 
voluntary standards developing differing criteria, indicators and measurements for 
determining carbon emissions reductions from projects. Even though each standard follows a 
similar basic structure, no two standards are alike (Table 3.1).  
The analysis of current market players and standards in the development of a new voluntary 
carbon standard is vital. Crucial to this process is benchmarking, which Camp (1989) defines 
as the search for industry best practice that leads to superior performance. This is vital as it 
allows for in-depth analysis of the current industry and market competitors and enable for 
increased understanding surround their business practices and that the new ideas and 
processes developed match or exceed those of the competitors. This technique has been 
widely used and promoted within organisational learning literature, but Laise (2004) describe 
it as a process that has been used to promote imitation rather than innovation. Massa and 
Testa (2004) argue that it can be more than just a tool to promote imitation of best practices, 
but rather one that can be used to identify and promote continuous improvement and 
innovation through acquiring, creating and transferring knowledge that leads to modified 
behaviour and the generation of new knowledge. The benchmarking process is intended as a 
learning process that involves observation of external practices and performance, comparison 
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with current practices, identification of knowledge gaps and then bridging these gaps through 
either innovation or investment in knowledge generation (Massa and Testa, 2004). This 
process of observation and imitation is an important cognitive step that adds value to the final 
process. The integration of both the observed external actions with internal knowledge results 
in innovation, rather than just the imitation of existing practices (Massa and Testa, 2004). 
There is a need to logically and systematically collect, analyse, modify and create knowledge 
(Hyland and Beckett, 2002) surrounding carbon market certification best practices. Kollmuss 
et al. (2008), Merger and Williams (2008), and Lopes (2009) have all analysed and compared 
a variety of voluntary carbon standards for different purposes and in a variety of ways. In 
2008 the WWF (Kollmuss et al., 2008) conducted a general evaluation of eight voluntary 
standards to allow for a greater understanding of this new and developing market. Merger and 
Williams (2008) followed on from this and evaluated four standards particularly aimed at 
A/R projects, specifically to inform buyers of voluntary standards. Lopes (2009) followed 
this up with an evaluation of seven voluntary standards with the aim to develop a tool to 
evaluate voluntary carbon standards and inform the purchase of carbon credits. However, the 
rapid development of voluntary carbon standards has seen the release of new standards, as 
well as the review and updating of existing standards. This calls for a new comprehensive 
evaluation of carbon standards in 2011 and the development of a technique that can be used 
for future comprehensive, rapid evaluation and benchmarking. 
To successfully develop a new and competitive voluntary standard for South Africa, it needs 
to incorporate the overarching market best practices. This needs to be done for the standard to 
become a recognised and accepted for the quality of its offsets. This is not to say that this 
study must and will emulate existing practices, rather it be based on the knowledge gained 
from this benchmarking process, and modified and tailored to South African conditions. This 
will the allow for the concentration and the pursuit of maintaining offset and project integrity, 
while striving for increased efficiency and the reduction of costs while using benchmarking 
the standard against current market participants and practices. 
3.2 Methods and Process 
3.2.1. Selecting Evaluation Criteria 
As discussed, voluntary carbon standards often have differing aims and focuses, especially 
with regards to the project types accepted for certification. These project types often require 
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different certification criteria due to the inherent differences between them e.g. landscape 
restoration and renewable energy.  
To assess voluntary carbon standards against the criteria that compose the certification of an 
A/R or landscape restoration project an extensive and detailed set of criteria is needed. A 
broad list of criteria was identified from Kollmuss et al. (2008), Merger and Williams (2008), 
Lopes (2009) and Walter and Kahlert (2010). These were then evaluated for applicability and 
feasibility and a final list was generated. The final criteria that were used for evaluation were 
divided into two sections of essential and variable criteria (Table 3.1). The ‘Essential 
Criteria’ are those criteria that ensure an offset is real, reliable and permanent and can be 
evaluated, re-designed and altered to achieve this. The ‘Variable Criteria’ relate to the criteria 
that will not affect the overall evaluation, as they can either not be directly determined (e.g. 
Price of offset) or have a little effect on the final evaluation of standard (e.g. Project 
Location). The final list can be in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1. The Components of a Voluntary Carbon Standard  
Essential Criteria Variable Criteria 
Baseline (BAU) Type of Credits 
Additionality Project Location 
Leakage Project Types (Eligibility) 
Permanence Cost of Certification 
Co–Benefits Price of Offsets 
Transparency  
Registry  
Public Participation  
Third Party Auditing  
Field Verification Frequency  
These criteria were then defined and interrogated to obtain a greater understanding 
surrounding the current debates and issues on voluntary standard criteria and development. 
To obtain a greater understanding of each individual standard: the histories, type of standard, 
essential and variable criteria were all investigated, analysed and detailed (Table 3.4). 
3.2.2. Selecting Standards for Review 
Standards were selected based on the availability of guideline documents and their 
applicability to the identification of best practices. Of the 16 standards initially identified the 
‘Offset Standard Screens’ were excluded from the review process as they offer a certification 
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process of existing voluntary standards and ‘Offset Accounting Protocols’ were excluded as 
they only include techniques for carbon accounting. The Brazil Mata Viva and CARBCO 
Platinum Standards were excluded due to the lack of any project documents and guidelines, 
thus making review impossible. Table 3.2 shows the 11 standards selected for review. 
Table 3.2. Voluntary Carbon Standards Selected for Review  
 
The latest version of each identified standards LULUCF / AFOLU guidelines were collected, 
where possible, and analysed. This was done for two reasons, firstly as the initial 
development of the proposed South African voluntary standard will focus on landscape 
restoration projects and it is vital to incorporate these best practices into the design process. 
Secondly, landscape restoration projects are the most complex and stringent projects for 
certification and incorporate all the elements that are needed to ensure that the credits are 
real, reliable and permanent, thus many of the components and techniques developed for a 
LULUCF projects are applicable to other project types. If a standard did not accept LULUCF 
Fully Fledged 
 Carbon Standards 
Project Design  
Standards 
Other Standard Types 
Gold Standard (GS) CCBS Plan Vivo  
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) SocialCarbon (SC)  
VER+   
Climate Action Reserve (CAR)   
American Carbon Registry (ACR)   
CarbonFix (CF)   
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)   
Panda Standard (PS)   
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projects or have guidelines, such as the GS, it was evaluated on its merits according to what 
was detailed in the actual project guideline documents. 
3.2.3. Developing a Score and Ranking the Standards 
To evaluate each standard only the essential criteria (Table 3.1) were chosen. This was done 
as they provide the appropriate detail vital for a carbon standard and allowed them to be 
quantified. The quantification of the essential criteria allowed for the development of a score 
for each essential criterion and this in turn facilitated the effective comparison between the 
individual criterion of each standard and the standards as a whole. The defining elements of 
each criterion were identified from Walter and Kahlert (2010) and Kollmuss et al. (2008) and 
used to guide the development of criterion specific questions and indicators (Table 3.4). A 
scale between 0 – 2 was developed for each question/indicator. A score of 0 showed that that 
particular element was not included in the standard, a score of 1 highlighted that the criteria 
was partly included, while a score of 2 showed it was completely incorporated into the 
standard according to the criteria. The scores were added up for each criterion so as to 
calculate the overall score for that specific criterion. A total overall score for each standard 
was achieved by adding up the scores for each criterion. The maximum possible score for 
each standard was 66. To make the evaluation more accessible and understandable; each 
criterion was converted to a value out of 5, thus allowing for each standard to obtain a score 
out of 50. No weighting was applied to the criteria for two reasons, firstly, not every standard 
incorporated each criterion and thus a weighting would have distorted the overall scores. 
Secondly, for consistent evaluation each criterion was assigned the same weight as it allowed 
for comparison between standards. 
3.2.4. Best Practice Identification 
The voluntary carbon market abides by the Sharif (2002) statement and is further reiterated 
by Galatowitsch (2009), that within the voluntary carbon market, as yet, there is no single 
dominant ‘best in class’ practice. Simply calculating the average score does not provide the 
requirements to identify an industry ‘best’ practice (Laise, 2004). This process does not allow 
for the verification of a ‘dominance’ relation of certain characteristics, as organisations will 
generally show better performance on some indicators and weaker performance on other. 
This is reiterated by Sharif (2002) which outlines that there is no single system which is best 
in class across all areas. This lack of a ‘dominance’ relation is traditionally overcome by 
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calculating the average scores and creating a synthetic indicator (Drew, 1997; Sharif, 2002). 
In turn the best practice is identified according to the organisation with the maximum 
averaged value (Laise, 2004). This averaging of scores has been highlighted as a main 
disadvantage to the traditional approach of identifying best practices. 
In this study the total scores were calculated to obtain an overall average score that allowed 
for a face value, initial comparison between standards; but these did not dictate the 
identification of ‘best practices’. To overcome this, a comparison between the individual 
criteria of each standard was conducted. If a standard obtained a high score in any one 
criterion, but lower in others, the key characteristics of that criterion were investigated. These 
were then documented and used to assess the positives and negatives of each of the standards 
evaluated. This is particularly relevant in relation to the GS evaluation. Due to the GS only 
certifying renewable energy projects it does not focus on, or include, some of the key 
criterion that are required for landscape restoration projects. This caused it to score lower on 
the overall average scores. This however is not an accurate reflection of its contents, thus an 
evaluation of its individual criteria, as described above, was conducted to obtain an accurate 
reflection of its contribution to identifying best practices. This allowed for both a quantitative 
and qualitative approach to determining the current market best practices and was an attempt 
to avoid the pitfalls highlighted by Laise (2004) through using the average score approach to 
dictate best practice identification.  
3.3. Voluntary Carbon Standard Criteria - Discussion 
3.3.1. Essential Criteria 
3.3.1a. Baseline (BAU) 
Calculating a baseline for a project is a vital component in calculating a projects GHG 
offsetting potential (Kollmuss et al., 2008). A baseline attempts to represent the proposed 
BAU scenario of the activity if the offset project was not implemented. This allows for the 
number of credits generated from the project to be determined. The difference between the 
BAU scenario and the emissions reductions resulting from the project equals the amount of 
carbon credits generated for the project (Kollmuss et al., 2008).Some standards prescribe a 
top-down approach to determine the baseline while others use a pure bottom-up approach. 
Bottom-up baselines methodologies require that the project developers propose, and gain 
approval, for project appropriate methodologies. 
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Baselines can be established using project-based or performance-based approaches. The 
approach used to determine the BAU scenario must be based on verifiable information and be 
explicit enough to allow for a conservative estimation of the corresponding GHG emissions 
reductions, so as not to overestimate the achieved emissions reductions. All the standards 
have differing approaches to calculating the BAU scenario. They differ in terms of the 
frequency of baseline determination; that is baselines can either be static or dynamic. A static 
baseline does not change and is calculated at the start of the project, while the dynamic 
baseline is updated periodically based on project observations and the emissions reductions 
are calculated accordingly (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
Gustavvson et al. (2000) outlines four basic principles of baseline construction. They state 
that all baselines should aim to be accurate, comprehensive, conservative and practical. There 
have been many criticisms of both approaches to setting baselines. Project-specific baselines 
have been criticised for their lack of consistency and their choice of subjective baseline 
calculation parameters (Murray and Sommer, 2004), when replicated over projects in a 
stratified area within a given region (Sathaye and Andrasko, 2007). The high transaction 
costs due to each project having to be evaluated individually have also been highlighted as a 
barrier to the use of project specific methodologies. Performance-based standards have been 
criticised for their generalisation and simplification of the local context. In most cases 
averages and extrapolations are made to obtain regional specific characteristics and as such 
the baselines. This process has called in to question the environmental integrity of developing 
regionally specific baseline criteria (Kollmuss et al., 2008). However regional specific 
baselines have been lauded for their cost effectiveness and reduction of the selection of 
contentious baseline criteria based and asymmetric information. Sudha et al. (2007) found 
that developing a performance specific baseline for the Kolar Distirct, India cost a quarter of 
developing project specific baselines for each project.  
Moura Costa et al. (2000) highlighted that baselines are inherently based on assumptions and 
to be as accurate as possible a detailed overview of local conditions has to be incorporated 
into this baseline determination process. Understanding the historical practices of the project 
area, the socio-economic situation and economic trends allow for the estimation of a more 
accurate and comprehensive baseline estimation. Moura Costa et al. (2000) recommend that, 
in the case of a lack of regulation concerning baseline estimation, the most conservative, 
accurate and comprehensive approach is developed through project specific baselines. 
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Murray and Sommer (2004) conclude that both approaches to baseline setting are valid, 
however it depends on the project’s perspective to selecting the appropriate baseline 
approach. Currently there is not enough reliable data to model highly accurate and 
comprehensive performance based methodologies for all potential project sites, therefore 
detailed project based approaches are currently the only viable baseline setting methodology 
for project developers (Murray and Sommer, 2004). A performance-based approach is more 
attractive from a regulatory and public policy perspective, however the responsibility and 
costs of developing these lies with the appropriate regional regulatory authority. A formalised 
approach to establishing baseline methodologies is needed and with the lack of appropriate 
market oversight and regulation, the project-based methodology will continue to be widely 
used and trusted.  
In evaluating each standard baselines determination approach, the principles outlined by 
Gustavvson et al. (2000) will be used. This will allow for an unbiased evaluation of each 
standard regardless if they prescribe a project-specific or performance-based baseline 
approach.   
3.3.1b. Additionality 
Additionality requirements aim to ensure that the emissions sequestered or reduced within a 
project boundary are additional to what would have occurred anyway (Murray et al., 2007). 
Vital to proving additionality is proving that the projects main aim is to reduce emissions that 
would not have occurred under the BAU scenario (Houdashelt et al., 2006). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, proving additionality is an essential component to any baseline-credit scheme. 
This issue has become one of the most fundamental, and contentious, issues in the carbon 
market as it is incredibly difficult to determine in practice. There have been many approaches 
to determining additionality to a) increase the accuracy of additionality calculations, and b) 
reduce the administrative cost for project developers. Additionality tests have taken two 
distinct paths, one being individual project based tests and the other performance-based 
standards. 
Project-Based Tests 
Project-based additionality tests evaluate each project on a case-by-case basis (Kollmuss et 
al., 2008). There are currently four common tests for additionality that aim to provide a 
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comprehensive overview, they are: Legal and Regulatory Test, Investment Test, Barriers 
Test, Common Practice Test (Kollmuss et al., 2008). 
 Legal and Regulatory Test 
If a project is undertaken to comply with official policies, government regulations or industry 
standards the project cannot be considered additional. The project can only be considered 
additional if it goes above and beyond mere compliance. 
 Investment Test 
The investment test aims to prove that the financial reward from generating offset credits is a 
decisive reason for implementing a project. This test assumes that a project is additional if it 
would have a lower than acceptable rate of return on the investment without the revenue from 
the sale of offset credits. 
 Barriers Test 
This test looks at identifying potentially significant non-financial barriers to implementation 
of the project such as local resistance, lack of experience or capacity or lack of technology etc 
that the BAU scenario would not have to face. It has to be proved that these barriers will be 
overcome by the project in order to be considered additional. 
 Common Practice Test 
The project must not use technology or practices that are commonly used. The argument is 
that the use of common technology might not be additional as carbon offsets did not play a 
decisive role in making the project financially viable. 
Performance Standards 
Performance standards aim to address some of the weaknesses of project based additionality 
tests. They establish a threshold for technologies or processes and the project is compared to 
these (Kollmuss et al., 2008). If the project exceeds the threshold then it is considered 
automatically additional. This allows for a simpler procedure to be followed and lower 
transaction costs for the project developer. There are two common performance standard 
approaches: the benchmark approach and the positive technology lists. 
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 Benchmark Approach. 
This test establishes a generic baseline scenario against which all projects of a given type are 
compared. Using this technique for additionality measurements presumes that technologies 
with emissions lower than a given emissions rate would not be deployed without the 
incentive from carbon offsets. In the case of an A/R or landscape restoration project, this 
would be the baseline scenario across a geographic region in terms of both land degradation 
and bio-sequestration potential. This would then be extrapolated to all the projects within the 
specific defined area for which the baseline has been developed. 
 Positive Technology Lists 
These lists define which technologies are automatically considered additional if installed in a 
certain geographic region. A baseline methodology is still required to determine the number 
of offset credits generated from the project. This allows for rapid additionality accreditation. 
This methodology is not applicable for an A/R project. 
3.3.1c. Leakage 
Leakage is the unintended GHGs emissions increase outside or, the displacement of activities 
by the project that increase or decrease emissions, outside of the projects boundaries 
(Kollmuss et al., 2008). Defining the offset project boundaries is a crucial process in the 
determination of leakage; these include physical, legal and organisational boundaries (Murray 
et al., 2004). Determining leakage is a vital process in accurately quantifying the projects 
emission reductions, all emissions decreases and increases that result from the project need to 
be taken into account. In many cases it is incredibly difficult to account for every possible 
source of leakage and GHG emissions caused by each project. Under some standards leakage 
is explicitly accounted for, while under some standards they exclude certain types of leakage. 
3.3.1d. Permanence   
The issue of permanence is highly contentious and applies uniquely to LULUCF and 
landscape restoration projects (Marechal and Hecq, 2006). Permanence refers to the length of 
time that carbon will be stored within the landscape after being sequestered (Kollmuss et al., 
2008). The issues revolve around the ease of reversibility of land based projects, either 
through anthropogenic or natural causes, which could cause the re-emission of the stored 
carbon into the atmosphere. Risks to the long term permanence of LULUCF based projects 
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can be varied and range from land tenure and financial issues to fires, pests and storms 
(Merger and Williams, 2008). LULUCF projects that are sustainably managed and have clear 
land tenure relationships can reduce the risks associated with permanence and allow for the 
projects to be considered long-term sinks. Some standards require the extensive risk analysis 
processes to be conducted during the project design phase and all risks to be mitigated. 
Others aim to ensure the permanence of the projects against natural risks by placing a 
proportion of the credits in a buffer fund that can be used to replace credit shortfalls (Thomas 
et al., 2010). 
3.3.1e. Co–benefits  
Co–benefits relate to the added sustainable development benefits that an offset project offers. 
Sustainable development criteria within offsets standards ensure that projects have social and 
environmental benefits (Merger and Williams, 2008). Well-managed and sustainable projects 
are closely associated with these co-benefits and they can offer increased employment, 
biodiversity and watershed conservation and the provision of recreational services. 
Landscape restoration projects have the potential to be one of the project types with a 
comparatively high provision of sustainable development benefits, and as such they should be 
aimed to be ensured in all LULUCF projects. 
The appearance of sustainability criteria within offset standards has allowed for the 
distinction between ‘gourmet offset standards’ and ‘minimum offset standards’ (see Chapter 
2, Section 2.8). The difference between the two standards is useful as the incorporation of 
sustainable development goals are no longer seen as vital requirement of a carbon offset 
(Kollmuss et al., 2008). Projects often choose to pursue certification under a ‘minimum offset 
standard’ in spite of projects that are certified to a ‘gourmet’ standard often receiving a higher 
price per offset in the voluntary market (Galatowitsch, 2009).  
3.3.1f. Transparency 
There are two major components of transparency in carbon offsets standards; these are the 
ability to communicate where the carbon has been stored and the prevention of double selling 
(Merger and Williams, 2008). Communication is the key to facilitating transparent projects, 
interactions and information transfer. As project investors make their decisions on a variety 
of project parameters it is vital that an easy to understand and comprehensive outline of the 
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project is publicly available and accessible. This will allow for project to become attractive to 
investors as they can judge a project for themselves.  
The second aspect to transparency is the prevention of double selling. This relates to the need 
to avoid one offset credit being sold to two or more parties, thus effectively negating the 
offsetting effect. This would be possible when one project is certified by two different 
standards or offsets are not accounted for (Merger and Williams, 2008). This has been 
counteracted by the creation of carbon registries and the allocation of unique serial numbers 
to all credits produced by projects.  
3.3.1g. Registry 
Registries are vital in minimising the risk of double counting of offsets and allow for the 
clarification of the ownerships of assets as they track and store all the records of issuance, 
selling and retirement. There is no single registry for the voluntary market and they have been 
developed by governments, non-profit organisations (NPOs) and the private sector (Kollmuss 
et al., 2008). However they all function similarly in that they provide publicly available 
information. Broekhoff (2007) states that the main role of a registry is to: 
 uniquely identify projects,  
 serial numbers for each offset generated by each project, 
 a system to track ownership of offsets,  
 able to retire or check on the status of an offset,  
 legal standards that identify the original owner of the emissions reduction project, 
 contractual or legal standards that identify the liability of the risk in case of project 
failure. 
Registries allow for the simplification of the carbon offset delivery process. This allows the 
buyers to be assured of both quality of the offset and their ownership of the offset. Registries 
also allow for the retirement of offsets if they are used to directly offset the purchaser’s 
emissions. 
3.3.1h. Public Participation 
Public participation allows for stakeholders that are affected in some way to be consulted. 
Stakeholders are individuals, groups or organisations that are affected by the project 
(Kollmuss et al., 2008). Stakeholder consultation also aims to ensure transparency of the 
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project through making information public and available for comments. These are important 
tools that can be used to obtain information that will mitigate the possible negative impacts of 
the offset projects. Offset standards require different levels of stakeholder participation and 
differ in terms of the scope of stakeholder consultation. This is particularly relevant in 
relation to the incorporation of co-benefits within LULUCF projects, as they are key 
component of precautionary decisions making. It is a vital step to ensure the transparency and 
credibility of a project. 
3.3.1i. Third Party Auditing 
An independent third party auditor is required to ensure rigorous monitoring, verification and 
validation of projects and their stated carbon offsets. The third party auditor is responsible for 
oversight throughout various phases of the project. The validation process is initiated during 
the project design phase; it confirms the sound planning of a project developer and the 
compliance with the chosen offset standards rules and regulations. The verification phase is 
ex-post and is a confirmation that the project is performing to its projected outcomes, the 
amount of emissions reductions are also confirmed in this phase. 
3.3.1j. Verification Frequency 
This involves the frequency of field visits undertaken to verify that the project is adhering to 
the standard. The process differs between standards but its aim is to ensure the integrity of 
standards and projects. Typical A/R projects have a lag time between project start and the 
generation of credits with standards varying the first initial verification from 2 – 5 years after 
the project start date. 
3.3.2. Variable Criteria 
3.3.2a. Type of Credits 
One of the most important contract parameters is the actual mechanism used to deliver the 
offsets to the project investor. These can take a variety of different forms and each form 
entails its own set of risks (Kollmuss et al., 2008). Offsets can be purchased in three different 
ways; these are: 1) guaranteed emissions reductions, 2) guaranteed future emission reductions 
or 3) intended emissions reductions. These are classified into two categories, guaranteed 
emissions offsets and ex-ante offsets. 
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 Guaranteed emissions offsets 
Guaranteed emission reductions have either already occurred (ex–post) or will occur in the 
future. Ex–post offsets are the sales of offsets that have already been generated 
(Galatowitsch, 2009). The project developer assumes all the costs of the project; these 
include project implementation, operational expenses and the costs for certification. The 
project developer also assumes all the risks during this phase. However after successful 
project implementation having the carbon offsets in stock allows for the risk-free delivery of 
offsets to purchasers. This allows for higher prices to be generated as the project related risk 
for purchasers is non-existent. The exact amount of carbon offsets can also be promptly 
delivered and guaranteed by the project developer. 
Forward delivery, or offsets that will occur in the future, is an agreement between offset 
providers and investors that emissions reductions certificates will be provided at a pre-
determined time and price. This is a way to eliminate market risks such as volatile prices 
even though delivery may occur later. Forward contracts may specify a fixed or proportional 
amount of offsets to be delivered. The major risk involved in this type of transaction is that of 
credit risk. This relates to the risk of the offsets provider being unable to meet its contractual 
agreement and thus the buyer has to pay the current market price for offsets. 
 Ex–ante offsets 
An Ex–ante offset is the forward crediting of emissions offsets. This is the most complicated 
type of transaction and hence carries the highest transaction risk. This works in the case that 
the buyer pays the purchase price for a certain number of offsets that have yet to be produced. 
These offsets do not exist and therefore the risk is inherent in that the successful generation of 
the offsets is uncertain (Kollmuss et al., 2008). In some instances purchasers pay upfront with 
no guarantee of fulfilment of offset delivery, therefore the purchaser carries the risk that the 
price paid may be lost as some offsets may not be delivered. In some contracts the developer 
carries the risk, though they are required to compensate the purchaser in the event of a failure 
to deliver the required credits. 
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 3.3.2b. Project Location 
Different standards only accept projects from different locations around the world, e.g. Panda 
Standard in China.  Understanding where projects are situated and the criteria needed to 
obtain certification will allow for a greater understanding of the certification process.  
3.3.2c. Project Types (Eligibility) 
Carbon offset projects vary widely and can be grouped into differing types of projects. All the 
projects vary in their scope and effectiveness. They can be roughly categorised into five 
categories: bio-sequestration, industrial gases, methane, energy-efficiency and renewable 
energy (Kollmuss et al., 2008). Standards differ in the projects they will certify, some cover 
all project types, while others only focus on renewable energy or exclude bio-sequestration 
projects. 
3.3.2d. Cost of Certification  
As high certification costs can be a significant barrier to entry for some offset project 
developers. It is vital to understand the costs involved in the process and where the majority 
of costs arise. 
3.3.2e. Price of Offsets 
Identifying the average price gained for each offset under each standard will allow for an 
understanding of what the market is willing to pay per offset. Direct market-related 
comparisons can then be made and the underlying reasons for the differing prices can be 
interrogated and understood. 
3.4. Results 
The results from the scoring process are presented in Table 3.3, a score of 5.0 shows that the 
standard effectively incorporates and deals with the criterion, while a score of 0 highlights 
that the criterion is not considered or dealt with at all. Table 3.4 highlights the main summary 
points of each standard evaluated. These summary points were obtained from the full detailed 
review of each individual standard.  
This table allows for a rapid comparison between criteria of the differing standards as well 
the comparison of the overall scores. It has to be noted that differing organisations have 
differing objectives and goals in the certification process, i.e. the difference between fully 
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fledged standards and project design standards. Therefore it is not necessarily accurate to 
compare overall scores to determine the ‘best in class’ standard. In this evaluation, the 
emphasis is placed on the comparison of the individual criterion between standards. This is 
done to identify common themes within the market well as prevailing practices amongst 
standards and how they are applied.
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 VCS GS VER+ CAR ACR CarbonFix CCX CCBS SC Plan Vivo PS 
Baseline (BAU) 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 3.0 3.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 3.0 
Additionality 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.0 4.4 1.3 5.0 0.6 1.9 3.8 
Leakage 4.2 1.7 0.0 5.0 4.2 5.0 0.8 5.0 0.0 2.5 5.0 
Permanence 5.0 0.0 3.8 3.1 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 0.0 5.0 3.1 
Co – Benefits 1.0 5.0 1.0 0.5 3.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.5 
Transparency 2.5 3.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 3.8 5.0 1.3 
Registry 5.0 4.2 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.2 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Public Participation 2.5 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
Third Party Auditing 5.0 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0 4.0 2.5 5.0 5.0 3.8 5.0 
Field Verification 
Frequency 
3.8 5.0 3.8 5.0 3.8 5.0 3.8 2.5 3.8 2.5 5.0 
Total Score(50) 39 37.2 36.1 34.5 40 46.4 21.1 35.0 29.7 39.2 34.7 
Table 3.3. Analysed Voluntary Carbon Standards 
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3.5. Discussion 
The 11 carbon standards analysed cover the entire scope of the voluntary carbon market, 
from the most popular, wide-ranging standards to brand new standards that are country-
specific. There have been a number of different paths followed, with the development of 
differing standard-specific tools for baseline determination, additionality and risk assessment 
to name a few. The voluntary market has become the ideal platform to encourage innovation 
(Peskett et al., 2007) and this is evident in the number of standards and their unique 
processes. Some standards have been more accepted then others in the market, making them 
the clearly dominant standards. It has been argued that the voluntary carbon market will 
improve with the reduction in the number of standards, as it will reduce complexity for 
project developers and allow for a uniform comparison of projects between standards for 
potential investors (Marais et al., 2007). However the relatively low presence of the voluntary 
market in global carbon markets has highlighted that there are pitfalls and barriers to entry 
into the market for project developers, purchasers and investors. This has often centred 
around the process involved in obtaining voluntary certification, and issues such as high 
transaction costs (Marais et al., 2007; Galatowitsch, 2009), complex methodologies and 
carbon accounting uncertainty (Peskett et al., 2007) and the often bureaucratic and complex 
processes dictated by standards to achieve certification (Marais et al., 2007, Neef at al., 
2010).  
The significant barriers to entry and therefore limited acceptance of carbon standards, both 
mandatory and voluntary in developing countries, sends a clear signal for the development of 
new standards, or the refinement of the processes that will address these issues and encourage 
the development of the global voluntary carbon market. These issues vary in different 
magnitudes across standards and there is not a single standard that currently addresses all of 
these issues. The most common issues are high transaction costs which severely limit and 
prevent projects in developing countries from obtaining certification and complex 
bureaucratic processes. The need for the use of third party independent certifiers and 
validators, often from developed countries, adds high amounts of costs to projects that often 
have limited start-up funding. While all of the processes contained within voluntary carbon 
standards have been developed to ensure the validity, permanence and legitimacy of carbon 
projects, and while some are highly successful at achieving this, they are often highly 
complex and inefficient. 
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The current standards in the voluntary market exhibit a wide-ranging swathe of differing 
characteristics and tools, all focussed at achieving slightly different facets and goals related to 
the voluntary market, from pure carbon certification to ensuring the generation of co-benefits 
from projects, as well as a mix of the two. Currently the most popular standards, in terms of 
market share, focus on carbon offsetting and co-benefits, the VCS, CCBS and CAR have 
dominated with a combined market share of 69% in 2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). 
However, offset standards focusing on both carbon and co-benefits achieved the highest 
prices in the market with the GS ($11. 1/t CO2), CarbonFix ($10. 9/t CO2) and Plan Vivo 
($8.9/t CO2), but with a relatively minor market share of 12.8% (Hamilton et al., 2010). Both 
project developers and purchasers need clear information on what needs to be done, how it 
should be done and the guarantee that their project will return legitimate carbon offsets that 
can be sold and retired; without these clear guidelines the voluntary market will continue to 
falter due to uncertainty off outcomes from all participants.  
The optimum way to achieve this is to ensure that the carbon certification process is clear, 
relatively simple to follow and efficient, thereby reducing transaction costs, both financially 
and in terms of opportunity costs. To overcome this there is an increasing trend of designing 
an “embedded standard” that is applied almost exclusively to projects within one geographic 
region (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). Key examples that have emerged from these are the 
BMV and China’s PS. While they all focus on differing areas, with different processes, they 
follow the same idea and are tailored to their unique domestic situations to meet local 
demand with a local, certified supply of offsets. This is a relatively new phenomenon and in 
2010, the first year for BMV, captured 5% of the global trade in VERs, and they were almost 
exclusively purchased by Brazilian investors (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). The BMV is 
currently the only embedded standard with certified projects that are being traded. These 
embedded standards have been predominantly situated within large developing economies 
and have served as an example of the potential effectiveness they can play in stimulating the 
local carbon markets through a locally tailored certification process. 
This analysis of the 11 voluntary carbon standards found that CarbonFix returned the highest 
overall score of 46.4, followed by the ACR (40) Plan Vivo (39.2) and VCS (39). The average 
score among all the standards was 35.8. A number of the standards score highly but there is 
not one that encompasses all the essential components of a voluntary carbon standard. It has 
to be noted that this is often via strategic choice of the standards such as ‘Project Design’ 
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standards, which cause these components to be less emphasised and in this specific 
evaluation it would lead them to score lower in the overall evaluation. The evaluation does 
however allow for a comparison of specific criteria, such as additionality, amongst all 
standards and this is useful for the identification of market best practise. To understand this in 
more detail it is necessary to discuss how and why and how each standard achieved its 
ranking (Table 3.3). 
3.5.1. VCS 
The most popular voluntary carbon standard, the VCS, with a 35% market share in 2009 
(Hamilton et al., 2010), scored 39. The VCS has been widely accepted in the market due to it 
being one of the first voluntary standards, a wide ranging acceptance of all projects and its 
association with respected institutions such as the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) and the World Economic Forum (WEF), which adds legitimacy. The 
VCS also followed a lengthy two year development process that incorporated a large public 
consultation process and this has led to the VCS being highly respected and adopted by both 
project developers and investors. 
The VCS is a quality standard that ensures that carbon aspects of a project that is certified are 
real, reliable, additional and permanent; however it does incorporate a highly complicated 
and inefficient process to obtaining certification. The VCS calls for a lengthy double review 
process for all new project methodologies which stymies development of new methodologies, 
as it leads to increased costs for project developers, especially in terms of opportunity costs. 
A lack of a detailed and mandatory public participation process that allows for comments 
during the validation phase also hampers the score for the VCS. This coupled with a lack of 
the critical recognition of sustainable development, especially biodiversity and water trade-
offs. This keeps the price of VCS credits low and might lead to questions surrounding the 
overall integrity and equity of VCS certified projects. The VCS also needs to address the 
frequency of field verification to ensure that a project is abiding by VCS guidelines once 
certified and that offsets are still reliable after a few years. 
3.5.2. Gold Standard 
The GS scored 37.2. It has become a widely recognised standard with the backing of the 
WWF and has been accepted for its stringent and comprehensive requirements. The GS is a 
high quality standard that emphasises the generation of co-benefits and ensures both the 
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carbon and sustainable development benefits of the projects that obtain certification. It 
ensures that projects generate credits that are real, reliable, and permanent and it scores 
highly in baseline requirements, additionality, co-benefits and public participation. It has to 
be commended in that it is the only standard that mandates the continual monitoring of co-
benefits in conjunction with carbon offsets, thus ensuring the continued emphasis on the 
generation of co-benefits. The GS has established itself as the largest voluntary standard that 
incorporates co-benefits and it does this in a unique and comprehensive way.  
The GS does however have its pitfalls. It is focused exclusively on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency projects and this has led it to fall behind in the global market. The GS does 
have demanding requirements and strict guidelines which adds complexity and cost to the 
process and might discourage some project developers from subscribing to their guidelines. It 
does not include any guidelines or requirements on the permanence of projects or the 
potential leakage associated with projects, but this is associated with the project types they 
accept and thus they score lower in this criterion. The GS also loses out on independent third 
party auditing requirements which they leave to the DOEs, this could lead to discrepancies 
surrounding DOEs interpretations and lengthy processes needed to obtain validation and 
verification from differing DOEs.   
3.5.3. VER+ 
The VER+ has been a relatively small player in the voluntary market but scores well in most 
of the essential criteria. The VER+ scored 36.1. It was developed by the TUV SUD, a well-
respected DOE which has a very good reputation (Kollmuss et al., 2008). The VER+ is a base 
level quality standard that achieves its goals well, but it does not place any emphasis on the 
generation of co-benefits and as such has been usurped by the VCS and GS. The VER+ does 
set out a straightforward approach to obtaining certification and accepts a wide range of 
projects of different sizes. The standard places a lot of emphasis on the baseline, 
additionality, transparency and registry elements.  
The VER+ however does not include any leakage considerations and has weak permanence 
criteria for projects. Public participation is also weak with a local process only needed if 
required by the host countries laws. The VER+ does not offer anything new or different to the 
larger and more established voluntary carbon standards and with questions surrounding its 
53 
 
third party auditing legitimacy (Kollmuss et al., 2008) it will continue to be overshadowed by 
its larger competitors. 
3.5.4. CAR 
The CAR has become the largest voluntary carbon standard within the USA and one of the 
largest in the world, with 31% of the market share in 2009 (Peters-Stanley., 2010). It is the 
most advanced and progressive standard in the USA, but is solely applicable to the USA 
market. The CAR scores 34.5. It scores lower as it uses a standardised baseline approach 
where all baseline methodologies are developed by the CAR. This adds uncertainty to the 
legitimacy of the carbon offsets as not all projects are the same. Additionality assessment is 
also standardised according to project types and this is a novel and unique approach, it allows 
for the removal of confusion surrounding additionality. This additionality methodology 
however might allow for the approval of projects that are not truly additional due to their not 
being a ‘back check’ process. Permanence is well dealt with and comprehensive, however it 
does not call for the mitigation of identified risks, rather just the insurance against the 
probability of the risks occurring. 
While there is still room for improvement on the additionality, baseline processes and 
permanence, the CAR falls short on its incorporation of co-benefits and public participation 
requirements for projects. A lack of validation of projects also needs to be assessed to make 
the process more transparent and it would ensure projects are additional and legitimate. In 
general though, the CAR ensures that purely carbon offsets are accounted for and offers some 
novel approaches to making this process quick and efficient. Improvement of some areas, 
namely allowing for both project specific methodologies and a standardised approach, 
instituting a validation process and incorporating co-benefits will make this standard more 
attractive to a wider sector of the market. 
3.5.5. ACR 
The ACR scores highly in the majority of essential criteria for a voluntary standard, with a 
total score of 40.0. The ACR has been developed privately, particularly for the American 
market, and builds heavily on the work of the CDM and other standards for its essential 
elements. It is for this reason that the ACR scores well in all its elements. The ACR allows 
for the utilisation of approved baseline methodologies from other standards such as the CDM 
and the VCS as well as providing a comprehensive approach to the third party verification 
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process. It does emphasise the potential co-benefits from projects more than the standards it 
has modelled itself after, however this is still not the most effective or efficient approach to 
incorporating co-benefits into the process. The ACR does provide an assurance that the 
credits certified under the ACR are real, reliable and permanent however it does not 
distinguish itself from other standards and thus it has obtained a small market share of 4% in 
2009 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2010). 
3.5.6. CarbonFix  
CarbonFix is highly recommended for all LULUCF carbon projects, and scores the highest 
with 46.4. It manages to turn a once thought of highly complex process into a user friendly, 
straightforward efficient method that uses unique methods and tools to ensure that carbon 
offset projects are real, reliable and permanent while ensuring co-benefits. It offers templates 
that each project has to follow; these provide a detailed and useful guide that allows projects 
to quickly and accurately apply for certification. It offers a unique credit tracking process that 
allows purchasers to tract their credits via Google Earth. All this has led CarbonFix to 
achieve relatively high prices but it still remains with a low market share, just 0.6% in 2009 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2010). The main reason for this is it only certifies LULUCF projects, 
which limits it wide spread use and acceptance. 
CarbonFix uses a standardised baseline which negates the need for a review process for new 
methodologies. This does speeds up the time of approval but it also might allow for projects 
to either under or over calculate the exact baseline for differing projects, this contributes to its 
lower baseline score.  
CarbonFix scores highly in all areas including additionality, permanence, co-benefits, 
transparency, public participation and verification frequency. Third party auditing does not 
score the maximum due to CarbonFix doing internal validation of projects, but it has to be 
noted that this is a novel approach to undertaking validation. CarbonFix is a highly 
commendable standard for LULUCF projects.  
3.5.7. CCX 
The CCX was a major player in the voluntary carbon markets and was the platform for the 
most voluntary market transactions worldwide (Hamilton et al., 2010). The CCX scores the 
lowest of all the standards reviewed with 21.1. This is as a result of large number of questions 
around the CCX’s additionality testing procedure which fell short and lacked a test of 
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financial additionality. This is a result of it aiming to institute a sectoral, performance-based 
test of additionality. Leakage is also a major issue within the CCX as it does not expect a 
forest project to result in leakage, thus it does not need to be included. Permanence of 
LULUCF projects was an area that needed to be addressed within the CCX. It did not have 
any legal guarantee that offsets would not be released back into the atmosphere after the 15 
year commitment period. This coupled with a lack of public participation, any recognition of 
co-benefits and weak third party auditing requirements made it a highly inefficient and 
unacceptable standard. 
While it was easy to achieve the weak certification requirements it did lead to an oversupply 
of credits to the CCX and a drop in demand. This is evident in that, even though it is a large 
market in terms of volume it continued to receive the lowest prices for its voluntary credits. 
This led to the closure of the CCX and the proof that stringent additionality, permanence, 
leakage and third party certification criteria are needed to ensure the integrity of carbon 
offsets for both suppliers and purchasers and thus encourage higher prices for offsets. 
3.5.8. CCBS 
The CCBS has established itself as leading project design standard that focuses exclusively 
on quantifying the co-benefits associated with LULUCF projects. It has become the most 
popular co-benefits certification tool and when coupled with other standards, such as the VCS 
or CarbonFix, it ensures the environmental and social integrity of projects. Accordingly the 
CCBS score highly on the criteria such as additionality, leakage, co–benefits, public 
participation and third party auditing. But as it is designed as a project design standard it does 
not score highly in some of the criteria specifically associated with full-fledged carbon 
standards. This causes it to score lower with a 35.0. 
The CCBS runs the risk of becoming obsolete as standards evolve and new standards emerge 
that incorporate more stringent co-benefit criteria in one package that ensures a project offers 
a ‘gourmet’ carbon standard without having to obtain dual certification. At the present 
moment, combining the CCBS with a fully-fledged carbon standard ensures that projects are 
real, reliable and permanent while ensuring the highest level of environmental and social 
integrity. 
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3.5.9. SocialCarbon  
SC is another project design standard that offers a methodology to ensure that the sustainable 
development co-benefits of carbon offset projects are obtained. It relies heavily on the 
requirements of the other standards it is partnered with, as these need to ensure that 
additionality, baseline, leakage and permanence of a project. The SC methodology 
emphasises public participation in determining and measuring co-benefit indicators, and thus 
it scores highly these areas. It scores 29.7 across all criteria, but in its focus areas it scores 
highly. 
SC is the only project design standard that is applicable to a wide variety of projects, and for 
this it has to be commended. However it runs the same risk as that of the CCBS. To remain 
relevant and competitive it needs to alter and improve the other essential criteria and 
standardise its processes associated with these. The use of SC on its own is not currently 
enough to ensure the integrity of carbon offsets. 
3.5.10. Plan Vivo 
Plan Vivo scores highly with a 39.2. This is a result of its novel approach to project design 
that emphasises participatory development of small-scale, community-based LULUCF 
projects. This enables Plan Vivo to score highly in the areas of permanence, co-benefits, 
transparency and public participation. It does however fall short around the key issues of 
baseline methodologies, leakage and additionality. In terms of additionality it utilises a 
barrier approach to determining additionality, this could lead to projects that are not truly 
additional being granted approval. Leakage also does not score top marks as it relies on the 
producers accurately reporting on activities, this could lead to some misrepresentation on the 
true leakage figures.   
Plan Vivo projects attempt to make a difference in the communities they aim to be involved 
in and, as such, the demand for Plan Vivo credits is high. However Plan Vivo projects are 
highly academic and this could be a barrier for project developers to utilise this standard. At 
the same time, the carbon accounting criteria are weaker than other standards. The grass roots 
approach of the Plan Vivo is admirable, yet it cannot truly guarantee that the actual emissions 
reductions will be realised out of a project. While Plan Vivo offers a fresh, unique and 
revolutionary approach to incorporating small, scale community based carbon offsets it will 
not be able to compete with the larger, standardised and recognised voluntary offset standards 
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unless the focus of the market turns toward purchasing offsets from projects that focus more 
on sustainable development then purely carbon offsetting. 
3.5.11. Panda Standard  
Launched in 2010 the PS is new and as such little information is available regarding the 
standard. It is one of the first voluntary embedded standards developed specifically for an 
individual country, in this case the People’s Republic of China. It scores (34.7) lower than 
other standards due to there being very little information to evaluate  It does look to include 
some exciting new developments for the voluntary market. It aims to address development 
challenges that are identified as Chinas’ main problems, for example a key benefit to be 
emphasised from carbon projects is poverty alleviation. It remains to be seen what the final 
detailed document of the PS lists, but this is a very encouraging sign in the development of a 
new, country specific standard for the voluntary carbon market. 
3.6. Conclusion 
There have been a number of overall trends identified within voluntary carbon standards. 
Each standard follows a similar format but addresses the detail in different ways. It is vital to 
understand the processes that have made the market favour the VCS and made it the most 
widely accepted standard, while for example CarbonFix has not been as widely accepted. 
These mainly relate to the preference to specific project-based baseline methodologies that 
need to be approved by the relevant standards methodology board. Once approved these then 
become publicly available for use by other potential projects developers. The use of a three-
pronged project-specific additionality test has also emerged as the preferred process for 
assessing additionality as it offers a comprehensive and efficient way to ensure that projects 
are additional. Performance based additionality testing has also been incorporated into some 
standards but it has not received much attention to date. Sectoral-specific additionality tests 
have also become prominent in a number of standards, such as CarbonFix, and this is 
encouraging as it will in future streamline the additionality determination process. 
Risk assessment tools that aim to ensure the permanence of projects has been a continued 
theme running through the majority of standards, but the way they have been implemented 
have been diverse and unique. The use of a buffer pool for LULUCF projects has been 
prominent and has become to be seen as a reliable and efficient way of reducing the risk 
associated with LULUCF projects, however the size and risk assessment methods to 
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determine this differs throughout. The VCS has been identified as a leader with its risk 
assessment methodologies and many of the standards incorporate the VCS or CDM 
methodology for risk assessment.   
Another key area where standards differ greatly is the methodology to ensure the generation 
of SD co-benefits. Not a single standard institutes a similar approach; they differ from 
sustainable development matrixes to guidance criteria and the development of specific 
indicators that need to be reported on. The CCBS methodology has been lauded for its co-
benefit methodology that ensures sustainable development within the LULUCF projects, but 
credit also has to go to SocialCarbon, Plan Vivo, GS and CarbonFix for their unique, 
innovative and comprehensive SD co-benefits methodologies. 
Public participation in carbon projects is emerging as a major, essential theme and some 
standards have begun to incorporate this into their guidelines. The GS and CarbonFix are 
currently the only fully fledged standards that mandate a thorough public participation 
process. Coupled with this is the need for transparency in the availability of project 
documents and decision the making process. In this CarbonFix is a leader with innovative 
techniques that allow for all interested parties to access information throughout all phases of 
the project. The need to ensure third party auditing of projects has been a key requirement of 
all standards, this is to ensure the independence verification of the validity of the project. Key 
to this is field verification visits. It is within this that standards have differed and the GS and 
CAR are leaders in that projects are verified every 3 - 5 years, thus ensuring that offsets are 
real and reliable and that a standards maintains its effectiveness over the lifetime of a project.  
It has to be recognised that this analysis is not as straight forward as suggested by the 
evaluation matrix. It has to recognised that acceptance by the market is not merely a case of 
the differing processes and details of each standard but rather a broader political, social and 
economic process that has evolved along with the standards and general global climate 
change developments. It is clear that certain standards do limit themselves in achieving 
widespread adoption, either through limits to applicable projects or to specific geographic 
regions.  
This detailed evaluation does however provide an insight into just how each standard goes 
about certifying projects and offers a large scope for understanding the intricacies of the 
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voluntary carbon market and certification standards. In a constantly evolving and rapidly 
changing market it is vital to understand these finer details and the differing mechanisms. 
The collection of this information has allowed for the identification of the successful 
techniques that need to be incorporated or advanced upon in the design of a new standard, as 
well as the pitfalls of existing standards that need to be avoided and rectified. This will only 
serve to aid the standard development process and improve the outcomes. Ultimately the 
creation of new knowledge and techniques from this best practice identification process will 
allow for the development of a new ideas and methods that can be incorporated into the 
proposed South African voluntary carbon standard. This will aid in ensuring that offsets 
certified under the standard are real, reliable and permanent. This will allow the standard to 
be recognised within the market for its certification credentials. The development of new 
techniques and processes that are specifically focused towards South African conditions will 
attempt to stimulate the South African voluntary carbon market and allow for a cost efficient, 
straightforward process that South African offset projects can follow to gain certification. 
This will hopefully allow these projects to compete in the complex, turbulent and constantly 
evolving voluntary carbon market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of the evaluated Voluntary Carbon Standards 
S.sel"",(BAU) 
I 
I 
Add"'''''''''') 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l'crmancnoc 
I 
I 
Co- Benef". 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
T)'pcofCrcd, .. 
ThUd pan)' Aooi'ing 
I 
I 
Field V<rif"""i"" 
FRXtucllC) 
I 
ProjoCI TypeS 
(EligiNlif)) 
Price ofOfl:sCl, 
(VCS) 
""*"" P'''p,,,,,,,"s' respon'i-
hili ') '0 c...,.,.., 'Old design 
GoldStandord(GS) VER~ CAR 
""nabko projoc1 spc<iflC 01",111_ spc<,nc n""hodoIOl;." ,fone 
,",CR"'PP«"'ed ,ools.. ~ 
d",,,,, .ndior 'nc1hodologks 
CarbollJ'h CCX CCBS Soci,lCarOOn !'Ian Vi,.., 
""" .. I. """""mic and em i"",_ IPee 1006 go,ideli..,. fo' 
AfOLU projoo" n","oJ oo",;lil;o", 10 mom'or Tccl,ni¢.1 ;po<ificali(M1S for 
CU",,,.I,' PO basch,,.. 
A "e", pn>joeI spc<if'" """hod-
01"", can be ""'doped .nd 
sub"'i tled fot "PP«"'''I 
I'r=Iibcsl1l< baseli"" n""h· A=po. m<'bodolOj!.lC5 from A basch"" ""lcu""""'lCmpl3l< each pr<>jccI "",'e '0 be submi,· '0 be ... bmi"cd '0 "'" ps ,<'Cil-
odoIO~,- 'h'" I .. , '0 be "SC<I for ,I", CDM. US,", EP,", . CL Of Rcqnin::d ,o<\oct",,,, .. ,l,,,or· 
f"",.on '1><<<>lIlmw,;,). b'<>di_ 
,c";')' and (he benef". ,hal 
"oold 10",,< ""e"ned II i(I"",, 
(ed '0 (!'" PI." Vi,'o (ceh"""'1 "","Ioo .. ,, .. il(<<: 
Accep" CAR:mol CD),,! 000<>- A.c"p" CDM EB. 'be SSWO 
line nlClhodologks 0' UNDP CF n""hodoI"llko The """hodolol;)' ha, '0 be 
del'cloped according '0 "'" 
Lin ofp",""""",,'ed tTIOIhodo1_ No". tTIOIhodologios need "I>- guidoli .... lbt JI 3CI~ili .. 
NCII PIT(IOC1 nlClhodologk> 
",,,e'o~"a_O:"pprt»-al 
.-
pITII-,1 b)' , be OS " _,<hnieal 
ad"i>Of)' eomllli "",,_ 
each indil;d",,1 projcc1 ')po ,I>< W; S 
NCII nlClhodoiopc. are ,e-
liowod by!"" ACRso.<pon 
"",'bodo~ pcn<1 
,l><offsctllngl"";lC<l 
11 ... ,,, p«I'lgCd I"";IC<I ba.oo Ptojoc1-boSC<l adJi,"",.h,) 'cst Projoel -b<.SC<I adJ i("""h(,- ,est. S(.,><\.onli.oo .pprooch fOf pm- 11""" p«I'lgCd. pt(IjC« based T"o oliff.",,\(. ",,,(,,,,11,' .,ei,, - Pri,,,.rih pc,fon,,,,,,,,, ba<Oil !PCC 2006 !!,-'ideh"'" f(M SC <Iocs "'" esr.;"'li,hc;ri ,"". Ptojoc1 \I<.scd 8<I<Iili<, .. "Ii(, 
addil",ml;,) ,,," "'luired joct 1)'PC' add i'",nal;'), ',," "''' "1";0'" AFOLU projoel< for addi(;onoll()' rules 
n."", pro"gco:I COM oddili",,· Projoel' h,,,-c (0 (lroI'C 1""1 IIIC) 
Performance and (cch""I"IO' CD.~1 addi"on"h" (0010' a,,,' ali,,· ,<>< Perfoll",lIIce-bascd 8<I<I" iornrli· n."", prongco:l CDM AIR 1Kldr. ,m: '-':11_ 001 .-egula(ed,nd in· An) .""",,'cd lI""hodolog)' of If a proJC<' dc>-cl""", .-elies 
otl." ,,,,,,,,,,-cd ad<Ii'ionali') 
,~, 
""13 gnide llllCS for """",0",,1· 
Il)' 
CFS "'lui""""" .. fo, addi(io'" 
all'" 01 .... be ...cd 
"Ol,'cd in ,,,,,,,,,,1, 'bcso in 
cla,, ' prnc1'ces 
Co",n, iuc< 
(he COM EB "'0:1) on SC ,n<lhodolo!l,) i( i, 
""";oed (""" tbe pr*", com_ 
,"'''' with ,heoddi'iooali()-
guide li,,,, oflhe CDM 
Will be 'PP«"'ed in 5(1 IIOt'<· 
ingda). from II"", of.ublln ... 
,ion 
Rooh II", p«IjoeI """,if", .,1<\ 
porfOll"''''''' SIa,.(brd,odo:Jj,ioo· 
,1",-,,,,,. 
AIR 1J'O:ic-'c' "'lUi"" !cakas< Nodetailoo Iealago ....... n.'"'' VER t <Iocs 001 spccificall)' Com p'-cI"""i,~ defini'ion of Prqjoc1 <101<1"",,1'< a"" ... >C. ReqUln::d 'oa...,,, po<i,,,,,.1td No p-r*", spccinc b,l;ago P,""", prop<>n<". i. "'luired SC _. "'" cSIaIlllshcriloria '-""«ago 1 ... '0 be a.OC<SCd ,nd ReqUlICS ,ha, lcakas<" ide",j· 
nlClhodologrcs :>COOlIn' fo, leakage concerns GHG ...... n"'n' boo.~'. OOIln( fOf""d m"'g:l'e c<""in .-.:ga<i,-c lcaklrge ofllood .nd a"""mm' .. requin::d '0 d.ctm"ine and p<oyc.1I for lcJiI<agc miug."oo fOfeach land u>c food_ a"".oed. acootln(oo fo, 
M"" i""h.1e "").nd.1I SSRs 
associa,oo ""'h(I>< p-rojoc1 
.-eg:lrdl"". of ,hei, phy'ical 
I"",,(io" 
1'"",Oflcak.!!" 
lPec Ic:JI,;agc guideli"". Noga''''''s hal'C '0 be ",i'iga(ed; 
.,.,.i'i,'o Ica""geo.",,,,, be ,.k· 
e" i,,'O""""""' 
fO'''' oflcak.!!" associOied 
"ithtbe!""*"" 
L<:akage "". '0 be _m<:'oo 
from (be GUO offsel<cal,,,,b,· 
ro 
The local :mol regIOnal c,,",r:.c· 
tcriSlko neal to oon,idon::d 
Risk .,,,,,,,,,,,, .. ( "",,,,,,1(1)- GUo. to be .. orod f(M" (ca" Risk assess"",,,1 " .. <Ida,o" S(rie< P""'",,,,,ocecritoria A; .. " (oc"r.w-epcm",,,e,oce of Doc. "'" I,,'e ;po<ifoc PC"' '''- SC <Iocs "'" C<labli,hc;ri,"". 'pc,,,,,,,,,,,oce """,I",,,i,,,,, Will de-o"l"" <isk ",..,.. .. ", .. ( 
100 )'"'''' forest)lf<l;l<d.;n 'hrc< lIa), '''''ICC require ... """ f", PC'"'l""'ICC ide,. ;fK<! '" be USC<l ,001, '0 i<le",;f), a,wI mjUg"'e 
nutT« pool C<labli'hed CO'''''''''h,'e "',fTo< """""",h ButTe, pool e<labl;,hed. (M ,-"i<le,,,,,, '!>,i,1Si p<otcclio<' 21J%bufTe, pool , 15 )'"",com. !be =" ... 1 risk> 
...cd Ensurc porn"""""", in J lI~y. fro", """,inc Iisk> relacing (0 u(i"(..,,, .,.;1 1«(<:<" ofi,,(en.. Rehcs on , I>;: pcnuancncc re· 1""ltlding ",Ie. agm:",m"and 
Si;>£ <Io(crnunoo bJ risk """ .... 
Buff« I"ill nOt be Ie« (/ran 
lll'Y. "f ,1", ,"rifK<! offSC1. 
Prqjoc1lmp","","(""'" Ayco· 
n"". (PIA). 
Buffe, pool oooed (>It ,hensk 
ACR.aWO'-ed ''''''''''''''' pol,. f"""''' pro;cc" i, "",,,in::d q"i"''''''''tsofOtI"" ~a<lda'ds. " IIW. ""ffcr pool Will ,,,ilise" "',ffo< pool "1>-
CFS ""ffo' f"nd "'G '""" ,I,,, 
30% of olfs«. arc ocld as Ill' 
proach (0 ""urins against rc_ 
l'c",,1 
NOt included in ~'" VCS ",,*,,"s "'U" 0/"", elc:r' .... • No _.nti,llICgiI1i,,, em'i · Mn" 001 crru'e locg:l'il'ec_"",' IIlI"""",,on col1ll1lnni';esand Emph",,,on ,he gwrl3n'",of Docs 001 require ,he qnantifo· E01pl ... i.on , I>< Mencr ... ion of M"in aim '0 = ,;gruf>e,m' Empba.i"", on 'hegcllCnt11OO Requin::d for- ne( .,.,."il'c illl' 
lai,,,bo: ""'clop,,,,,,,, be,,,,fi... ro""""" Ot"",i~1 effecl<. U"')' ",.lilies. lhe e",iro""""" a'" posihl'e (1", gC<",,"tio" {)f«>-bc,,,,fi lt calion or """",i<\gofro- ""-bc,,,,filS fOt 1.,.;1 00scd pm-- <o<'lri",,,",,,, lo"-,<I.i,,,blc ofoo-bc,"'fi" f""" PfO.ie<I. """I< 10 be !!",,,,,,,,ed f""" 
AFOLU pro;cccs ha"e (0 ,ni,i - nero '0 be "''''8'''cd ",-crall beocr" J"<1' ""'-olopn",n' projocu; 
ga'" pot",,"al ncg.""" "IlI'i· Foo, pan <Ict>rloo ... "ainabil· Ncl_.,.,.i("" ocologkol and Require. (ha( all pr*,," pro-
"""""""",nd ""'",-O;;01IOIuic 
impac1' 
Cou(i ... """, n",,,i(oo-i"gofslIs-
tairubili,) reqUired 
EIA RXtuim! i fk:~al~' "'"' 
quin::db) host """'Uf) . 
Pro",,"e' d", uscorCCBS 
(oois. Ibe",su"'h(M"ofll",_ eli",,"c impac1S 'nd"",'i""""",",1 coodilio<lS "",,, and ""'U""",i!) 
ofa proJ"<1 Prqjoc1s "'" r."oo acoonli ,,~ (0 coon(1) 
,be" """loglc:rl.,wI "",",I co- I~ basi<;",,"'pul><>f)' "'Gu;"" Communi,) led ." ••• ;nabl< 
bencft" 
'-''''''''',"!!"joi'' ' "seofCCBS T""lcI'clsofl'erif1C:l 'ion, 
" .... ><brd. Regula, 1"",,1 :uwl(I>< {'.oold 
lc\'cI 
SL' ""'13;""b,h,) Ind,co'o" 
USC<l '" """;''''l''ojoC1s 
land u>c"''',,"'s 
"",~), . I I",-ia(",nllillbea 
ke) fact'" .""",i.,oo lIilh pm-
JOC1<I.:wlopn""" 
Docull",n"'I'"lIabk .fI",pro- Docun",n" a, .. ilablcaOcr pm- All proj<:C1 .:Iocull",n",rc All (he .:Iocume"'. re"'ting (0 Octa,I. p"".-idcd fOfeach pm- Each projoel ,Hoe,"od ol"n Noaccc .. (0 proJ"<1 """"if", Ali proJ"<1.:1ocuIl",,,"are All proJCC' .:IocumCll"arc A \I'd> page for-each projoct NOllldrcaoion 
.i«" l"'e t>cc" ",gj"cn::d joel, I"' et>ccn "'~i".n:d .""il'''""n (I", "'!li"'"" lIet>- each PfO.ie<I'''' publiCi) """il_ joct. lI'cb',« <Iocu""'''''''"''' or for public "'"il",le ""iIabO:(M,(I"''''gjSl''' IICt>-
.i'e able ""II"'",'" .i,o 
PDD. ,-,lId,"",n,u\ll ,'"rif",,_ [locu"",n" aI-.ilable are Docum"nts "",11NIc protocol.. All proJect _"n",n"'re 
,i"n .-epon'a",i~c for public PDDs_ "lOOi'oring. local """c· The.., il1e11N1c (he PDD_ ,non,· ProjcC1 sub"""a) form_ projCC1 proJCC( pla".and ,'crif.",u",n ",'ail1blc. 
PDD_ all public OOl1l,,",nt,,-
, "ohda<;on """,Its,,'; pr<>jccI 
cen ifica'« 
"on ,,,,,,,Its pons ,nd ,-.llda,ion repon. nca'",n r"f'O'1' 
StaIocOOlde,in,.oI,."n",n( fol· ""0 pubhc COll>llltalio<, Loc:r.I "akcboldc, process: and Doc. "'" ouUinc any require· Docs 001 oo,lIIle o"nd'ca1e (I>< S'rong","p1=ison publicpar-' No requ;ren"",,, for public The pt(IjC<' daiS" mn" in· DOl. oolicCled through partie,' P,ojoc1 ""<10 ha,,, undcrgon< PIlbhc """men" period of 20 
loll's ISO 1-'60-'-2 "",,,i,,,_ ",",ods.", "'Guin:o:l global ' 13kcbol<le, pro«:ss """.' for public pcnicipll(io<, ,ICed for "',' public ",nicip"- (ie,paoion iu (I", ..:xn::di,,(;.,., pcnieipao"," lI'ithin (I", PfO.ie<I clode !be ""''' '''U,,;(itJ; ",,; P"(O,,' nlClhods • pnXi""",loo",nlOni,,' led day, in (I", .. ""11OdoIog,, "I>-
'" ""kobolde, «>n'hl",""" 
0<'.,,1«1 !'f'lC<'du"", and ",. 
~ '0 .:Iocum"n" .. '; gi,.cn Quirem",," fo, ""keholde, 
""""nUII;(,' (Ooff.tOO""'''''1S """""1;;' 
Local p"bllC panicipa<ion onl)' 
ha. '0 oc ur><lcr13kcn ,fu i , 
and inpo" ' 
n,n:edilfc"'"("'SiS!rics. 
"'''''''1) M>rI';; •. APX and 
CalSIiC des Dc"",. 
U";q"" serial ... ""be,,"S-
";gncd to each oil.." 011"'" 
l.ocal SI;d.choidct""'IS"U"",,, If,,," , o j""if1C:llion ofllh) 
"""'" h. ... '0 be oo-mpl«ed.,wI has '0 be published ",uh", ,lie 
,ubmiltoo (oOOl.i" GS "i'P"O" POD 
" Olobal ""~chol<le, "",,,,,I~'· 
... 6O-da)' period p<io.- (0 ,.ah· (IOn _ ",,,,,,I 1'1)1) pubh<hed on 
",,'",n .... ,idc ['" ""keOOld- (he OOE. "cbsi'e fo' J.Oda,', 
01'< '0 "",nn"",( "" (1)0 PDD 
Uses (I", ' hird """)' "'!li"'" 0.", >q;i"f) . (1)0 Bh",Rc~;'- Uses (I", 'l,i«l .. ,n,' ICl;i",y 
APX 'I) APX 
GS<Iocs "'" pw\llkc III ,II< 
lr-n'\aC1",,,,ofVER. 
Projc<:' d"yelope" arc foro,d· Un;que >cnlli ""mbers.s· 
de .. f",," "'Si""""S "i()' '''' ,i!i-'ood (O"""h otTsel cmi .. 
otl><rro!li"""" 
lion prncc .... 
ACR "'n' its "" n "'~i"" 
Uniq,,,,SC1'i.I .. ,,,lbcl'S'" 
oigned to each off ... Clnl>-
S(aI;ohold.c,con, .. I13lion J Only publ", pcnlC;p,,(",n i. 
Docu".,,,,oo .nd pr'-"""'oo 
A pubhe coml1",n" lIindow of with !be PDD. 
plOIu'ingpm"", 
I11O,,(h, befo", (M dnri,1S ""0" "i(hi" (be ",,-isi<H, ",1<1 <Io,'cl - J.O da,', f(M .:Iocu""".,,-
No ,ndicaoion. ofpobllC I"'n",· 
ip"(i",, in (Iocprojoct desiS" 
fl<ld,i.i'i'""-.ncll'~ 
Con"neru. can be ",bmi"cda' 
;In) ' i,,,,, ",I<! "'" oon,i_ in 
,I>< ""~, ocruf""nion pr"""" 
op"",n( of ""'" p'otocol, f", 
U",CCX All gri"" "'ICCS",,,S(be",. 
5pOndcd (0 "' J.Oda) "-
CFS u"'" ,I", Ma<1..iI "'gi"", CCX lUih"'" its """ ",~i"f) I)c",,, .. ined In "", ,ldard Ih'" U"", (he M.,k~ F.",'iro"""",I.1 Uses ,I", ~"'<1..il,-,",'i""",,,,,," 1 The "'gi",), "i)l be in(en,,1 
TZI .nd gn:e.-.'-',e" ", .i"" 
"I"ion. 
Uniq""scri.1 n"mbe,,",· 
.igned '0 each ofT ... em,<-
,wifi«,md.,lloca'", VER!; (0 regi<ll)' ",gi<lf) "wI ro'P"n';blc for (I>< ,"'" 
foch en::d" ha .. uroque seri"1 
..,,,nbc, i. assigned 
DClcnnincdbJ'l><pcnncrship Dcto,mincdbJ ,I>< pannership f;X-anlecrcd".onl)' 
:lIlOCofcn::dn, 
Requimr durd parly atld,"ng Kcqnire. durd party auditillJl Rcqu""" durd part) .udi'ing Rcquif<S 'h"d pcnyycnflca· Requires durd pari)' "OO,"ng Prc ..... lidauorr arwl ,,,nf,ca';o,, I\cqu,re , .. Iida,;"".nd ,,,"ft· A durd parly .ud"or IS""" SC aocq>I' a,,)- nidopcridcn' 
Otj;<.nisa(ion(l"" i,c,peri -
cnero jn ,I>< ,.Iida'iool 
Pian ViI<, ro:ju,res (I>< ,-.Iida· Third pany ,-alidation 11111 be 
Can beoon< a' ,I>< ... """in", CD)'-! DOEs pcrforn, ,Iu,d par. Eligible aud"Of'Oarc """red"oo 
venn"" (I>< onu .. iorr rrouc· 
,ion'a'wi (1",,,,,,,"'"'''' of(I",,,, 
If,,,,,,,,,,,f,,lIy ,.,Iid.1lcd(1)< 
projCC1i •• uto,",,(icall)' .p-
<)'.ooi'illjl COM and JI .udi,o<> 
Field ,,,rif,o:.(i,,,, isorrl) ca' - ""*""S neal (0 be I'i,i(oo b,- A ro", ,'"nfica'ion i, rcq"in::d Within 30 """,(I,, ofbei"~ 
riedou ' OIICCd",ing U'" 'I>< I-C,inOt< ;I101",ofll", f'", I -'''''' an", (1)0 "'g;"c.h"" <II ",b",i"oo 
I,f""",n of(I><)lf<I;I<d 2 )""".00,,1>< """ of,1I< !be ""n dale of,l>< proJCC( 
Ma)' 001 go longc"h:m6)'<:a" 
LUI.UCF projed" ,~rif,ca_ bel"""" I'erificalio< .. 
'10111", '0 DOCU' \li'hin ~ )cal'< 
aflc,,-. Iidalion 
VcnficI'<nero '0 be """red"ed 11U,ia! ccnifico(lOn '0 be con· Validol1ion "done b) ,I>< CCX 
duc'oo b,' a ,hird pcn)' 
Third pan)' ,-"rif"""lOn ",e-
F"", (0 choose ""'' «:nif,o:.(ion quirro 
bod) . 
quim!IO ,-.lido.le .,wi ,Ctif) 
,1",projoc1 
,uif .... "on of projed'-
1",,,. ,.;1 ,'«ifiC"ho"Ofp,o-
.i«" 
One on ,;'e audIt i. required '" 
I'ahdalion 
\'crif,ea(",,' i, "'G l"m! .. " I... i .. ili.1 ""nif""''''''' 12 """"h. FiclJ ,'orif""'I"," ofprqjoc1' i, P~ ",,,,, be ,,,'ifood ",,,t>' Based on (I",othcr- ",,,I<ia ,d, Ve,if1C;)(ion" "'Guim! "i()'i" Vorif1C:l(ion ofPS pt(IjC<cs " ill 
(hall"""" CI'Ol)' ~ -,'cal'< 3n", 1"01'.>I;da,ion of'l>< pm- .Ocr 'I>< l"ojoc1 i. ' PJlfO\'oo ~ )CO" requi'"",o"",- 'I>< f,'" ~ )""1'< ofa projoct I"'-e '000C'll' "'ICC ol'ef) ~ 
J"<1 )''''''' 
In·fteld ,'enf""tion ha, (0 be 
Regular c<~ if"'I"," ",,,<I ta~e ""'''po:(ed du'i'l;; II", oo"""i! -
place ""Ory ~ l""""..""'" "an '''''," period. "'''I) 1· ~ )"'" 
~O< 
I)c>l;(opaudi' "ro:juired III 
Pro;cccs '''u" be ceniftoo [Of at 1'0:1" w~ieh in-f",ld ,Ctiroe,,-
Ica" JO )'""".Oe"l>< pt(IjC<' 11011<00 "'" OCCU, 
Pro;ccts can be I"",,'ed . n)· 
\ll><rein'I><II",-ld 
Pt-ojoc1' ""') be 1oc"led in "n) The VER+can be 'pplioo 0.,1\' projocl,"ithin (I", US,", Pro;ccts "") be I,,,,,"ed in ""} Pro;cc" can oriSi" • ., f"'IlI Aocq>IS projee<s in a,,) """'" CCBS prqjoc1'na) be Ioca(oo The SC "",UlOdoIo!l,) ""n be Can (M, I., ' be I"",,'ed ill de-o'<I· Alii pro;cc' lIithinll>< Poopk:s 
coon(I)' 
f'rol'ided (he), :rrc ,"pponoo b,' ){c,,,,wablc <IICrg) "wI 
• VCS.PPrt»'OO """IIOdoIog)-
No nuclcar-encrll,y arld large 
h)d", p"'''.' pl,,", 
"",n(1) "')'lIl><re in ,l><lIo,ld ui«OtI><"hana ,,,,,,,,b,,,,,,,,c III an) coon'I)' of,1>< lIo,ld applied 'oan) ",,"n(I)' "Pln8 coon'ncs. RopublkofOu"" 
of(heEU ITS 
Fron, """ ... "" """,bu""'" (0 LULUCF pro;occs o"ly No RXtui~u"'n( .. LULUCFprojoel. 
forestl) projoc!', 
(Pcto .... S'an .. ) C1 aI uSJ VlC01c US$IlI'C01c US$1II1C02e US$ mcmo US~JIlC010 US$II!JtC010 USHflC010 US$8IlC02c US$W,C01c No data 
lOll) 
 61 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: 
 
An Analysis of the Development of Sustainable 
Development Indicators and Voluntary Certification 
Standards in Multiple Environmental Sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 62 
 
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Purpose of Chapter 
This chapter will focus on the historical development, challenges, criticisms and successes of 
various other voluntary environmental certification processes. Critical to this investigation 
will be surrounding how sustainable development measurement and evaluation has become to 
be operationalized and verified within these existing certification systems and if they have 
been successful in achieving their goals. The analysis of these will then provide a platform 
for the extraction of key lessons to be learnt that will serve to further guide the development 
of a comprehensive South African voluntary carbon standard. This will allow for the 
inclusion of current best practice contained within these certification systems, especially 
surrounding the inclusion of sustainable development considerations into the standard. 
4.1.2. Certification in Context 
Certification has evolved over the past 15 years as a key way to differentiate environmental 
or socially beneficial products from their conventional counterparts (Carothers et al., 2010). 
Certification labels aim to provide a voluntary supplement to the price mechanism, and guide 
choices of consumers towards responsibly and sustainably produced products. Despite this 
increasing activity and their increased adoption, even the most prominent of certification 
schemes only cover less than 10% of the market they are active in (Carothers et al., 2010). 
Comparable to any market-based systems differing certification bodies have arisen in 
competition due to the perceived weaknesses within other certification schemes. This has led 
to increasingly diverse and confusing marketplaces for certification, especially around what is 
considered to be sustainability. In spite of this certification has been shown to be feasible 
from an economic and technical perspective (Carothers et al., 2010).   
Certification cannot be seen as the panacea to effective market transformation, rather it is one 
tool that can be used to influence producer and consumer behaviour. As most certification 
schemes are voluntary they can be flexible and innovate into levels that regulation does not 
cover. It is vital to understand that there are two parts to an environmental certification 
scheme, and that is the voluntary environmental program (VEP) and an eco-label.  
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4.1.3. Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) 
Carmin et al. (2003) define VEPs as programmes, codes, agreements and commitments that 
encourage organisations to voluntarily reduce their environmental impacts beyond the 
requirements established by the environmental regulatory system. VEPs have been promoted 
as a self-regulatory, efficient, flexible and an effective approach to environmental protection 
(Rivera and de Leon, 2008). However, these come in a variety of forms, from strictly 
voluntary initiatives with no standards, reporting or monitoring to certification programmes 
with specific performance-based requirements and consistent third party auditing and 
verification (Rivera and de Leon, 2008). They also differ widely in their aims, goals and 
industry focus. VEPs have become popular among corporations in that they have apparent 
win-win characteristics for all those involved. These characteristics relate to the development 
of a positive brand image, quality and safety assurance, increased market penetration and 
system coordination (Rivera and de Leon, 2008), while promoting environmental stewardship 
and the social co-benefits of these activities. Regulators see them as a soft policy option that 
can be used to stimulate strong consumer responses and as such stimulate a quality-oriented 
and process-oriented change in markets and attitudes (Giovannuci and Ponte, 2005). The 
most prevalent and well known VEP is that of the ISO 140001, this has been set at the 
international level to ensure that corporations design and implement effective environmental 
management systems, and currently there are over 66 000 participants in over a 100 countries 
(Rivera and de Leon, 2008). 
4.1.4. Eco-Labelling 
While VEPs aim to ensure that the environment is actively incorporated into the decisions of 
all participants in the programme, but for this to be communicated and highlighted they are 
often associated with an eco-label. Eco-labelling is a process that aims to evaluate products, 
projects or services against base criteria so as to evaluate their environmental credentials and 
impacts (Potts and Haward, 2007). The ISO defines eco-labelling as a voluntary, multiple-
criteria based, third party program that awards a license that authorises the use of 
environmental labels on products. This licence is awarded on the basis of a life cycle 
assessment of the good, project or service in question (Potts and Haward, 2007). The main 
goal of eco-labelling is to inform consumers about the effects of the good, project or service 
on the environment. It aims to drive a change in consumption patterns towards consumers 
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making choices based on the environmentally friendly certification of the product, project or 
service (Potts and Haward, 2007).  
Since the 1960’s there have been numerous approaches used to move production systems 
towards becoming more sustainable and environmentally friendly. The first eco-labelling 
program was that of the German Blue Eco Angel in 1977 (Rivera and de Leon, 2008). Since 
then eco-labelling has gained increasing momentum worldwide and has given rise to a 
multitude of different certification schemes. Eco-labelling systems were initially started by 
NGOs and were thus voluntary, but eco-labelling of certain sectors has increasingly become 
mandatory, especially in the EU for food and consumer products (EU Eco-label) and the 
USA for energy efficiency (Energy Star) (Rivera and de Leon, 2008). Eco-labelling has 
become prevalent in a number of industries and sectors from certifying energy efficiency to 
environmental management systems, organic farming, sustainable fisheries and sustainable 
forest management (SFM).  
As discussed earlier, eco-labelling and VEPs have aimed to improve and guide the actions of 
entire commercial sectors, but the concepts and practices of these two instruments have 
begun to be combined and have taken the form of voluntary certification standards. This has 
spurred the rapid increase in the number of differing certification instruments, especially 
within the forestry, fisheries and environmental management systems sectors. These are all 
aimed at incorporating and evaluating sustainable production or harvesting processes as well 
as evaluating the social and environmental performance of projects within their respective 
sectors. These have been developed as voluntary environmental certification standards that 
aim to ensure that the entire project process is sustainable; this is achieved through 
compliance with SD criteria dictated in the standard and subsequent third party verification. 
In turn this provides increased information to potential consumers about the project, good or 
service and its environmental and social impacts (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005). Each of 
these voluntary certification standard has differing ideals, goals, processes and measurements 
but the overarching goal of all of them is to ensure that goods, projects and/or services that 
they certify incorporates sustainable practices and that this information is passed on to the 
eventual buyer.  
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4.1.5. Value of Analysis for this Study 
These environmental certification programmes have existed for a lot longer than current 
voluntary carbon standards. Understanding how they have established themselves as leading 
and widely accepted standards offers a myriad of lessons to be learnt for the development of a 
new voluntary environmental certification standard, in the case of this thesis a voluntary 
carbon standard.  
The standards that will be focussed on are the ISO 14001 environmental management system 
standards, voluntary standards in the forestry sector, such as FSC and the Program for 
Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), and standards for sustainable fisheries (e.g. 
MSC and Friends of the Sea, FOS). A critical evaluation of their development, content, 
successes and failures will allow for the incorporation and avoidance of the lessons from 
other sectors into the development of a voluntary carbon standard.  
4.2. Sustainable Development, Certification and Indicators 
4.2.1. Sustainable Development 
SD has become a diverse, wide ranging and highly contentious topic. SD is classically 
portrayed as the interaction between environmental, economic and social systems (Figure 
4.1.) (Goodland and Daly, 1996).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It differs from traditional theories of development as the philosophical focus is on improving 
the quality of life of people at the present moment without degrading the environmental and 
Environment 
Economic Social 
Figure 4.1. Sustainable Development (adapted from Goodland and Daly, 1996) 
Sustainable Development  
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natural resources for future generations (Bell and Morse, 2003). SD has become a contentious 
issue surrounding what the reality of ensuring SD in practice actually is. The extent of the 
application of SD principles relies on the perception of the people involved in applying them 
(Meppem and Gill, 1998).  Templet (1995) argues that SD is all about equity, not just inter-
generational but also within the same generation. The very basis of SD is participatory in 
nature and this is enshrined in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development: 
“Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens. Each individual should have… the opportunity to participate in the decision 
making process” (Bell and Morse, 2003). 
This principle is highly relevant, but the practical implication to identifying and engaging 
with all stakeholders to ensure SD determination is highly complex. SD means very different 
things to different people and it is how an individual rationalises and interprets SD that will 
ultimately affect their viewpoints (Bell and Morse, 2003). Recognising this diversity in 
perceptions is a key step to operationalizing SD, in that it moves SD from a purely scientific 
definition into a process that recognises that diversity is inherent to SD development and 
implementation (Meppem and Gill, 1998). SD has always been intended to be a practical 
process but the definitions, perspectives and requirements surrounding SD implementation 
have become bogged down in scientific debate and technicalities (Reed et al., 2006). 
Although the precise meaning of SD in any one context may differ and be open to debate due 
to differing stakeholder viewpoints, it is necessary to measure the effectiveness of SD. This is 
reinforced by Bell and Morse (2003) who state that ‘assessment is a necessity for action’. To 
assess SD many differing tools and techniques have been developed to gauge progress, but 
there is not one definitive method used that is currently acceptable and applicable across all 
scales (Bell and Morse, 2003, Rempel et al., 2004). 
4.2.2. Sustainable Development Indicators 
The most popular approach to gauging SD has been the development of indicators and 
indices (Reed et al., 2006) and in turn has become a major part of policy development (Reed 
et al., 2006). Gallopin (1997) has defined indicators as ‘an operational representation of an 
attribute of a system’. However the development of appropriate indicators has also become 
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highly complex and controversial as not one recognised dominant system has emerged that 
dictates the development of effective indicators.  
The purpose of an indicator is to simplify complex systems into a number of variables 
through targeted assessment and measurement. These can then be used to guide the project 
towards achieving true SD objectives. In this it has been stated that indicators are the primary 
tool for “doing” sustainable development (Bell and Morse, 2003). Indicators aim to measure 
and represent specific issues or concerns, and if they fail to achieve this they are simply 
measurements with no bearing on informing management or monitoring (Rempel et al., 
2004). Kneeshaw et al. (2000) identify two main types of indicators, prescriptive and 
evaluative. Prescriptive (or compliance) indicators stipulate the future project conditions and 
check on the activities that were promised, while evaluative (or effectiveness) indicators test 
whether the future conditions have been met and measure the response of the system to 
management activities (Rempel et al., 2004, Heink and Kowarik, 2010). Developing and 
incorporating indicators in the certification process that do not provide the correct 
information or measurements could lead to a false representation of a project’s sustainable 
development credentials (Nasi and Frost, 2009). 
Conceptually McCool and Stankey (2004) identify three important roles that indicators play 
in SD assessment. Firstly they depict the existing conditions (establish a baseline) of systems 
that are often complex, multi-faceted and interdependent. Secondly, they allow for adaptive 
management in evaluating the performance of management activities, and thirdly they 
facilitate for the early warning of change in social, environmental, cultural or economic 
systems. As a result of this they allow for the continued adaptive management of complex 
environmental systems and interactions. However due to the popularity of the top-down 
approach to designing indicators they have become to be seen as cold and technical, that have 
been corrupted by the scientific desire to place a numerical value on all aspects of a system 
(McCool and Stankey, 2004).   
Reed et al. (2006) show that indicator development falls into two broad methodological 
paradigms, one that is expert-led and one that is community-led. The expert-led process for 
developing indicators is based on the scientific need to quantify complexities within dynamic 
systems. This methodology has been widely used in disciplines such as landscape ecology, 
conservation biology and economics (Reed et al., 2006). The community led approach is 
based on a bottom up approach to developing indicators and draws on social sciences, 
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including social anthropology, adult education and development studies. This approach 
argues that to set goals and priorities it is vital that social actors are involved (Reed et al., 
2006).   
There are numerous strengths and weaknesses to each approach. The top-down approach 
allows for a rigorous process that is scrutinised by experts and assessed for relevance using 
statistical techniques, however this process often fails to engage local communities. The 
bottom-up approach is rooted in the understanding of local context and uses this as a source 
of indicator development, as well as enhancing community capacity for learning and 
understanding. However these indicators might not have the capacity to accurately or reliably 
monitor the necessary processes or actions that contribute to sustainability (Reed et al., 2006). 
These two approaches are thus conceptually different; although both systems have the same 
end goal. There is a need to develop a hybrid approach to capture both knowledge areas, but 
as yet there is no consensus on the best methodology to achieve this (Thomas and Twyman, 
2004; Reed et al., 2006; and Mascarenhas et al., 2010).  
While utilising indicators is a logical and practical step towards operationalizing SD, Bell and 
Morse (2003) highlight a number of key questions that relate to the practical development 
and application of SD indicators: 
 What indicators should one select? 
 Who selects them? 
 Why are they selected? 
 What are the meant to achieve? 
 What about the balance between various dimensions of SD? 
 How are the indicators to be measured? 
 How are the indicators to be interpreted, and by whom? 
 How are the results going to be communicated, to whom and for what purpose? 
 How are the indicators to be used? 
How the development process of the indicators answers these questions is pivotal to the 
design process. Since indicators are multi-faceted, complex and often highly contested areas, 
these questions offer a lot of room for value judgement. Traditionally these questions have 
not explicitly excluded the development of qualitative indicators but they have been more 
aligned and conducive to the development of quantitative ones. The way one views SD and 
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interprets these questions, depending on the project, will automatically cause conflict with 
other SD indicator designs. This has spurred the design of a number of SD indicators rules 
and checklists that attempt to guide the development of ‘relevant’ indicators (Bell and Morse, 
2003).These authors’ detail that an indicator should be: 
 Specific (must clearly relate to outcomes) 
 Measurable (implies that it must be quantitative) 
 Usable (practical) 
 Sensitive (must change as circumstances change) 
 Available (straightforward to collect relevant data) 
 Cost-effective (not be expensive to collect data) 
Another list of criteria has been developed by Guy and Kilbert (1998), who detail a list of 
suggestions to guide SD indicator development: 
 Community involvement (were they developed and accepted by stakeholders?). 
 Linkage (do they link social, economic and environmental issues?). 
 Valid (do they measure something that is relevant?). 
 Available and timely (is the data available on a regular basis?). 
 Stable and reliable (are they compiled using a systematic method?). 
 Understandable (are they simple enough to be understood by lay persons?). 
 Responsive (do they respond quickly and measurably to change?). 
 Policy relevance (are they relevant to policy?). 
 Representative (do they cover the important dimensions of the area?). 
 Flexible (will the data be available in the future?). 
 Proactive (do they act as a warning rather than measure an existing state?). 
While there have been various lists developed (e.g. Guy and Kilbert, 1998; Fisher 2001; Bell 
and Morse, 2003; Hanson, 2003 and Rees et al., 2006) surrounding the preferred 
characteristics of indicators, Rees et al. (2008) developed a summary list from a wide variety 
of indicator lists to determine the common characteristics that compromise an ideal indicator. 
They highlighted ten common characteristics: 
 Capable of conveying information that is responsive and meaningful to decision-
making (directly tied to management questions and linked to goals). 
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 Linked to a conceptual stressor – response framework (the ability to communicate 
potential cause – effect relationships). 
 Capable of measuring change, or its absence, with confidence. 
 Highly sensitive and anticipatory (early warning system). 
 Applicable over a variety of spatial scales and conditions. 
 Desirable operationally (easy to measure, reproducible with minimum measurement 
error, costs effective). 
 Integrative (serves multiple indicator purposes). 
 Non-destructive. 
 Easy to understand and communicate. 
 Scientifically and legally defensible (robust to peer review and wider challenge). 
McCool and Stankey (2004) however argue that lists or rules such as those of Guy and 
Kilbert (1998), Bell and Morse (2003) and Rees et al. (2008) frame the selection of indicators 
as a technical/scientific problem rather than a political/social challenge and thus do not or 
cannot achieve their sustainability goals. This is evident in that it is increasingly claimed by 
implementers that indicators provide few benefits to actual users for which they are intended 
(Reed et al., 2006). While the reasoning underlying why science has had a privileged position 
in the indicator design and selection process is valid, there is a need for the incorporation of a 
multi-stakeholder perspective in the indicators design process. The environments within 
which SD is implemented are highly variable, complex and dynamic and are often 
characterised by competing and conflicting values and interests (McCool and Stankey, 2004). 
A bottom-up, community led approach has been emphasised as one way of bridging this gap 
(McCool and Stankey, 2004; Fraser et al., 2006; Reed et al., 2006; Turnhout et al., 2007). 
However the methodology to actively engage stakeholders has been highly debated (Bell and 
Morse, 2003).  
Involving stakeholders in the process as early as possible allows for a quality control process 
that leads to the development and acceptance indicators (Turnhout et al., 2007). SD indicators 
will only truly work if they are developed in partnership between scientists and the 
communities they intend to help, and as such provide their intended management and 
information benefits.. Bell and Morse (2003) argue that SD indicators have been mired in 
developing technical excellence rather than assisting managers to manage. This has been 
reiterated by Rametsteiner et al. (2011) who argue that the development of indicators has 
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been rooted in the scientific ‘knowledge production’ sphere rather than in the inherent 
political ‘norm creation’ aspect of indicators. Recognising this is a key step to creating 
indicators that can be effectively implemented and accepted.  
To be useful in a management context indicators have to be set and measured on a regular 
basis. The information they gather needs to answer the vital questions of the context in which 
they are applied, as well as being easily interpreted and communicated to all stakeholders 
(Bell and Morse, 2003). Thus considering the SD indicator framework and monitoring 
approach to indicators is a crucial component of their development and operationalization.   
4.2.3. Sustainable Development Indicator Frameworks  
A SD indicator framework attempts to separate a broader environmental situation in to 
various elements in an attempt to fully describe and understand it (Lundberg et al., 2009). A 
key role of a SD indicator framework is to structure indicators in a systematic manner to aid 
interpretation, understanding and implementation (Gambarelli and Bucher, 2002). They also 
allow for the understanding of the interconnectedness of indicators and how they function 
together to obtain the required outcomes of an indicator set. SD indicator frameworks have 
been widely used at national levels, such as countrywide State of the Environment reports 
(SoERs). This has generally taken the form of a causal framework characterised by 
identifying Drivers, Pressures, State, Impacts, and Responses (DPSIR) (Lundberg et al., 
2009). Indicators are then developed for each of these elements as a way of describing the 
status of the specific element. While these have been widely used at the national, regional and 
international scale, they have not translated well into use for local and project level SD 
evaluations (Segnestam, 2002). These shortcomings lie in the complexities and costs 
associated with evaluating and collecting the data required for each indicator developed 
within this framework, especially at an individual or regional level (Gambarelli and Bucher, 
2002). 
The United Nations (2001) however highlight that a framework by itself is an imperfect tool 
for organising and expressing the complexities and inter-relationships that encompasses the 
full ambit of assessing sustainable development. In response to this the framework has to be 
designed to meet the needs and priorities of the end users, only then will it be truly useful 
(United Nations, 2001). The World Bank reiterates this and states that the design of any 
monitoring and evaluation system and the identification of suitable indicators should be 
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directly derived from the projects specific developmental goals (Ayres et al., 2010; Bowen 
and Riley, 2003). As discussed earlier, the development of sustainable development indicator 
frameworks that can be applied at a project level, has been more complicated and complex.  
This has led to the development of the Input- Output-Outcome – Impacts (IOOI) framework 
that has been designed and used in monitoring the effectiveness of local level projects where 
an objective is to improve the state of the environment (Segnestam, 2002). This allows for the 
development of a robust framework to assist in the design of indicators and processes that can 
be directly applied at a project level rather than a national or regional level, and thus 
mainstreamed for project developers. This framework signals a movement from a traditional, 
broad DPSIR framework to a simplified indicator framework (Ayres et al., 2010) that is 
useful for a local context.  
4.3. Examples of Third Party Certification Standards 
The incorporation of SD indicators and frameworks has become immensely popular in 
current voluntary environmental certification programmes. The aim of these programmes is 
to develop a set of principles and criteria that actively ‘do’ and ensure sustainable 
development and almost universally they have chosen indicators and indicator frameworks as 
the main tool to achieve this. The certification bodies develop a set of principles, criteria and 
indicators that each project has to abide by in order to achieve certification. If the criteria set 
out in the certification guidelines are achieved then the project is deemed to be sustainable, 
but have these been successful? Has the incorporation of indicators into the certification 
process actually led to the increased sustainability of projects? This leads back to some of the 
original questions asked: are sustainable indicators and frameworks the best tools for 
operationalizing SD objectives, and if not how can it be done? Analysing literature from the 
sectors that have embraced and promoted the use of SD indicators in certification projects 
provide useful case studies to understand if they have fulfilled their objectives and goals. 
4.3.1 Sustainable Forestry Certification 
The current process of forest certification emerged in the 1990s to address public concerns 
surrounding rapid deforestation, especially in the tropics (Merry and Carter 1996, Kiekens, 
2003). In 1992, at the Earth Summit, the Agenda 21 Forestry Principles set out an action plan 
for the development of sustainably managed forests; it was within this forum that the process 
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of identifying and developing criteria for sustainable forest management principles was 
developed.  
In parallel to this, a voluntary approach to forest certification was initiated through a variety 
of NGOs which culminated in the establishment of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
(Perera and Vlosky, 2006). Voluntary forest certification standards have been designed to 
meet the aims of sustainable forest management (SFM). Projects are evaluated and certified 
against the criteria and indicators designed to ensure that projects abide by the aims of SFM 
(Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003). This allows for a third party approach to certification, 
which results in a written certification being issued by an independent third party, attesting to 
the location and sustainable management status of a forest that is producing timber (Perera 
and Vlosky, 2006). It aims to provide consumers of these timber products with a credible 
guarantee that the product comes from timber forests that are environmentally responsible, 
socially beneficial and economically viable (Perera and Vlosky, 2006). There are two 
essential components of any forest certification scheme, 1) forest management activities and 
operations are assessed against pre-determined principles and criteria; and 2) there is both 
forest management certification and product certification that provides the necessary 
information to the end consumer (Perera and Vlosky, 2006).  
The forest certification market has seen the varying development of scale and scope of the 
current certification standards. This has resulted in the emergence of four major schemes 
worldwide; however there has also been the development of a number of other programs 
aimed at national and regional initiatives. AS mentioned earlier, the main forestry 
certification schemes that have emerged are the FSC, PEFC, ISO 14000 and Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative (SFI). The FSC and PEFC have dominated the market and many other 
players have been absorbed by them, in particular by the PEFC. The PEFC is the largest 
certification framework in terms of forest area with 225 million hectares certified and has 
endorsed 28 national programs in 28 countries worldwide, mainly in temperate and boreal 
forests (UNECE, 2010). The FSC has certified forest area of 129 million hectares in 13 
countries. The FSC penetrates most areas of the world but large gaps remain in tropical 
Africa and South East Asia and developing countries (UNECE, 2010). Combined, they 
account for 355 million hectares of certified forests or 9% of global forest cover. The 
adoption of forestry certification has been rapid in developed countries but has been lagging 
in developing countries. Durst et al (2006) highlight that developing countries, in particular, 
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face large barriers to certification with only 13% of certified forests. The main reasons 
highlighted are the high direct and indirect costs associated with obtaining certification along 
with the insufficient capacity to implement sustainable management of forests, weak 
implementation of national forest policy and a number of others. Despite these challenges and 
constraints many developing counties are still willing to pursue certification and thus there 
entry needs to be facilitated. 
This has seen the certification of natural forests predominantly in Europe and North America, 
and a large percentage of plantation forests worldwide (Perera and Vlosky, 2006). There has 
also been the establishment of a number of competing voluntary forest certification 
organisations which has led to increased competition and the broadening of forest 
certification from tropical forest to temperate and boreal forests (Perera and Vlosky, 2006). 
These have all focussed at differing scales and gone about certifying forests in different ways. 
Each certifying body sets guidelines that have to be followed by those seeking certification, 
these may be performance-based or systems-based. The FSC has undertaken to set a 
performance-oriented approach to forestry certification. The FSC requires that specific 
actions, practices and outcomes are documented and adhered to in order to obtain 
certification (Fischer et al., 2005). Adhering to and achieving these criteria allows for the 
project to utilise the ‘FSC certified’ logo in marketing products from the forest. The PEFC 
takes a different approach to the FSC in that it has established a framework for the 
development and acceptance of national or sub-national certification schemes (Fischer et al., 
2005). The PEFC has become an umbrella organisation which facilitates the recognition of a 
number of national or regional standards (Perera and Vlosky, 2006).The PEFC encourages a 
bottom up approach to a multi-stakeholder standard development process (Perera and Vlosky, 
2006).   
The FSC has developed a global standard for its definition of well-managed forests and this 
includes ten principles and 56 criteria of sustainable forest management. These cover key 
issues such as land tenure rights to indigenous people’s rights, maintaining biodiversity and 
forest planning, monitoring and management (Auld et al., 2008). The FSC takes two routes to 
standard development; the first of these is a national, local or regional tailoring of the broad 
FSC principles to meet that areas unique scenarios. This is done in a process that ecological, 
economic and social stakeholders collaborate to identify the principles and criteria that apply. 
These are then submitted to the FSC board for approval. The second route, and can only be 
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pursued if a region specific standard does not exist, is the use of the global FSC standard by a 
project. The PEFC follows a similar a route to the FSC by outlining broad principles and 
criteria and only accepts and endorses nationally-based certification schemes that abide by 
these. 
Wood (2000) examined eight forestry certification standards and found that although there 
are commonalities between the standards, there are also major discrepancies and 
inconsistencies between standards which inject confusion into the market. Van Kuijk et al. 
(2009) argue that certification of a forest does not necessarily lead to or allow for the claim of 
the forest being sustainability managed. The difference arises in how sustainability is defined 
within each standard and what aspects are assessed and evaluated, as highlighted earlier in 
this chapter. They argue that in reality there are trade-offs, differing definitions, and 
knowledge and data limitations to accurately and holistically evaluating and assessing all 
aspects of sustainable forestry certification schemes (van Kuijk et al., 2009). These 
limitations add questions to what forestry certification standards can legitimately claim to be 
sustainable forestry projects. Rametsteiner and Simula (2003) state that the various voluntary 
certification standards do establish higher levels of requirements on forest management than 
current legislation. They establish criteria that are not currently addressed by legislation, in 
particular towards mandatory sustainable forest management principles and practices and it is 
these that contribute to SD objectives (van Kuijk et al., 2009). 
Van Kuijk et al. (2009) reviewed 67 studies on the effects of forest management certification 
on biodiversity and concluded that the forest management practices, in general, arising from 
certification leads to increased biodiversity protection and sustainable forest management 
practices. Therefore it has been found that certified sustainable forestry good practices 
encouraged by the various standards, in spite of their differences, mitigate many of the 
negative effects associated with logging and forest management activities. This highlights the 
benefits of the requirements laid out in a forestry certification system can have on ensuring 
that projects reduce their impact on the environment. 
4.3.2. Sustainable Fisheries Certification 
Sustainable fisheries certification began in1996 when the WWF and Unilever entered into a 
partnership and established the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) to create an eco-label for 
responsible fisheries management. This was created out of a dual vision of securing long term 
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supplies of fish for global markets and of creating a viable, alternative tool to halt or reverse 
the decline in global fish stocks (Agnew et al., 2006). The MSC aimed to adapt the model 
created by the FSC and apply it to developing a comprehensive labelling initiative for 
fisheries (Auld, 2007). The MSC aimed to create a streamlined organisation with little 
bureaucracy that can operate strategically. This led to the MSC being launched as an 
independent non-profit organisation in 1997. The principles and criteria of the MSC were 
developed after a two year process that included global stakeholder consultation and input 
(Auld, 2007). The MSC is a voluntary process that employs a standard against which 
fisheries are measured by an independent third party. This standard is based upon three 
fundamental elements that contribute to sustainable fisheries and fisheries that pass this 
standard are certified and allowed to claim that their products come from a well-managed and 
sustainable fishery (Potts and Haward, 2007).  
In response, and as added competition to the MSC, the FOS standards setting and 
certification body emerged in 2006. The FOS is an NGO that aims to conserve the marine 
habitat and is the only organisation that sets standards for both sustainable fisheries and 
aquaculture practices. The FOS has become an international certification project that utilises 
independent third party certification auditors to ensure that projects abide by and certify its 
sustainable fisheries credentials. The FOS subscribes to the United Nation Food and 
Agriculture Organisations standards of good practice in developing and designing 
assessments of fisheries. By the end of 2010 the MSC and FOS have certified 98 and 30 
fisheries respectively. Fisheries standards aim to ensure that ecosystem management practices 
of the certified industry are higher than that of the current mainstream management practices 
(Agnew et al., 2006). This has led to an expectation of sustainable environmental 
improvement in fisheries that achieve certification. 
Each standard develops and sets individual principles and criteria that have to be followed for 
fisheries that gain certification. The FOS sets a number of detailed criteria that need to be met 
to obtain certification and use of their eco-label on products, while the MSC sets overarching 
principles and criteria that are used as the basis to develop a set of specific indicators and 
benchmarks against which each fishery is individually assessed (Potts and Haward, 2007). A 
fishery is assessed against the criteria and individual indicators and successful certification 
allows the products to carry the ‘MSC’ logo. However these individual methods of certifying 
fisheries have called into question the legitimacy of some of the fisheries certified (Ward, 
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2008). It is argued that the MSC has developed a poorly expressed environmental standard 
which has allowed for differing interpretations among certifiers, leading to an inability to 
accurately compare the credentials of the different certified fisheries (Ward, 2008, Jacquet et 
al., 2010). Fisheries certification faces the same challenges and shortcomings as forestry 
certification. With debates surrounding the definition and requirements of what determines 
sustainable fisheries, differing development of indicators, interpretations and bias by 
certifiers and the lack of data and knowledge about long term viability of fish stocks and 
fisheries have all led to the questions of whether fisheries certification actually promotes the 
sustainable management of fish stocks (Ponte, 2008, Jacquet et al., 2010). 
Goyert et al (2010) investigated whether the costs of MSC certification are actually worth it 
for the industry. They found that currently MSC certification is currently unable to offer the 
price premiums needed to incentivise the process of certification for fisheries. While this is 
the case it is necessary to understand if certified fisheries have sustainable development 
benefits. Agnew et al. (2006) set out to examine if MSC certification had his impact. They 
selected 10 fisheries that had received MSC certification and had gone through a first audit 
phase. They found that all the fisheries that had been certified had shown some SD benefits 
that result from the certification process (Agnew et al., 2006). This does not necessarily mean 
that the fishery is anywhere near untouched but does show a positive trend towards good 
environmental performance. They highlight two important lessons learnt from the process: 1) 
the biggest gains seem to arise in areas where conditions for certification were attached and 
2) the authors argue that ‘difficult fisheries’ should be encouraged to apply for certification.  
Ponte (2008) points out that while certification is deemed to be a good tool for fisheries, the 
stricter certification criteria needed to ensure environmental benefits makes it more difficult 
to obtain certification, thus decreases the incentives of fisheries to apply. There are therefore 
trade-offs within the certification process. Agnew et al. (2006) do however acknowledge that 
all of these environmental benefits cannot be definitively linked to the role of certification, 
rather they state that: “environmental gains have flowed from the conditions (during the 
certification process) set, and have been generated independently of conditions, at time scales 
that are coincident with, or appear to have been stimulated by, the certification process.” 
There does however seem to be a strong link between stringent criteria, which are 
operationalized through indicators, and the environmental improvements of a project. 
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4.3.3. Environmental Management Systems 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) aim to ensure that environmental considerations 
are incorporated into organisational management structures, so as to reduce their impacts on 
the environment (Rondinelli and Vastag, 2000). The premier and dominant EMS has become 
the ISO 14000 suite of guidelines, which are a family of voluntary standards and guidance 
documents to help organisations internalise environmental issues and reduce their impacts. 
The family of standards ranges from environmental management systems to EMS auditing, 
environmental labelling and life cycle assessment. The ISO 14001 standards have become the 
world’s largest VEP with 130,000 organisations certified (Nawrocka and Parker, 2009). This 
has attracted interest from industry, policy makers and has become vital, in some cases, that 
companies are ISO 14000 compliant (Sambasivan and Fei, 2008). Often obtaining 
certification is viewed by some companies as an entrance to global competitiveness, while in 
some cases it is mandatory for companies to obtain ISO certification to supply and partner 
with other companies (Sambasivan and Fei, 2008). This has led to the ISO 14000 EMS 
standards becoming virtually mandatory within some industries to remain competitive.  
The ISO process of obtaining certification is voluntary, it sets out 17 guidelines that a 
business has to follow and implement. Once this has been done an independent auditor 
accredited by the ISO evaluates whether the company fully abides by the guidelines. A 
company that does fulfil all the ISO 14001 guidelines and is found to be compliant are 
allowed to claim their environmental credentials. The ISO 14000 brand has become a global 
mark of environmental best practice and the most successful voluntary environmental 
standard, in terms of acceptance and implementation (Gavronski et al., 2008). It has been 
argued that obtaining ISO 14001 criteria does not actually initiate the required change in 
behaviour, rather it is used as a form of ‘green washing’ as it only focuses on downstream 
consequences rather than upstream causes and the underlying principles of unsustainable 
behaviour (Macdonald, 2005).  The ISO relies on the principles of “continual improvement” 
that guide the business actions, without any identification of ultimate objectives that comply 
with the basic principles for sustainability. This has led to the ISO 14000 standard being 
described as vague and one that does not incorporate the true end goal of sustainability 
(MacDonald, 2005).   
The ISO 14000 uses a system of qualitative sustainability indicators to address the issue of 
environmental performance; however it does not establish an end goal or objective for 
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projects. Individual environmental targets are set for each organisation, but these are not 
substantive in nature and thus the level of targets varies significantly across sectors, industries 
and individuals (Nawrocka and Parker, 2009). Thereby the indicators used to assess if the 
targets set have been reached are not actually a measure of sustainability; rather it is a 
measure of a case-by-case basis from differing baseline scenarios working towards differing 
end goals. This moves the organisation on a path towards sustainability but does not ensure 
that an organisation is achieving the optimum level of ‘green’ practices. 
Nawrocka and Parker (2009) conducted a meta-study of 23 articles that aimed to analyse the 
connection between EMS adoption and improved environmental performance. It was found 
that the differing baselines and end targets distort, confuse and complicate the measurement 
of what actually constitutes overall improved environmental performance and that thus the 
connection between ISO 14000 adoption and environmental performance and sustainability 
cannot be proven or substantiated. It is this reality that has led to the argument ISO 14000 
implementation is merely a form of ‘green washing’ rather than a concerted effort to improve 
environmental performance, and thus contribute to sustainable development. 
4.4. Lessons to be learnt for Voluntary Carbon Certification and SD Indicator Development 
The analysis the development of SD indicators and their application in some of the largest 
and most widespread VEPs has identified a number of lessons for the development of new 
certification standards, in particular surrounding the incorporation of SD indicators into the 
proposed development of a South African voluntary carbon standard within this thesis. 
4.4.1. Principles and Criteria of SD Indicators and Certification 
Section 4.2.2 highlights the debate around what constitutes an effective indicator and its 
applicability in moving towards ‘doing’ SD. There is only one agreement; that SD is a 
complex issue and that there is no single, definitive indicator measurement of SD (Bossel, 
2000). There has been a strong trend towards the development of SD indicators as a key step 
to incorporating SD goals in the certification process. Success has stemmed from the 
establishment of standard-specific, overarching principles and criteria that are used to guide 
and establish standard-specific end goals. These broad objectives of each certification system 
are then used to guide, and focus the development of indicators used by each standard with 
the aim to operationalise the objectives and the SD criteria detailed in each standard. A key 
lesson to be learnt from this analysis is that the effectiveness of the standard is based on the 
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motivations and goals (principles and criteria) upon which it is constructed. The development 
of a standard is a highly political and complex process between all those involved and that 
has to be carefully managed. Failure to manage this process brings into doubt the legitimacy 
of the certification process as it might be construed to become a form of ‘green washing’ that 
suits the agendas of certain individuals.  
While there is undoubtedly pressure on the developers of certification standards to 
incorporate more lenient requirements within the standard, it is imperative that they do not. 
Leniency has appeared in a number of certification processes and a key area is the lack of a 
definitive end goal (or overarching principle) of sustainability that every prospective project 
is measured against. The evolution of individual, project-specific criteria and indicators (both 
of the MSC and ISO 14000) has called into question the legitimacy of the claim to 
sustainable development of the projects that obtain certification under these standards.  
The independent findings of Agnew et al. (2006) and  van Kuijk et al. (2009) in different 
certification sectors (MSC and FSC, respectively) reinforce that establishing specific 
indicators for measuring SD objectives are a viable way of operationalizing sustainable 
resource management goals. In both it has been shown the requirements outlined in the 
prescribed indicators greatly contributed to moving the certified programs to a more 
sustainable development path. This in contrast to Nawrocka and Parker (2009) who highlight 
that the success of ISO 14000 in internalising SD is inconclusive, as this process is 
individualistic and distorts the actual, concrete measurement towards any real SD progress. A 
main reason could be due to lack of universal indicators mandated in the certification process 
that subjects every prospective project to the same process of validation and verification. The 
call has been the same, though to differing extents, through every certification sector 
evaluated as the differing indicators amongst certification standards within the markets and 
even within individual standard has added complexity, uncertainty and subjectivity to the 
process.  
4.4.2. Incorporating Local Context into SD Indicator Development 
The complexity of setting and developing standards is vast due to the complexity of different 
geographical regions, management regimes and stakeholders. The concept of sustainability is 
highly diverse and differs depending on the geographical, social, ecological and economic 
context within which the project is situated. This complexity has resulted in a call from 
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Rametsteiner and Simula (2003) for forest management standards to be based on, and adapted 
to, the regional or local conditions, both with regard to ecological and socio-economic 
circumstances. This is in line with van Kuijk et al. (2009) who argue that the criteria and 
principles of forest management certification are universal; however local context needs to be 
incorporated into the design of the indicators to determine the sustainability of forestry 
projects. As discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, this has been reinforced in the development 
of both the FSC and MSC standards setting broad criteria and principles that projects have to 
meet and then subsequently unique indicators are developed either nationally (FSC) or for 
each project (MSC) that are based on specific conditions (Potts and Haward, 2007). This 
uniqueness translates into a high specificity of indicators for sustainability in each location 
either regional or project specific, that reflects the diversity of local conditions, challenges 
and stakeholder views (Gullison, 2003). This reflects well with the call from Peskett et al. 
(2007) for voluntary carbon standards to be designed to meet the different objectives of the 
differing offsetting schemes, the process of developing these project specific indicators 
however is still highly debated (Mascarenhas et al., 2010). 
The FSC has arguably been the most successful certification system reviewed; the findings of 
van Kuijk et al. (2009) highlight this. The success of the FSC is attributed to their 
development of regionally-specific indicators that follow guidelines set by broad principles 
and criteria. This allows for all the projects to be assessed under the same system, but subject 
to regional-level criteria. These are then indicators designed to be applicable at a scale 
suitable for the necessary detailed information to be gathered surrounding a projects 
sustainable development potential and progress.  
4.4.3. SD indicator Frameworks 
Section 4.2.3 highlighted that the role SD indicator frameworks play in developing and 
operationalizing SD is essential. The choice of an efficient, simple and practical framework 
allows for the practical implementation, monitoring and understanding of the certification 
standards SD indicators and their goals. However there are no distinct, conventional  
The organisational framework is an important starting point for the development and 
implementation of indicators and as can be seen with the certification standards highlighted 
above, and combined with the lessons learnt from the voluntary carbon standards, there is no 
single best practice guiding SD indicator framework development. They need to be based on 
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a sound and factual basis but also actively incorporate local and user specific context to make 
them capable of achieving their intended outcomes. There is however no single recognised 
standard SD indicator framework that is used either by in one certification sector, eg forestry, 
or across sectors.  All the certification standards reviewed here utilise their own SD 
framework to arrange and organise the indicators. These frameworks usually take the form of 
a modified version of existing frameworks such as the DPSIR or IOOI frameworks. While 
these are essential starting points, this analysis highlights that in order to useful the 
framework has to be designed to be used in the context that the standard will be applied. 
4.4.4. Third Party Certification  
The issue of independent, third party certification has also emerged as a key area that needs 
to be refined and considered within general certification design. In many cases, amongst all 
the certification systems reviewed, there have been instances where differing interpretations 
amongst differing independent, third party certifiers has led to the distorting of the overall 
rules and the certification of projects that do not abide by the certification principles. This has 
been highlighted in the MSC process which Jacquet et al. (2010) states allows for the “loose 
interpretations of its rules” by independent, third party certifiers and this leads to 
accreditation of fisheries that are not sustainable. One of the main reasons for this is that 
leniency comes with an economic incentive for independent certifiers, as those that interpret 
the rules more leniently will obtain more continuous work during the annual audit phase 
(Jacquet et al., 2010). This is not unique to the MSC process only, and is prevalent in both the 
FSC and ISO 14000 certification system and is a problem inherent to the whole third party 
certification process. Differing certifier’s perceptions and interpretations of standard 
principles and guidelines leads to the accreditation of projects that do not meet the intended 
initial outcomes of what the certification system was designed to do. This leads to a broader 
failure in the process as it reduces the amount of trust and credibility within the standard by 
both potential projects and end consumers and as such reduces the effectiveness of the 
standard. Trust is integral to the success of a certification system and this need to be rapidly 
addressed and the appropriate mechanisms developed that ensure the integrity and validity of 
new third – party certification systems, such as a new voluntary carbon standard.  
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4.4.5. Costs, Complexities and Public Participation 
The practicalities and costs of adoption and compliance with certification systems have also 
been noted as a challenge, in particular for small, scale projects within developing countries 
(Goyert et al., 2010; Durst et al., 2006). Carothers et al. (2010) argue that this is a result of 
existing certification schemes focussing more on the development of the standard, then how 
the standard will be adopted and implemented. Many developing country projects that aim to 
attain certification are not only hampered by complex, expensive and bureaucratic 
certification processes but they are also constrained by systematic challenges such as limited 
availability of reliable data and monitoring challenges. Gough et al. (2008) argue that the SD 
assessments within standards are relatively expensive, time consuming undertakings and the 
reliance upon experts for SD evaluation, which is often the case in existing voluntary 
certification standards, and can push both the budget and time frames past the limits that are 
viable for a small project and monitoring program.  
Fraser et al. (2006) used the ‘Wellbeing Assessment from the Coast Information Team’ in 
British Columbia as a key example of where protracted public participation processes leads to 
a part failure in the indicator assessment process. This assessment relied heavily on an 
extensive, complex community consultation process that took up far more time than 
originally planned for and this in turn led to cost overruns because of missed deadlines while 
still producing skewed indicators. Communities however did feel more empowered after the 
process and disenfranchised residents were able to access policy makers. There is however a 
demand for quick, efficient and useful indicators and at the same time a desire to validate 
these through a public participation process. It has to be recognised that there are inherent 
trade-offs between costs, complexities and public participation Gough et al. (2008), these 
have to be acknowledged and incorporated in a third party certification design system, 
especially when designing SD indicators and frameworks. 
The theoretical framework for the development of effective and accepted indicators calls for 
a bottom-up approach (Reed et al., 2006; Doody et al., 2009). The practicalities, in terms of 
feasibility, cost (both financial and time) and efficiency of this approach have to be fully 
considered. While the top-down approach to indicator development is not the ideal way of 
achieving ‘true’ SD, its utility must not be discounted. Top-down indicator development has 
its place alongside a bottom-up approach and an expert, knowledge driven, practical approach 
to selecting relevant indicators has as much of role to play in the overall process as those of a 
 84 
 
bottom-up approach to developing and conceptualising SD and SD indicators. There is a call 
from Mascarenhas et al. (2010) for the use of a mixed approach to SD indicator development. 
While the FSC and MSC have incorporated and embraced the concept of regionally or 
project-specific indicators, they have all relied on a top-down approach to achieve this. While 
in practical terms this approach is more feasible, it does not recognise the differing 
perspectives of all stakeholders that are vital to effective SD operationalization. Mascarenhas 
et al. (2010) details a methodology that utilises a knowledge, science-led approach to 
selecting and synthesising a broad list of criteria into a single list. Then from this a bottom-up 
approach is used to refine and choose the indicators to be used in a particular region or 
project. This process has not been widely adopted in current third party certification standards 
and proposes a new and unique step in the development of SD indicators for new certification 
standards, such as the proposed voluntary carbon standard within this thesis. 
4.5. Developing SD Indicator Guidelines for a Voluntary Carbon Standard 
All the certification standards, as discussed above, apply different principles, criteria and 
indicators to assess the environmental management practices of a specific type of project. 
This is no different in terms of a voluntary carbon standard and SD. These need to be taken 
into account in the development of indicator guidelines for carbon certification. These will 
then help guide the development of future voluntary carbon standard SD indicators. 
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the literature on indicator development details 
varying extensive, broad criteria lists (Bell and Morse, 2003; Rees et al., 2006; Rees et al., 
2008) that are designed to guide and assist in the development of new indicators. However in 
the case of the of certification systems, indicators are used in a different way to those highly 
analysed in the current literature, e.g. indicators for monitoring purposes. Current SD 
indicator literature has focused more on the development of normative indicators that are 
classified as either prescriptive or evaluative indicators (Rempel et al., 2004; Heink and 
Kowarik, 2010) and are used to monitor future conditions of systems and the impacts of 
projects on the systems respectively. Current use of indicators, in certification standards, do 
not explicitly fall into either of these two normative categories, rather they aim to interpret 
and evaluate the current SD credentials of proposed or existing projects, as well as serving to 
guide projects in the development phase as to what they need to incorporate into the project 
to obtain certification. Certification SD indicators therefore exhibit a multi-purpose function 
and should be classified as descriptive indicators according to Heink and Kowarik (2010). 
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This defining an appropriate SD indicator, specifically for certification systems, also calls for 
the need to questions what constitutes an effective SD descriptive indicator. This list 
summarises the characteristics needed to develop an effective descriptive indicator, 
developed for this thesis from the literature, specifically to guide the development of SD 
indicators for the proposed voluntary certification standard:  
 Descriptive (synthesise data for a specific sector) 
 Accurate and Reliable (reliable data available on a regular basis) 
 Multi-purpose (measure current levels of, and provides guidance towards, SD)  
 Trans-disciplinary (quantitative or qualitative indicators integrating a variety of 
disciplines) 
 Representative of stakeholders (relevant to their specific needs and desires) 
 Efficient (cost-effective, time scales) 
 Practical (data collection and monitoring) 
 Applicable to a variety of spatial scales (regional and local) 
 Straight forward (easy to understand, interpret and communicate) 
This list differs from existing indicator development lists as carbon certification is not 
involved in using indicators purely for monitoring purposes, this is stressed in their multi-
purpose nature of both guidance and monitoring. This requires a different emphasis to the 
formulation of descriptive indicators as they are not explicitly required to measure change of 
actions, rather they are designed to measure the final outcomes of projects. This highlights 
the need for the emphasis on a trans-disciplinary approach of utilising both quantitative and 
qualitative measurements from a variety of disciplines (economics, social and 
environmental), ensuring the practicality of indicators to project developers and ensuring 
stakeholder involvement in their development. Abiding by these guidelines will serve to 
ensure that SD indicators incorporated into certification systems serve to achieve the desired 
outcomes of both indicators and certification. 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
It has to be recognised that there are trade-offs between any activities of a project and its 
impact on the environment, with the main aim of certification being to ensure that the adverse 
impacts are identified, limited and/or mitigated. It is for this reason that even the most 
stringent certification standards will never guarantee that a utilised and managed natural 
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resource is equal to an untouched one (Agnew et al., 2006; van Kuijk et al., 2009).. The 
development of SD indicators has emerged amongst all the certification sectors as a vital first 
step of ‘doing’ sustainable development.   
The FSC, MSC and ISO 14000 are just some of the certification standards that have adopted 
varying forms of SD indicators. These programs all share the same broad end goal of 
ensuring that sustainable development consideration are incorporated into the sector that they 
aim to guide. However the process of developing the applicable SD indicators has not been 
without its controversies and debates and has become a highly political issue. It prevails 
around the use of a top-down or bottom-up approach to developing and selecting the 
appropriate indicators for the SD objectives. The arguments centre on the feasibility of a 
purely bottom-up approach and the true SD benefits of a top-down approach. Large amounts 
of criticism have been directed at the use of multiple, differing third party auditors in each 
system. This adds large amounts of subjectivity and perverse incentives encourage certifiers 
to be more lenient in the verification process. This has introduced a degree of distrust 
throughout the certification industry and reduced the effectiveness of voluntary 
environmental standards.  
Nasi and Frost (2009) highlight that certification, using indicators, cannot be used as a 
definitive measure to ensure sustainable development; rather it has to be viewed as a vital 
step and tool towards achieving the management of natural resources. The use of reliable and 
easy to understand indicators can go a long way to increasing the legitimacy and acceptance 
of certification standards and VEPs, for both the potential project investors and consumers of 
the products generated from the projects. To achieve a holistic goal of sustainable 
development, indicators are only just one part of the equation. To be truly effective, the 
outcomes of certification have to be coupled with viable incentives through either positive 
economic gains for projects that obtain certification or through government regulation or 
taxation that penalises projects who do not abide by the standards. This will encourage a 
move towards the increased acceptance and development of new VEPs and eco-certification 
schemes that move towards the acceptance and incorporation of SD goals in a wide variety of 
goods, services or projects. 
This analysis of SD indicator development and the FSC, MSC and ISO 14000 certification 
processes has offered a variety of lessons to be learnt from the existing voluntary 
environmental standards: 
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 The development of SD indicators for certification schemes is a viable way of 
operationalizing SD, but the indicator frameworks and implementation needs to be 
refined. 
 Developing indicators specifically for certification schemes needs to move away from 
the traditional approach to indicator development and focus on the development of 
descriptive indicators. 
 The development of SD indicators for certification needs to incorporate both a top-
down and bottom-up approach and recognise the inherent trade-off between public 
participation, costs and complexities, especially in developing countries. 
 Third party certification needs to be reviewed and altered to ensure that projects are 
evaluated consistently and fairly, this will install trust into the certification standard. 
Coupling the lessons learnt from this analysis with those gathered from the previous analysis 
of the current voluntary carbon standards will greatly aid in the development of a South 
African voluntary carbon standard. All this information from both analyses (Chapters 2, 3 
and 4) needs to and will be consolidated and put towards the development of this standard. 
While it might not borrow directly from all the standards reviewed, their historical 
development will guide the new standard. This chapter has identified the pitfalls that need to 
be avoided and the positives that need to incorporated, refined and enhanced, especially 
surrounding voluntary certification and SD consideration. As the voluntary carbon market is 
a constantly and rapidly developing market there is large scope for innovation and these 
lessons from past certification schemes will contribute to the development of new ideas and 
techniques for the South African voluntary carbon standard.  
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The Development of a Standard Specific SD Indicator 
Framework 
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5.1. Introduction  
5.1.1. Purpose of Chapter 
This chapter aims to address the part of the vision (Chapter 1) relating to the emphasis of the 
proposed South African voluntary carbon standard to actively contribute to ensuring the 
sustainable development credentials with a particular emphasis on addressing South Africa’s 
developmental challenges. It has to be noted that the details and suggestions contained within 
this chapter are nowhere near ready for practical application or use, nor is the content within 
this chapter designed to be a final product. It has to made clear that this chapter does not set 
out to address any of the carbon quantification aspects of a project, as they are addressed in 
Chapter 6. 
5.1.2. Sustainable Development and Co-benefits  
It is becoming increasingly recognised that carbon offsetting projects, in different forms, have 
the potential to achieve a lot more than purely carbon offsetting but they can contribute 
significantly to achieving SD. Whether this is through providing increased employment 
opportunities to restoring landscapes and catchments or increasing ecosystem functioning and 
biodiversity conservation. The market also offers the opportunity to promote the inclusion of 
sustainable development benefits into offsetting projects. It offers an avenue to utilise 
existing financial market structures to engage with and unlock potential funding for offsetting 
projects with explicit sustainable development benefits. Voluntary carbon standards are seen 
as a ‘market-making’ intermediary in a market that currently has no recognised form of 
regulation. It is within this role that they play the crucial role of defining the norms, value and 
beliefs that ensure the functioning of the market (Merger and Pistorius, 2011).  This is 
imperative as all land-based projects are situated within complex socio-economic and 
ecological systems and it is essential that they address and incorporate these prevailing social 
and environmental issues (Merger and Pistorius, 2011). This is crucial to reduce the risks 
associated with a project and to gain acceptance and involvement of local stakeholders. 
Voluntary carbon standards have the potential to instil and ensure sustainable development 
within the market, through making it a market norm and value for both project developers 
and purchasers. This can both enhance both a project’s legitimacy and credibility but also 
reduce the immediate and long term risks associate with a project.  
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As discussed in Chapter 4, a crucial issue in this has become the process and frameworks that 
voluntary carbon standards use to evaluate, incorporate and ensure that projects are 
contributing to sustainable development within the region they are situated. The process used 
to evaluate sustainable development objectives during the certification process is paramount 
in ensuring that they are effectively incorporated, monitored and reported on. It has to be 
recognised that a project can produce both positive and negative externalities. Co-benefits 
have been described as the positive externalities that arise from the successful 
implementation of an offset project, while the negative externalities have often been 
described as co-costs. A certification standards sustainable development evaluation 
framework has to take into cognisance both of these potential outcomes and explicitly 
identity, incorporate, evaluate and monitor them to create a picture of a project’s SD 
credentials.   
It has to be recognised that there are extra costs and complexity associated with attempting to 
incorporate SD characteristics and evaluation into the project design process (Gough et al., 
2008). In a competitive environment, with differing voluntary certification standards (Chapter 
3) competing with each other to verify the most offsets, there needs to be an incentive for a 
project to choose the path of attempting to obtain certification with an added sustainable 
development component. Currently the majority of projects are going the route of pure 
carbon certification through VCS, but there is a steady increase in recognition of offsets with 
a certified sustainable development component. As the voluntary carbon market offset 
purchases are currently driven predominantly by corporate social investment purchases, 
corporates are realising the marketing and ethical incentives that arise from purchasing 
offsets with added sustainable development benefits. This has caused projects that have 
obtained both VCS and CCBS certification receiving between 1 and 2 US$ more per offset, 
purely as a result of the co-benefits that can be verified, monitored and reported from the 
project (Neef et al., 2010).  
This has begun to gain more prominence throughout the voluntary markets as evaluating, 
monitoring and reporting allows the market to place a value on these SD benefits and as a 
result they can therefore effectively internalise and place a value on the externality. This has 
led to the process of ‘bundling’ the sale ecosystem services and has allowed for a higher price 
to be charged on an offset generated from a project that is certified by a standard that 
incorporates a SD evaluation framework that aims to measure and report on these ecosystem 
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services. This is evident in that in 2010 many of the offsets generated from voluntary carbon 
standards that explicitly incorporate co-benefits in the certification process (CarbonFix, GS 
and Plan Vivo) attained a higher average price than the average over-the-counter price in 
2010 (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). While the market share of these standards is still relatively 
small the growth potential of projects that have social and environmental appeal is beginning 
to come to the fore. The GS and Plan Vivo transacted increased volumes in 2010, while 
CCBS continued to establish itself as the most sought after project design standard in the 
market (Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). 
5.1.3. Voluntary Carbon Certification, LULUCF and SD Indicator Frameworks 
Currently the voluntary standards that incorporate SD evaluations utilise a differing 
framework, or a combination of various frameworks, for reporting on the SD benefits of the 
particular context in which they are situated. It has to be recognised that differing project 
types have the potential to contribute differing amounts of SD benefits and that this needs to 
be incorporated into the various certification designs. It is however becoming increasingly 
documented and recognised that LULUCF projects have the potential to contribute to and 
ensure high levels of co-benefits (Peskett et al., 2007). This has seen project specific 
sustainable development indicator frameworks being mainly included in standards that focus 
predominantly on LULUCF type projects, such as CCBS, CarbonFix, SC, and Plan Vivo.  
Standards have chosen to design their SD indicator reporting guidelines around both 
recognised SD frameworks in the literature (e.g. SC utilises the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework) or designing their own from expert input during the certification standard design 
phase (e.g. CCBS). This has led to the incorporation of differing aspects of sustainable 
development within standards. The relatively new development of country specific or 
embedded standards, such as Brazil Mata Viva and Chinas PS, has also led to the 
development of new adaptation country specific sustainable development assessment and 
evaluation methodologies and frameworks. These standards can only be used by projects 
situated within the specific host country and the co-benefits and SD indicators are therefore 
adapted to addressing the inherent developmental challenges of the specific host country 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). This has allowed a standard to become a lot more focussed and 
relevant to ensuring the sustainability of projects developed within a specific country. 
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5.2. The SD indicator Framework Development Process 
The discussion of SD indicator frameworks in Chapter 4 is vital to the development of an 
effective and efficient SD indicator evaluation methodology for a voluntary certification 
standard. The lessons learnt from this discussion emphasise the development of an SD 
indicator framework that is applicable in the context it is situated. This is reinforces by 
Gough et al. (2008) which identified that it is imperative to define and develop a detailed, 
multi-scale, standardised list of indicators that can be used to guide the selection and 
development of more project-specific indicators that take cognisance of the context in which 
they are situated. This allows projects to achieve a higher level of autonomy and assessment 
of the true sustainable development benefits generated from a project. 
The incorporation of sustainable development is a vital component of the proposed South 
African voluntary carbon standard (see Box 1.1). This voluntary carbon standard system aims 
to be one of the few worldwide that explicitly evaluates, monitors and reports on the 
sustainable development credentials of a carbon offset project. However it is recognised that 
this process brings with it extra complexity and costs for the standard development process 
and both project developers and certifiers. It is envisioned that the development of a South 
African specific, common sustainable development indicator framework that can be used 
across all projects will go a long way to addressing these issues and minimising the 
associated costs.  
To initiate the process of SD indicator identification for this thesis, a workshop with experts 
was held to fulfil the top-down process as suggested by Mascharenas et al. (2010). The 
overall aim of the workshop was to identify a wide range of indicators that are relevant, 
feasible and that can be practically applied at a landscape restoration project level taking 
cognisance of the South African developmental context. These are essential as this standard 
aims to move beyond pure carbon certification to one that places SD at the same level as 
carbon. 
5.2.1.Aims and Objectives of the Workshop 
Developing indicators that are uniquely positioned within a South African context and 
designed surrounding South Africa’s developmental challenges is essential to the success and 
practicality of the standardised SD indicator list.  
To achieve this, the specific objectives of the workshop were to: 
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 Review and develop a framework for SD indicators selection. 
 Identify key and South African specific indicators that can be used to assess the SD 
criteria of landscape restoration projects within South Africa. 
 Develop an inventory and standardised list of SD indicators that can be used for South 
African landscape restoration projects. 
 
5.2.2. Workshop Process 
Over twenty experts were identified with knowledge of South Africa’s socio-economic 
situation, carbon markets and landscape restoration processes. They were selected based on 
their experience and expertise based on the above criteria, and it has to be noted that experts 
invited were from or based within South Africa, and where possible Grahamstown, due to 
time and budget constraints. They were invited to attend the workshop to be held in 
Grahamstown, South Africa. These experts were from a diverse range of fields including 
forestry, landscape restoration, biodiversity, economics, water, carbon offsets and social 
sciences and comprised of academics, practitioners and researchers. They were challenged to 
identify and critically analyse the key sustainable development challenges within the context 
of South Africa and in particular those that landscape restoration projects face and can 
contribute to addressing. These were then used to guide the selection of the SD indicators that 
can be applied to these projects.  
The workshop consisted of a presentation and discussion section and a breakout session. In 
the presentation experts were presented with more detail about the proposed project and its 
overall aims and principles and the hoped for workshop outcomes discussed above. Experts 
were also allowed to question and debate about the workshop structure and content so as to 
allow for a more conducive process to reach outcomes of the workshop. The presentation 
session also allowed for debate and the identification of the guiding, broad sustainability 
themes that were needed for the breakout sessions. Figure 5.1 outlines the process followed to 
achieve the workshop results.   
5.2.3. Identification of SD Themes and Sub-Themes  
It was agreed that the three pillars of sustainability as outlined in the Brundtland Report 
(United Nations, 1987) were a well-recognised starting point for the discussions around SD 
and the identification of crucial sub-themes that could be used to guide the development of 
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indicators. It was however accepted at the workshop that the social and economic categories, 
in this context could be joined, to form the socio-economic theme (Figure 5.1). These two 
categories then set the overall themes for each discussion group and experts were asked to 
participate within the group that they felt they could contribute the most too.  
In the breakout session, experts were challenged to consider and debate the South African 
specific challenges within their broad themes and from this identify a number of more 
focused sub-themes. These sub-themes were then used to focus the selection of the indicators 
that can be used to evaluate these sub-themes. The development of the sub-themes allowed 
for the focussing of the indicator selection process on the areas that the experts identified as 
being essential. This then allowed for identification of specific indicators that could be fed 
into the development of the SD indicator framework. 
Experts were guided and assisted in capturing the proposed indicator through being required 
identify and classify indicators in three distinct groupings: 1) essential to have – indicators 
that are non-negotiable and critical for the assessment of SD; 2) desirable to have – indicators 
that would be nice to have and add to enhancing the SD assessment of a project, and 3) love 
to have – indictors that would be ideal to include to ensure the maximum assessment of SD 
credentials. 
This process allowed the participants to highlight the crucial indicators within each theme 
and categorise them according to ‘importance to have’. To assist in identifying and grouping 
these indicators, the experts were guided by the following questions: 
 Why measure it – the purpose and rational of the indicator. 
 Strengths and limitations – how useful overall and what problems may occur in using 
the proposed indicator. 
 Are they feasible to implement - data, costs, time etc. 
 How are the data collected - method and approach used to collect the information. 
 How are they measured, reported and communicated. 
 
The experts identified twelve crucial sub-themes that they believed need to be addressed that 
would ensure the SD assessment of a landscape restoration project. These were then 
presented to the group as a whole for additional comment, debate and input.  
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5.3 Workshop Outcomes 
This process allowed for the identification of the initial broad suite of SD indicators within 
each theme for landscape restoration projects within South Africa. The experts identified 44 
indicators in the 12 sub themes (Table 5.1. – 5.4). It is these identified sub-themes and 
indicators that constitute the initial broad standard-specific indicator list as suggested by 
Mascharenas et al. (2010).  
5.3.1. Fitting Indicators into South Africa’s SD Challenges  
To understand the challenges that a South African voluntary carbon standard faces in 
ensuring that carbon offsetting projects contribute to SD, it is imperative to understand the 
broad context and challenges in which the standard will be situated. South Africa has been 
through a well-documented, turbulent history and faces vast and complex socio-economic 
and environmental challenges to development and in improving the well-being of the entire 
population. The environmental and socio-economic developmental challenges that South 
Africa faces are explicitly interlinked and addressing each of these is vital to encouraging 
sustainable development within the country.    
5.3.1a. Environmental Challenges 
The South African State of the Environment Report (SoER) (Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, 2006) provides an extensive overview of the current conditions of South 
Africa’s environment. It identified a number of major environmental challenges and priorities 
that South Africa faces and central to these are the identified sub-themes of water; 
biodiversity and land degradation issues.  
i. Water  
South Africa is a semi-arid, water-stressed country and access to fresh, quality water for 
agriculture, industry and human use is one of the key limits to development. South African 
has historically been plagued with both water availability and quality issues and since 1994 
and South Africa has steadily had less water available and that which is of a poorer quality 
(Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2006). However, the use of the available 
fresh water resources from both rivers and aquifers has been steadily increasing with a 
concurrent result in decreased freshwater flows into river systems. Water quality has also 
been steadily decreasing due to inadequate controls over pollution and the current land use 
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practices. Coupling these two facts together has led to an overall decline in the health of 
South Africa’s river ecosystems. The sustainability of water resources, its quality and 
availability it depends on the improvement of land management practices within catchments 
(Mander et al., 2010).  
Water Indicators 
Specific issues surrounding water have been largely neglected in current voluntary carbon 
standards. While they have been included and acknowledged at a broad level within standards 
focused at LULUCF projects such as the CCBS and CarbonFix, they have not included 
explicit indicators relating to the effect of landscape restoration on the availability and quality 
of water resources. Since water is a crucial issue within South Africa, its availability and 
quality needs to be explicitly monitored and accounted for in projects that fundamentally 
affect land-use within catchments. The experts identified six key indicators that could be 
assessed and reported on that specifically relate to water and land-use issues within South 
Africa. Table 5.1 below documents these. 
Sub Themes Indicator How to measure 
Water 
Rainfall Levels  
Proof that there is a plan, equipment and methodology 
for monitoring annual rainfall levels.  
Seasonal Streams 
Measure the change in water base flow levels using a 
recognised method on seasonal stream flows (e.g. 
Arnold and Allen, 2007). 
Ground Water Levels 
Record and report groundwater levels using a 
recognised method (e.g Pickens et al., 1978). 
Infiltration Rates 
Report on infiltration rates in permanent plots using a 
recognised method (e.g Pickens et al., 1978). 
Wetlands 
Record and monitor all wetlands within the project area 
using the WET Health assessment system according to 
Macfarlane et al. (2008). 
Water Quality 
Measure and record river quality within project area 
according to SASS guidelines according to Dickens and 
Graham (2002). 
Table 5.1: Water Indicators 
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As can be seen these indicators focus on the pertinent aspects of a wide variety of water 
related issues. These extend from indicators that have to be used to provide contextual 
information, in particular measuring and reporting on rainfall levels to those that need to be 
actively monitored and reported on, such as infiltration rates, ground water levels and water 
quality. Where possible the suitable, rapid assessment methodologies are dictated, such as 
that of WET-Health for wetland assessment (Macfarlane et al., 2008) and SASS guidelines 
for water quality (Dickens and Graham, 2002).  
ii. Biodiversity 
Due to South Africa’s rich diversity of plants, animals and ecosystems it has one of the 
highest levels of biodiversity in the world. South Africa contains three globally recognised 
biodiversity hotspots: the Cape Floristic Region (CFR), Succulent Karoo and the 
Maputaland-Pondoland-Albany Hotspot, MPAH (Mittermeier et al., 2011). The South 
African SoER (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 2006) states that the 
general condition of South Africa’s biodiversity and ecosystem functioning is ‘not good’. 
Increasing human pressures in areas of high biodiversity are leading to a rapid decrease and 
loss of species and the resultant decline of ecosystem functioning. 
Of all South Africa’s natural systems the aquatic ecosystems are experiencing the greatest 
threats. There is a particular risk to the destruction and conversion of wetlands. Terrestrial 
biodiversity is also under threat with areas of high biodiversity situated in areas with high 
levels of human pressure, as a result widespread land degradation is leading to loss of 
ecosystem functioning and in turn reducing the productivity of the land.  
Another major pressure relating to the loss of biodiversity within South Africa is the rapid 
rates of spread of alien invasive species (AIPs). They are leading to the loss of biodiversity 
and ecosystem functioning with the reduction of stream flow in rivers a key aspect. There are 
currently 198 plants classified as being invasive and it is estimated that they cover about 10% 
of the country (van Wilgen and De Lange, 2011). 
Biodiversity Indicators 
Biodiversity indicators have been well investigated, covered and incorporated into current 
LULUCF voluntary carbon standards, such as the CCBS, and in the majority of standards 
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they act as a cornerstone of assessing the environmental sustainability credentials of a project. 
However, to encompass a broad swathe of projects in differing locations they offer more 
guidelines and requirements to assessing biodiversity then specific, implementable indicators. 
They allow for projects to select their own assessment methodologies and reporting 
guidelines and thus these are not standardised across projects, making accurate comparisons 
and third party assessment between projects more challenging. Biodiversity is however a 
highly complex and the multi-dimensional aspects of measuring and conducting full 
biodiversity assessments of a given area are highly time consuming and expensive. Therefore 
to obtain an indication of biodiversity within an area, the current standards utilise a number of 
proxy measures, but it should be noted that these will never be able to truly account for the 
entire extent of biodiversity. 
Accordingly to overcome these challenges the experts identified a number of biodiversity 
proxy indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, that can be used to assess the potential 
biodiversity benefits from a project. These include proxy indicators of biodiversity through 
changes in vegetation cover and species richness (in particular plants). Other, simpler to 
report, proxy indicators require that projects show if they are situated within a biodiversity 
hotspot, and therefore contribute to restoring habitat of a vital ecosystem or that they list all 
the endemic species within the project area. Table 5.2 below details the proxy indicators 
identified by the experts:  
Sub Themes Indicator How to measure 
Biodiversity 
Vegetation Cover 
Measure levels of vegetation cover within the project area 
using an appropriate method, such as aerial photos. 
Species Richness 
Measure and report all plant species in a sample of 
permanent, fixed plots over the lifespan of the project. 
Alien Invasive Plants 
 Report on the extent, density and species of all AIPs 
within the project area. 
 Project has to have evidence of a clear AIP removal 
and control plan. 
Biodiversity Hotspot Detail if project is situated in a biodiversity hotspot. 
Endemic Species 
Describe all endemic or endangered species present in the 
project area. 
Table 5.2: Biodiversity Indicators 
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iii. Land Degradation 
The 2004 National Action Plan to Combat Land Degradation and Alleviate Poverty 
recognises the need to reverse land degradation in South Africa to both improve livelihoods 
and protect biodiversity (DEAT, 2004). Land degradation is seen to be severe in communal 
and rural areas as this is in conjunction with the total densities of livestock in South Africa 
which exceeds the lands long term grazing capacity (DEAT, 2006).   
The intensification of land-use and farming has led to increased localised effects in 
biodiversity loss and decreased water quality from increased sedimentation in the river 
systems. It is estimated that soil degradation cost South Africa nearly R2 billion annually, 
purely in dam sedimentation and increased water treatment costs (DEAT, 2006). 
Land Degradation Indicators  
 Land degradation has an adverse effect on water, biodiversity, as well as high costs and 
decreases the productivity of the land on which the project is situated. Land degradation, 
despite being a major environmental issue, has also been neglected in current LULUCF 
voluntary carbon standards. There has been much work done surrounding rapid assessments 
of land degradation and function over time, especially that of Tongway and Hindley (2004) 
and through utilising these existing methodologies a project can adequately assess its role in 
addressing land degradation. Table 4.3 below shows the indicators that the experts identified.  
 
 
5.3.1b. Environmental Indicators Discussion  
These indicators cannot be seen in isolation of sub-themes or individual indicators; they have 
to been seen as a collective and applied to assess the environmental sustainability of a 
Sub Themes Indicator How to measure 
Land 
Degradation 
Bare Soil Cover 
Report on % of bare soil cover in project area, relative to 
the functioning ecosystem. 
Land Degradation Index 
Rapid assessment of land degradation using a recognised 
and suitable methodology (e.g. Tongway and Hindley, 
2004) 
Table 5.3: Land Degradation Indicators 
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particular project. In some instances they extend across themes and overlap, e.g. the 
assessment of AIPs has both a role to play in biodiversity and water issues, while calculating 
a land degradation index includes aspects of infiltration and vegetation cover.   
It has to be recognised that due to the complexity and challenges associated with accurately 
assessing environmental sustainability, ecosystem functioning and biodiversity there are 
inherent trade-offs between extent and depth and costs, expertise and time. These indicators 
aim to act as rapid assessment proxies that focus project development on addressing and 
implementing actions that ensure the net positive environmental benefits of a project 
Reporting on and assessing these indicators will however allow for projects to go a long way 
to proving their contributions to environmental sustainability.  
These indicators while focussed at contributing to SD, they also implicitly focus on the 
assessment and monitoring of vital ecosystem services that are associated with a landscape 
restoration project. This is implicit in the SD assessment process as restoring the functioning 
of ecosystem services through landscape restoration will ensure the environmental integrity, 
and hence SD, of projects. This will also have the benefits of allowing for the reporting of a 
project’s contribution to restoring ecosystem functioning and capitalise on a form of bundling 
and selling of ecosystem services, albeit with carbon as the lead commodity. 
5.3.2a. Socio-economic challenges 
South Africa faces many challenges to socio-economic development, from high levels of 
unemployment and poverty to historical barriers and economic exclusion of vast sectors of 
the population (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). These challenges are well documented and while 
there is no quick fix there needs to be steps taken to redress the imbalances and ensure that all 
South Africans have the opportunity to benefit from new economic opportunities. The 
overarching South African socio-economic sub-themes identified by the experts in this 
workshop are consistent with those identified by Bhorat and Kanbur (2005), but tailored 
towards a carbon offset project development. The experts identified nine important socio-
economic sub-themes: poverty alleviation; good labour practice; gender equity; carbon 
equity; social capital; value chains; policy and practices; income and benefits; and 
infrastructure and services development. 
A large proportion of South Africans live in poverty. It is widespread amongst all geographic 
locations but concentrated mainly in rural areas amongst the majority black population 
 102 
 
(Leibbrandt et al., 2010). In 2008, 48% of the South Africa people were living below the 
poverty line of US$2 per day (National Planning Commission, 2011). It is estimated that 70% 
of these people live in rural areas (Shackleton et al., 2010). A direct contributor to this is 
South Africa’s high levels of unemployment, with government statistics for the 2nd quarter of 
2011 highlighting an unemployment rate of 25.7% (Statistics South Africa, 2011) but with 
real unemployment rates around 40% (Davies and Thurlow, 2010). Within this the women 
and youth are highly affected with only one third of youth under the age of 35 currently 
employed and women also vastly under-represented with them contributing only 34% of the 
economically active population (Bezuidenhout et al., 2008). 
These high levels of unemployment and equity issues underpin and compound the 
widespread poverty within South Africa, especially within rural communities (National 
Planning Commission, 2011). Leibbrandt et al. (2010) reinforce this and highlight that the 
rising inequality in South African is both due to the rising rate of unemployment and rising 
earnings inequality amongst the South African population. It is these characteristics that have 
prevented the labour market from playing a positive role in poverty alleviation. For the South 
African labour market to contribute to poverty alleviation there needs to be the creation of 
long term, equitable and stable employment for those living in poverty. 
The cycle of poverty described above is being further exacerbated by the widespread 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS which contributes stressors and shocks to already impoverished 
individuals or households. South Africa has one of the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in 
the world, with 10.5% of the total population living with HIV (Statistics South Africa, 2011). 
Aliber (2003) states that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is expected to contribute to the 
impoverishment of 26-33% more households that would have been the case without the 
disease. 
i. Socio – economic Indicators 
The combination of the social and economic themes led to the development of nine sub-
themes that were identified as being crucial to addressing the myriad of developmental 
challenges that South Africa faces. It has to be recognised though that a carbon offsetting 
project cannot address all the embedded social issues within South Africa, but it can 
contribute to increasing the well-being of those employed by the project and contribute to 
sustainable livelihoods of communities surrounding the project. As a result the indicators 
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identified by the experts predominantly focus on those social and economic issues that a 
project can have direct influence or control over.   
In recognising this, the experts identified 31 indicators that could address and evaluate a 
project’s socio-economic sustainability credentials. Theses covered a wide range of socio-
economic issues from poverty alleviation to gender equity and infrastructure and services 
development. Table 5.4 highlights the socio-economic indicators identified by the experts at 
the workshop that could go some way to contributing to addressing the challenges identified. 
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Sub Themes Indicator How to measure 
Poverty Alleviation 
Poverty Alleviation Potential Is the project situated in an area of high poverty? 
Number of Employees and cumulative working 
days (annually for the project) 
Record of number of employees and their cumulative working days, permanent and contract, employed by the project. 
Local Employment Majority of people employed from the area surrounding the project. 
Skilled vs. Unskilled Labour Detail the ratio between skilled and unskilled labour employed by the project. 
Employee Education and Training 
Evidence of a plan for employee skills development and training and a professional development plan coordinated to employee 
needs. 
Health Awareness 
Evidence of programmes and plans that raise awareness and provide guidance for employees around health issues e.g. 
HIV/AIDS awareness 
Employee Dependents Number of dependents supported by the employee’s income. 
Good Labour Practice 
Employment Status Detail the ratio between contract and permanent employees. 
Employment Turnover 
Percentage of employee turnover every year. 
Evidence of employee dismissal procedures and reasons for dismissal 
Health and Safety Evidence of a plan that deals with health and safety issues and training with regards to employees of the project. 
Dispute Resolution Evidence of a plan that adequately outlines dispute and grievance procedures for employees of the project. 
Child Labour Evidence must be given that no children under the legal working age are employed by the project 
Employment Equity 
Equal Employment Opportunities Evidence of a recruitment plan that offers equal opportunity for employment 
Gender Employment Ratios Detail the ratio of male and female employees. 
Equal Compensation Rate Equal compensation and benefits for male and females at same pay grade. 
Youth and Women Employed Evidence of the ratio of youth (below 35) and women employed as compared to men. 
   
Table 5.4: Socio – Economic Indicators 
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Carbon Equity 
Establishment of Community Upliftment Trust 
Fund 
Evidence that project contributes to uplifting communities through a fund that invests in development (education, health, 
housing).and that any investments are aligned to community needs and wants. 
Access to Natural Resources 
Proof that communities surrounding the project have not been involuntarily excluded from using or access to the use of 
traditional sources of natural resources. 
Social Capital 
Forming New Networks 
Assess the extent of new networks and benefits gained or formed between or among managers, employees, everyone else 
affiliated with the project using an appropriate methodology.  
Employees (or Community) Representative 
Council 
Encouragement and assistance for workers to discuss issues in a formal setting. 
Elected representative that is involved in project strategic meetings. 
Value Chains 
Income Distribution and Capital Sourcing Disclosure of company shareholders and nationalities and the percentage of profits distribution to shareholders. 
BBBEE Compliance Projects have to disclose BBBEE compliance and partners. 
Policy and Practices 
Local Based Suppliers Policy to purchase from locally based suppliers where possible. 
Local Labour and Management Policy and plan to employ local labour and management where possible. 
Income Diversification Plan Show planning steps or a strategic plan for a future income diversification plan for the project. 
Income and Benefits 
Project Wage Rate Compare average project wage rate to the legislated minimum wage. 
Remuneration Proportion Proportion of profits spent on remuneration between managers and employees. 
Income Contributed to Employee Benefits Costs spent on housing, education, healthcare for employees. 
Income Distribution Wages paid to contract and permanent workforce. 
Infrastructure and Services 
Development 
Infrastructure and Basic Services Spending 
Disclosure of spending on infrastructure development and basic services improvement for both employees and the project, and 
what this has been. 
Access to Infrastructure Who has access to the improved infrastructure? 
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5.3.2b. Socio-economic Indicators Discussion  
Social and economic indicators within current voluntary carbon standards are addressed and 
integrated in a variety of different ways, while the CCBS does not prescribe any specific 
indicators or areas that need to be assessed it does dictate that projects include and report on a 
recognised and consistent method of social assessment. SC on the other hand uses the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SocialCarbon, 2003) as a structure to guide the 
inclusion of specific indicators that projects need to monitor and evaluate in a participatory 
manner as dictated by the standard. CarbonFix highlights some standard specific issues while 
also borrowing from other voluntary standards such as CCBS and FSC. The majority of 
assessment methodologies focus predominantly on social issues of a project and the 
economic issues have often been neglected and side-lined within current voluntary carbon 
standard SD assessment methodologies. What is clear is that there is no predominant, best 
practice for assessing both the project specific and broader social and economic impacts of a 
landscape restoration carbon offsetting project. 
There has been little emphasis in voluntary carbon standards on ensuring true local level 
carbon equity through the explicit incorporation of these considerations into indicator design 
that aim to influence project level design. Carbon equity involves developing access to 
carbon markets, involvement in carbon project decision making and the continued use of 
forest and natural resources for the communities involved in or surrounding the project 
(Brown and Corbera, 2003). Developing this equitable interaction amongst all stakeholders in 
carbon offset projects is vital to the development of projects that promote SD benefits. The 
differing interests of all stakeholders need to be acknowledged and incorporated into carbon 
projects with a strong emphasis on the generation of co-benefits. Key to promoting carbon 
equity is the development of robust, trusted cross-scale institutions (Brown and Corbera, 
2003). Interests between different groups need to be aligned and the issues of fairness and 
who benefits from the project and whom is included in development actions are vital to 
promoting these truly sustainable development objectives.  
The experts within the workshop highlighted that more emphasis needs to be placed on 
requiring projects to assess the pertinent aspects of both social and economic systems, in 
particular those aspects specifically under the influence of the project. Social indicators 
identified related mainly to project specific aspects and with a large emphasis on poverty 
alleviation and meaningful job creation as well as other issues such as health and safety, 
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gender equity and good labour practice and representation, but also included broader issues 
such as employee dependents, community upliftment projects and education and training.  
Economic indicators focused predominantly on project-specific characteristics such ensuring 
a fair wage rate and ensuring that there are relevant policy and plans for locally based 
employment and suppliers are developed. The incorporation of the social and economic 
indicators highlight there inherent interconnectedness and places the emphasis on the 
potential socio-economic impacts that a project can have on the communities that surround it. 
The use and implementation of the indicators identified are also constrained by the time, 
costs and expertise needed to collect the relevant data and subsequent analysis of it. It is for 
this reason that the majority of indicators are related to internal, project related information, 
such as policy and plans, good labour practice and value chains. This information should be 
readily available to the project and allow for the ease of reporting and monitoring of these 
indicators.  
A landscape restoration carbon offsetting project does have further reaching and longer term 
socio-economic effects and impacts than just within the project specific boundaries and 
amongst those that are employed or active within it. To evaluate the positive, long-term effect 
a landscape restoration carbon offsetting project can have on its workforce and surrounding 
communities these factors need to be considered in the design of the appropriate framework. 
5.4. Developing a SD framework for a proposed South African Voluntary Carbon Standard 
The broad lists of SD indicators identified from the expert workshop (Table 5.1 – 5.4) 
provide the ideal starting point to develop the initial standard specific SD assessment 
framework for the purposes of this thesis.  
5.4.1. The Input – Output – Outcome – Impact (IOOI) Framework 
As discussed in Chapter 4 the development of an appropriate SD framework is essential to 
the practical operationalization of SD indicators.  The IOOI framework is one of these and 
has been discussed previously. It is widely used by the World Bank and its related 
organisations, and is the project level development of the common DPSIR framework 
(Lundberg et al., 2009). This process has also become known as a programme assessment 
framework (Bowen and Riley, 2003) or a project based framework (Ayres et al., 2010), 
emphasising its project based nature. Ayres et al. (2010) state that it is a simple, yet, clear and 
efficient framework that can be used to assess both the immediate, short and long term 
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impacts of a project. This project based framework is predominantly used to monitor the 
effectiveness of projects where a major aim is to improve the state of the environment (Ayres 
et al., 2010). It effectiveness lies in its ability to differentiate between the direct and indirect 
impacts of a project, as well as its reliance on project specific characteristics that need to be 
used to develop the necessary indicators that can then be measured and reported on (Bowen 
and Riley, 2003).   
This framework (Figure 5.2) can be essentially categorised into separate input, output, 
outcome and impact indicators that follows an implementation plan that flows from 
influencing the project design phase to the implementation and measurement of sub-themes 
and projects that contribute towards the desired goals and impacts (Bowen and Riley, 2003). 
This framework is inherently useful as it allows for indicators to be linked to the project cycle 
through defining indicators for every stage within it. This allows for the development of 
indicators that can guide projects and contribute to assessing the project’s performance 
towards the desired outcomes, in the immediate, short and longer terms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are four crucial steps and indicator types within the IOOI framework (Segnestam, 
2002): 
 Input Indicators – These indicators are designed to obtain the project-specific input 
data. These data are crucial as it allows for the baseline information to be obtained 
and the objective judgements about a projects SD characteristics to be made. These 
Figure 5.2: The IOOI Framework (adapted from Gambrelli and Bucher, 2002) 
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can also offer complimentary information that can then be used to assess the SD 
contributions of other aspects and indicators. 
 Output Indicators – Once a project is implemented there are a number of immediate 
outputs. These indicators are designed to measure and monitor these effects on the 
immediate environmental or socio-economic spheres of a project. 
 Outcome Indicators – These are designed to measure and monitor the short term 
outcomes and results of a project. These indicators work in conjunction with the 
impact indicators. 
 Impact Indicators - These indicators are designed to measure the longer term impacts 
of the project and thus monitoring the projects effectiveness towards achieving its 
sustainability objectives. These indicators have to be specifically related to the 
outcome indicators so as to obtain a picture of the indicators contribution to SD of the 
project.  
 
Input indicators usually take the form of project-specific inputs and can be determined by 
analysing what specific tasks are to be funded, plans to be implemented, personnel committed 
and/or the funds earmarked for implementation for a specific purpose. Output indicators then 
relate to the specific actions that have been taken during the project’s design and 
implementation phase (Gambarelli and Bucher, 2002). The development and formulation of 
outcome and impact indicators however are more of a challenge. Outcome indicators aim to 
measure the larger, but shorter term goals, of a project or the state of the environment as a 
result of the project (Bowen and Riley, 2003). Impact indicators take this further and aim to 
measure the longer term, broader impact that a project has had on the environment 
(Gambarelli and Bucher, 2002). 
5.4.2. Developing the SD Indicator Assessment Framework 
To design an effective and efficient SD evaluation framework it has to be recognised that 
each action can be measured using this IOOI approach. Accepting this provides an ideal 
mechanism that can then act as a link between the specific project goals and outcomes with 
the broader environmental and socio-economic sustainability considerations (Bowen and 
Riley, 2003). To be truly effective within a voluntary carbon standard process this framework 
has to be seen as an implementation plan that influences and guides the design of a project 
type (in this case South African landscape restoration projects) rather than being initially 
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focussed and tailored to each individual project. Accordingly, the IOOI framework developed 
for the South African voluntary carbon standard has to be adapted from that of Gambrelli and 
Bucher (2002). Figure 5.1 highlights this modification of the framework to make it in line 
with the carbon project development and a certification cycle.  
This framework differs in that the proposed standards overarching SD goals and criteria (see 
Chapter 1 and 6) are used to guide the amounts and types of inputs that a project needs to 
align themselves with these requirements (Input indicators), rather than the other way around 
(Gambrelli and Bucher, 2002). This alteration will allow the framework to be applied across a 
range of project locations within South Africa and provide a uniform process to assess and 
monitor the SD characteristics of projects. This can then be used to monitor and assess a 
projects’ performance to a positive contribution to SD using the output indicators. 
Subsequently these are used further to assess a project in both the short (Outcome indicators) 
and long term (Impact indicators) and their contribution to SD of both their environmental 
and socio-economic impacts. 
5.4.3. Incorporating the Indicators into the Standard Specific IOOI Framework 
While the raw indicators and lists were identified at the workshop and are represented in 
Table 5.1 – 5.4, these needed to be organised and modified to fit into the IOOI framework. 
To achieve this, the identified indicators were assessed for the applicability in any of the four 
IOOI categories. Those that were suitable were placed into the relevant category, while those 
that were not were modified to work within the framework. This involved developing 
indicators to monitor changes and time scales according to the framework. The initial 
indicators offered the basis to achieve this and no indicators were altered from their original 
intent or interpretation. The IOOI framework is presented in Table 5.5 below:
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SD Theme 
SD Sub Themes and 
Issues 
Standard SD Goals  
Project Inputs 
(Input Indicators) 
Project Performance 
(Output Indicators) 
Project Outcomes and Impacts 
Short Term 
(Outcome Indicators) 
Long Term 
(Impact Indicators) 
E
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o
n
m
e
n
t 
 Issue: Decreased 
freshwater flows.  
 
 Increase Water base flows 
and quantity. 
 
 Technical and financial assistance to 
measure rainfall and monitor 
groundwater and seasonal streams. 
 
 Detailed and current records and data for rainfall 
assessment and monitoring. 
 Detailed methodology and plan to measure 
seasonal streams within the project area 
 Detailed methodology to measure ground water 
levels within the project area. 
 % change of seasonal changes in groundwater 
recharge rate and levels in the project area. 
 % change in seasonal variation in the flow of 
seasonal streams within project area. 
 Inter - annular % changes in 
groundwater recharge rates and levels. 
 Inter - annular % change in water flow 
within seasonal streams. 
 Issue: Decrease 
in water quality. 
 Increase the quality of 
water. 
 Identification of rivers and streams 
within project boundaries for water 
quality testing. 
 Investment in SASS practitioners and 
training. 
 Baselines for water quality according to SASS 
guidelines and reporting standards (Dickens and 
Graham, 2002). * 
 Annual water quality according to SASS 
guidelines.  
 Changes in water quality according to 
SASS guidelines. 
 Issue: 
Decreasing 
wetland health 
and functioning. 
 Protect and monitor 
wetlands within project 
area. 
 Technical and financial assistance to 
assess and monitor wetlands using 
WET-Health rapid assessment system 
(Macfarlane et al, 2008). 
 Number of wetlands within the project area.* 
 Health status of the wetlands within the project 
area.* 
  Change in Wetland status; ensure 
avoiding a decrease in status. 
 Issue: Spreading  
Alien Invasive 
Plants (AIPs) 
 Remove AIPs and halt 
spread within the project 
area. 
 Plan to monitor and control AIP 
species. 
 Number of Full-time equivalent 
employees (FTE) dedicated to AIP 
clearing and management. 
 Total hectares covered by AIPs.* 
 Species and distribution of AIPs within the 
project area.* 
 
 % change in cover of AIPs within project area. 
 
 Hectares cleared and used for project 
activities. 
 Issue: 
Biodiversity 
Loss 
 Ensure that biodiversity is 
maintained and natural 
vegetation restored within 
the project area. 
 Technical and financial assistance to 
assessing and monitoring biodiversity. 
 Detail if project is situated in a biodiversity 
hotspot.  
 Identify all endemic and endangered species 
within the project area. 
 Record the % of vegetation cover within the 
project area.* 
 Measure and report on species richness in fixed 
plots.  
 Annual % change in vegetation cover in project 
area. 
 
 % Change in species richness in the 
fixed plots. 
 Issue: Increasing 
Land 
Degradation 
 Halt and reverse land 
degradation in the project 
area. 
 Technical and financial assistance to 
assessing and monitoring land 
degradation.  
 Record the % of bare soil cover in the project 
area.*  
 Rapid assessment of land degradation index 
using recognised methodology e.g. (Tongway 
and Hindley, 2004)* 
 % change in bare soil cover within the project 
area.  
  
 Change in landscape degradation 
indicator according to the chosen 
methodology. 
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 Issue: Poverty 
Alleviation 
 Create jobs for the 
communities surrounding 
the project.  
 Indicate if the project situated in an 
area of high levels of poverty. 
 
 Number of employees employed by the project.* 
 % of employees from the communities 
surrounding the project.*  
 Cumulative working days for all employees of 
the project. 
 % of employee turnover each year. 
 Ratio between skilled and unskilled workers. 
 Number of dependents supported by the 
employee’s income. 
 Change in well-being of employees as a 
result of the project.  
 Create decent 
employment 
opportunities. 
 Development of a recruitment plan 
that offers equal opportunities for 
employment. 
 Proof that all employees are of the legal working 
age. 
 Ratio between permanent and contract 
employees. 
 
 
 Good labour practice  Development of a plan that outlines 
dispute and grievance procedures. 
 Development of a plan and financial 
and technical assistance to employee 
health and safety. 
  Number and types of disputes. 
 Number and types of work related injuries. 
 Lost workdays due to injuries or illness. 
 Reporting on all disputes lodged. 
 Evidence of fair dispute resolution 
procedures. 
 Evidence that steps are taken to rectify 
the cause of the injury or illness.  
 % change in dropout rates of employees 
and reasons why 
 Skills development,  Technical and financial assistance to  List of programs and plans for employee  Number of employees participating in training  Impact of skills training and 
Table 5.5. The proposed IOOI Framework for a South African Voluntary Carbon Standard 
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education and training develop programmes and plans for 
employee training and skills 
development. 
training, in particular surrounding personal 
health awareness. 
 Proof that plans and programs are aligned to 
employee needs and wants.  
and skills development programmes. development on employees. 
 Employee perceptions of the utility of 
training. 
 Issue: Income 
and Benefits 
 Ensure a fair wage for all 
employees. 
 Proportion of project profit spent on 
remuneration of project employees. 
 Average employee wage as compared to the 
legislated minimum wage.* 
 Proportion of profits spent between managers 
and employees. 
 Changes in savings rates of employees 
of the project. 
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 Issue: 
Development of 
Infrastructure 
and basic 
services  
 Contribute to the 
development of local 
level infrastructure and 
basic services 
 Financial and technical costs of 
developing infrastructure and basic 
services. 
 List of infrastructure and basic services to be 
developed by the project. 
 
 % of profit allocated to the development and 
maintenance of the infrastructure developed. 
 % profit allocated to providing basic services for 
employees. 
 Use and access to of new, developed 
infrastructure. 
 Number of households benefiting from 
increased access to basic services and 
infrastructure. 
 Issue: Ensure 
gender equity 
 Ensure equal 
opportunities for all 
members of the 
community. 
 Development of a recruitment plan 
that offers equal opportunities for 
employment. 
 Number of male and female employees.* 
 
 Evidence of equal compensation rates at the 
same pay grade. 
 Representativeness of employee 
workforce as compared to community 
demographics. 
 Issue: Contribute 
to the 
development of 
carbon equity 
 Ensure projects contribute 
to local level carbon 
equity.  
 Establishment of a community 
upliftment trust. 
 Education of employees and the 
community about the project and its 
goals and aims. 
 
 Report on members of trust fund management 
committee. 
 Records and minutes of meetings. 
 
 Annual contributions to trust fund.  
 Target areas of trust fund are in line with 
community needs and wants. 
 
 Trust fund disbursements. 
 Records of projects funded from trust 
fund 
 Knowledge amongst stakeholders about 
the project and its activities. 
 Ensure access to natural 
resources  
 Plans to manage and control access to 
natural resources. 
 
 Amount and types of natural resources harvested 
from the area.* 
 
 Evidence that local communities have not been 
excluded from access to these natural resources. 
 % change in annual natural resources 
harvested from the project area. 
 Communities’ perceptions on access to 
natural resources as a result of the 
project. 
Issue: Increase 
levels of social 
capital 
 Encourage the 
development of new 
social networks amongst 
all project participants. 
  Establishment of an Employee (Or community) 
representative council. 
 Evidence of participation or consultation in 
project strategic decisions. 
 Number of new social networks formed 
as a result of the project. 
 Perceived benefits as a result of new 
social networks. 
Issue: Contribute 
to  local 
economic 
development 
 Contribute to local 
economic development 
within the project area. 
 Total spending within the local 
economy (wages, infrastructure and 
suppliers) 
 % of suppliers who are locally based.*   % contribution of project to regional 
GDP. 
Issue: Ascertain 
value chain of 
capital flow. 
 Encourage the 
participation of South 
Africans in projects 
 Disclosure of all Company 
Shareholders. 
 Disclosure of BBBEE compliance, if 
required to comply. 
 Evidence that local stakeholders are given the 
priority and provided an opportunity to become 
shareholders and participate in the project. 
 % of shareholders that are South African 
citizens. 
 Number of participants in the BBBEE scheme. 
 % of profits distributed to shareholders. 
 % of profits disbursed to BBBEE 
partners 
* - Denotes Indicators to be used in the SD baseline determination process
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5.5. Practical Considerations of the SD Framework 
The organisation of the identified indicators (Table 5.5) into the IOOI framework aims to 
provide a structures approach to organising the SD indicators through providing a structured, 
easy to interpret process. However at the same time there are a number of other areas that 
need to be considered that work in conjunction with the framework. These relate to ensuring 
SD assessment practicality, effectiveness and cost efficiency especially in areas of developing 
SD baselines, data collection methodologies for project developers and indicator reporting 
guidelines.  
5.5.1. SD Baselines 
To determine a projects specific contribution to ensuring net positive SD benefits, a baseline 
level will have to be set before a project starts. This will allow for a specific project to be 
monitored and evaluated over time against the pre-project characteristics. There are practical 
considerations to setting a project specific SD baseline, especially surrounding the costs and 
effectiveness of obtaining and assessing the project areas current environmental and socio-
economic conditions.  
There is a trade-off in complexity between establishing baselines for project-specific 
environmental and socio-economic conditions. Environmental baselines would relate to the 
current environmental conditions prevalent within the proposed project area. Setting socio-
economic baselines is however more complex. It requires a socio-economic assessment 
surrounding current land-uses and practices within the specified project area. Especially 
considering that projects have differing effects on the scale of the impacts as socio-economic 
effects cannot be isolated to a specific project area or boundary. Within the SD baseline 
assessment framework these need to be accounted for. 
Putting in place requirements that a project has to report on surrounding the current condition 
of the land and environment and the socio-economic effects of the land-use will allow for the 
development of a standardised project SD baseline assessment methodology. The 
practicalities and costs however still need to be considered surrounding the establishment of 
these SD baselines. Requiring extensive environmental and socio-economic baselines to be 
undertaken will increase costs, both time and monetary, for project developers and as a result 
decrease the attractiveness and efficiency of the certification process. This will in turn 
diminish the use the proposed standard. To overcome these challenges it is imperative that a 
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standardised carbon certification SD baseline assessment process is developed that is both 
practical and cost-effective. 
The indicators developed in the expert workshop (Table 5.1 – 5.4) provide an opportunity to 
facilitate this. It offers the scope to identify the indicators within the IOOI framework that 
serves a dual role of setting the baseline and for future monitoring. However, not all of them 
are as adept in playing this dual role, and so a subset of these indicators needs to be selected 
and prescribed for projects’ to use when establishing baseline conditions. The indicators that 
have the potential to play this role are denoted in Table 6.5 by the * symbol. 
The indicators are all situated within the Output section of the IOOI framework as these are 
the indicators designed to give the immediate overview of a project’s SD situation and 
current SD credentials, and therefore are equally applicable in determining the baseline of a 
project. It has to be noted though that utilising a subset of the Output indicators will not 
provide a comprehensive, in depth analysis of the current projects SD situation but it will 
provide a baseline for a project to be evaluated against in the future. In turn this assist in 
ascertaining if a carbon offset project is contributing to the provision of net positive SD 
benefits within the area it is situated. 
5.5.2. Data Collection Methods for Indicators 
Utilising the appropriate methods in collecting the relevant data is an essential step in 
ensuring the accuracy of SD indicator assessment and reporting. There have been a few 
approaches taken by current voluntary carbon standards and they relate to prescribing the 
methods used (e.g. SocialCarbon) to allowing a project developer to select and develop their 
own methods to report on the indicators required in the standard (e.g. CCBS and CarbonFix). 
These two approaches have their positives and negatives, and the development of the SD 
indicator framework has incorporated aspects of both of these approaches. While many of the 
indicators outlined in the IOOI framework do not require active data collection or have 
specified methodologies, there are a number that do.  
To reduce the costs involved with the development and use of rigorous and complicated 
scientific methods it was aimed, where possible, to utilise existing proven rapid assessment 
methods to collect data for indicator reporting. This was particularly relevant within the 
environmental theme and the experts identified a number of rapid assessment methodologies 
that could be appropriate to use to collect the data for a number of indicators, these included 
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the Landscape Function Analysis (LFA) developed by Tongway and Hindley (2004); WET-
Health developed by Macfarlane et al. (2008) and the South African Scoring System (SASS) 
for river health by Dickens and Graham (2002). Stipulating that projects utilise these 
identified rapid assessment or similar methodologies that have already been proven, tested 
and peer-reviewed aims to promote consistent data collection techniques and reduced costs.  
While these are not a definitive list of methodologies they provide the starting point for 
debate surrounding which methodologies would be applicable to evaluate certain indicators, 
e.g. is the LFA the most appropriate methodology to use in assessing landscape degradation. 
The development of data collection techniques for the socio-economic indicators are however 
more challenging. While the majority of indicators will require internal project data there are 
a number that require assessment of the wider stakeholder impacts. The experts did not 
identify an overarching prescribed method for collecting this data, and is one area that needs 
to be addressed if the proposed standard is to ever be released. To make the SD assessment 
framework practical the methods for collecting this data will have to be interrogated and 
defined further as the framework is developed. 
5.5.3. Reporting Guidelines and Periods 
The environmental and socio-economic impacts of a project act in different time frames and 
at different scales. These have to be explicitly recognised in the practical implications of 
indicator reporting. The IOOI framework aims to achieve just this but for practicality the 
actual time periods need to be defined. The input and output indicators act in the immediate 
term, with some output indicators overlapping with the selected baseline indicators. In this 
case they will be required to be reported on by the end of proposed initial certification 
process (see Chapter 6). 
The outcome and impact indicators act at longer time scales. The outcome indicators are 
envisioned to be reported on annually by the project to allow for the tracking, transparency 
and monitoring of the SD characteristics of a project. The annual assessment and reporting of 
these indicators will allow for the establishment of an effective monitoring programme for a 
project and allow for adaptive management to be instilled from a projects design phase.  The 
impact indicators are designed to act at a broader scale and evaluate a project’s effects both 
inside and outside of its boundaries; as a consequence it is more complex and costly to collect 
the required data to report on. Therefore these indicators need to be aligned with the proposed 
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voluntary carbon standards third-party auditing cycles (see Chapter 6). This will provide a 
project with a set timeframe and some long term monitoring guidelines surrounding projects’ 
broader and cumulative long term impacts on both the environment and socio-economic 
situation in which they are situated. 
5.6. Conclusion  
Bowen and Riley (2003) state that the effective integration of socio-economic and 
environmental dynamics can only enrich and aid a project’s decision making abilities and 
facilitate outcomes that contribute to sustainable development. Environmental and socio-
economic indicators have to be interlinked to ensure they contribute to effective project 
management and performance; however this requires a large, broad set of indicators that can 
address as many of the factors as possible. Tracking a project’s SD influence over its lifetime 
will provide a long-term picture of the impacts and effectiveness on improving the socio-
economic and environmental sphere in which it is situated. There is however an inherent 
trade-off and complexity involved in developing the appropriate, broad swathe of indicators 
around and practicality, detail, costs and time. This indicator framework is designed to 
establish these links and offer a programmatic approach to assessing SD performance of 
landscape restoration projects within South Africa.  
There are a number of challenges however in attempting to understand the relative 
contributions of natural cycles, episodic events and anthropogenic influence on a project and 
at a broader level (Bowen and Riley, 2003). These are especially pertinent in sectors where 
there are a myriad of other influences on systems, in particular within ecological systems 
(e.g. water quality) and the various socio-economic factors (e.g. wellbeing). It is for this 
reason that the IOOI indicator assessment framework aims to act at different scales and time 
frames. The majority of indicators identified in the expert workshops relate specifically to 
assessing controllable aspects of a project in the short term, especially with regard to socio-
economic indicators. The long term indicators are however also crucial to the evaluation of 
the success of a project in contributing to SD. The immediate, short and long term indicators 
will allow for a project to track its performance and alert both project managers and other 
stakeholders to prevailing trends and allow for adaptive management capacity to be built.  
The process outlined in this chapter has provided a basis for the top-down expert consultation 
and identification of the pertinent indicators that need to be considered for a South African 
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voluntary carbon standard for landscape restoration projects. The workshop has facilitated the 
first stage of the development of an SD indicator framework for restoration projects under a 
South African voluntary carbon standard. It has achieved this by allowing for the 
identification of a wide variety of indicators that will provide a holistic, but practical and cost 
effective, assessment of the SD characteristics and trends of a project. The incorporation of 
the indicators into the IOOI has achieved the second phase of this process, but there is still a 
long way to go in order to design an accepted, comprehensive framework that can be 
incorporated into a potential South African voluntary carbon standard. 
This process and framework is by no means a final product and requires refining and 
consultation and debate with a wider variety of stakeholders in a variety of disciplines, in 
order to make it truly effective.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
A Preliminary South African Voluntary Carbon 
Standard 
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6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Purpose of Chapter 
This chapter will incorporate all the ideas and processes developed and discussed from the 
lessons learnt in the previous chapters to create the first initial draft or ‘straw dog’ guiding 
framework of a potential South African voluntary carbon standard aimed at certifying 
landscape restoration projects. This will incorporate the preliminary SD indicator framework 
developed in Chapter 5 and aims to abide by the the vision outlined in Box 1.1. 
6.1.2. Context for the Chapter 
The developments of the various voluntary carbon certification processes have taken different 
routes, forms and directions. While they have all been based on a common ideas and 
outcomes they have all focussed on different strategies to achieve these. As seen in Chapter 
3, these have distorted the market and made it difficult for both project developers and 
investors to select the appropriate voluntary carbon standard and projects in which to invest 
that align with their goals or outcomes. The majority of standards have aimed at 
accommodating a wide range of projects using the same certification requirements (e.g. 
additionality, leakage etc.) at a global level. The concept of country specific voluntary carbon 
standards has only just begun to emerge, and has been discussed throughout this thesis, see 
Chapter 3.  
While these standards are a new and innovative approach to the development of the voluntary 
carbon market and voluntary standards, they do hold the risk of confusing the market even 
more. However the poor uptake of the current voluntary standards in many developing 
countries, especially in South Africa, highlights there are shortcomings to the current 
standards and opens up a niche for a new, innovative, local, cost effective standard that 
achieves the same (and or more) as the current voluntary carbon standards. As previously 
discusses,  it is imperative that these standards are grounded in current market best practices 
so as to be accepted by both developers and purchasers within the local and global market, 
and as such ensure the legitimacy of the offsets. Failure to adhere to the basic concepts of 
certification design and as a result the incorporation of the essential criteria (highlighted in 
Chapter 3) will cause the carbon certification process to fail in the marketplace, through 
diminishing confidence in the standard and thus attracting lower prices for the offsets that 
obtain certification. Ensuring the confidence in the standard and the offsets it certifies is 
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imperative to its success and potential acceptance amongst local participants, both developers 
and purchasers, in the voluntary carbon market. 
This thesis has so far shown that there is not one single recognised certification development 
process or methodology for a developing a new voluntary carbon standard. Chapter 3 and 4 
have aimed at gaining a broader understanding of the voluntary carbon standards through 
identifying best practice as well as the vital lessons surrounding certification design and its 
historic application, in particular its successes and pitfalls. Particular focus and emphasis was 
given to developing a standard specific sustainable development (SD) assessment framework 
(in Chapter 5) as the standards vision (Chapter 1) is to instil and encourage SD credentials of 
potential projects. 
6.2. Standard Design Process 
6.2.1. Standard Principles and Aims 
While the principles and vision of the proposed standard are outlined in Chapter 1 there needs 
to be clear setting of this preliminary standard and what it aims to achieve. As discussed in 
chapter 1 the development of this preliminary South African voluntary carbon standard has 
the overarching goal of making it simpler and more cost effective for South African 
landscape restoration projects to gain certification, but all the while maintaining both the 
integrity of offsets generated and the SD credentials of a project. To achieve these objectives 
it is vital that the standard ensure that the certified offsets meet the following overarching 
principles: 
 Real – All GHG reductions and removals from projects have to be proven. 
 Reliable – All GHG reductions and removals must be quantifiable using recognised 
measurement tools and they must establish a credible emission baseline. 
 Permanent – All GHG reductions and removals must be for the long-term (excess of 
30 years). Where a project is a risk of potential reversibility then the appropriate 
mitigation actions and safeguards must be abided by.  
 Additional – Emissions reduction or removals must exceed that which would have 
happened under a BAU scenario if the project would not have taken place. 
 Conservative – All project calculations must use conservative assumptions, values 
and procedures.  
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 Exclusive – Each offset must be unique and associated with a single offsetting activity 
to avoid double counting.  
 Sustainable Development – Projects must incorporate and monitor the environmental, 
social and economic attributes associated with the project and promote the benefits, 
throughout its lifetime. 
 Transparent – Key documents and information associated with the project must be 
publicly disclosed to allow interested parties to make decisions with reasonable levels 
of confidence. 
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6.3. The Development of a Preliminary South African Voluntary Carbon Standard 
This process will be discussed in terms of where the essential criteria fit in to the different 
steps outlined in Figure 6.1. The main aim of this chapter is to create a proposal of a ‘straw 
dog’ certification process that can be used to guide the potential future development of a 
South African specific voluntary carbon standard. In doing this these thoughts and ideas will 
be allowed to be critically debated so as to assess their practicality, efficiency and 
applicability to potential implementers and project developers and South African conditions. 
This will in turn allow for a more detailed, accepted and practical standard that can be more 
easily implemented. This thesis will address and discuss proposals for steps 1 – 7 (Figure 6.1) 
and their sub sections especially surrounding the theoretical development of these concepts 
and how they are proposed to be addressed within a potential South African voluntary 
standard. While these steps are not the entire ambit that is required for a viable certification 
standard, they are the essential criteria highlighted in Chapter 3 and those that can be dictated 
and changed in the standard development process. 
Step 1: Restoration Information Note (RIN) Development 
i. Theoretical Development 
The proposed RIN process fulfils a similar role as that of the Project Idea Note (PIN) that has 
been used within the CDM certification process. The CDM PIN process aims to make an 
assessment of the projects financial viability and estimations of its GHG reduction potential 
before the BAU calculations have been completed in the PDD. The CDM PIN requires the 
following (Hodes, 2007):  
 The type and size of the project. 
 Project location. 
 The anticipated total amount of GHG reduction compared to the BAU. 
 The suggested crediting life time. 
 The suggested CER price in US$/ton CO2eq reduced. 
 The financial structuring (indicating which parties are expected to provide the projects 
financing). 
 The projects other socio-economic or environmental effects/benefits. 
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It has been argued that the PIN process in the CDM is unnecessary in that it adds extra costs 
and duplicates information to be provided in the PDD process. The information  required 
does not allow for the correct scoping decisions to be made with regard to true project 
eligibility, rather it calls for hypothetical project scenarios to be evaluated. Thus it adds extra 
costs and time and acts as a barrier to project development, rather than an assist in project 
design and certification. The PIN document can however become a useful document in the 
project process and one that can work in conjunction with the PDD to decrease costs and 
increase efficiencies.  
ii. Standard Process 
To expedite, but ensure the quality, of the process of certification it is necessary to have as 
many checks on a projects integrity and potential success in place before it is implemented. 
This is vital to ascertain if a project is viable and if it will be successful in gaining final 
certification and continued operation before it has to face the expenses of PDD design, and 
third party validation. Developing and submitting a RIN document is the first of these 
processes to be incorporated in the standard. The RIN document in the standard is designed 
as a scoping phase that details the initial ideas and processes behind the proposed project. It 
has two main roles: 1) to determine if the project is eligible to apply to undertake the 
certification process, and 2) to identify any potential major pitfalls that the project might 
experience in its development. In doing this it needs to take a critical look at the project and 
provide enough information so that an initial decision and determination of project eligibility 
can be made. As such the RIN document will require information that can be used to evaluate 
it against the proposed Eligibility (Step 2) requirements.  
It is envisioned within the standard, that the RIN document can play a key step in simplifying 
and expediting projects. However the RIN needs to be formulated correctly and require 
suitable information to assist both the project developers and the proposed certification body 
(the potential standard management agency) in understanding the detail associated with the 
project. To achieve this, the RIN will focus on the background to the project and allow for the 
assessment of the eligibility of the project for certification purposes. In doing so the RIN 
needs to provide sufficient information to make these judgments. It is suggested that the 
requirements of the RIN (Box 6.1.) will address these challenges.  
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RIN 
 Project Title 
 Type of Project (standard classification) 
 Detailed Geographic Project Location and Coordinates (shapefiles, maps etc.) 
 Project Time Frame (proposed start date and length) 
 Description of the project (technical details - species to be used, planting method etc.) 
 Proof that the project abide by all laws of the country e.g. (require an EIA, if not – 
proof of exemption). 
 Baseline methodology to be used. If designing new methodology then this has to be 
motivated as to why and how it differs. 
 Estimated offsets potential and project size category (tCO2eq) 
 Proposed carbon and leakage pools. Need to be motivated and proven why. 
 Project developer details: contacts and list of all individuals, companies, managers 
and consultants related to the project and their relative roles and experience. 
Project Eligibility Criteria 
 Description of current and historical land use for the last ten years (land-use, property 
rights etc). 
 Proof that only locally indigenous species at the correct densities to be planted 
 Proof that the planting area : 
o Is not a natural area at project start date, 
o Has not been a forest ten years prior to project start date, 
o There is no relation between project participants and cause of deforestation for 
ten years before start date, 
o That no planting occurs within areas that were/are different ecological areas 
originally (e.g. vegetation types, biomes, wetlands etc.) 
This is a unique and novel approach to instituting a comprehensive, mandatory scoping phase 
for projects through the RIN document. It aims to turn the RIN from merely a supporting 
document into a major, useful project document that guides the initial scoping and design and 
proof of eligibility before a project begins. This will also allow the restoration design 
Box 6.1. RIN Process 
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document (RDD) to be simplified and to focus on just the essential criteria that need to be 
met for certification. This will simplify the process for both project developers and certifiers 
and thereby reduce the costs and increase the efficiencies in both the project design and 
validation. 
Step 2: Determine Eligibility 
Once completed, the RIN will have to be submitted to and evaluated by the certification body 
(or the voluntary carbon standard governing body). The RIN will be evaluated against the 
Eligibility criteria (outlined previously in Box 6.1). If the project is deemed eligible the 
project developer will be given permission to begin compiling the Restoration Design 
Document (RDD). If the project is not deemed eligible, the project developer will have to 
rethink the project and submit a new RIN with the required amendments as determined by the 
RIN corrective actions. To expedite the certification process the certification body will 
review and return the RIN with a record of decision within 30 days of submission; this will 
allow for the timeous and efficient processing of RINs.  
It is imperative that the project developer is not kept waiting on decisions from the 
certification body, this has the potential to cause a ‘log jam’ effect and slow the entire 
certification pipeline. This in turn introduces new and higher costs for project developers.  
 Step 3: Developing Guidelines for a Restoration Design Document (RDD) 
i. Theoretical Development 
The development of the project design document (PDD) is the most important part of the 
certification process, and the RDD required within this proposed standard aims to fulfil this 
step. In the current CDM and voluntary carbon certification processes the PDD is used to 
describe the entire project process from baseline calculations and monitoring plans to leakage 
requirements, risk assessments to project boundaries and project participants. It is the 
cornerstone document that is submitted to the certification body and the information 
contained within it is what a project is validated against. However current PDDs have been 
criticised for being overly complex and confusing. The United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP, 2008) highlighted 38 pitfalls associated with the projects developing the 
CDM PDD and that cause significant delays in the process. These ranged from a “lack of 
logic and consistency in  the PDD” to “absence of baseline data” , “poor quality of PDD”, 
“insufficient explanation of baseline scenarios” and “monitoring and project management 
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procedures not defined”. These all stem from the CDM PDD requirements being overly 
complex, disjointed and ambiguous which has led to misinterpretation by the PDD 
developers. The main point of contention has arisen in what is actually required within the 
PDD (UNEP, 2008), and this can be seen from the CDM pitfalls above and the same 
confusion has extended into voluntary markets PDD design as well. 
The main areas of confusion centre around whether the PDD requires reporting on both detail 
surrounding proposed methodologies and actual calculations (e.g. actual baselines) or if it just 
includes providing the proposed methodologies to be followed. While it is supposed to be 
unequivocal that the actual detailed calculations are required in the PDD, it has been 
misconstrued by project developers and has led to confusion in the project design phase 
(UNEP, 2008). This has increased costs and project failures due to PDDs failing the 
validation phase. Therefore it is vital that this process is streamlined and unequivocal so it 
can be used to inform project developers of the exact detailed information that is required to 
obtain validation and certification. Providing this information will make the certification 
process more cost effective for project developers through reducing costs from possible 
corrective actions in the validation phase.   
ii.  Standard Process 
It is envisioned that the requirement for a more detailed RIN document that it will allow for 
the streamlining and simplification of the entire RDD process. Allowing for an initial 
evaluation of the project detail, eligibility and proposed methodologies in the RIN and then a 
subsequent submission and evaluation of the detailed project information, such as baseline 
calculations, additionality determination, leakage and permanence assessments and 
monitoring activities in the RDD will allow for a more streamlined and efficient process. This 
will in turn shorten and simplify the final RDD document and make the validation and 
verification process more efficient through reducing the time needed for the validation 
process. The proposed certification process is outlined in Figure 6.1 and the detailed 
requirements of the RDD (Steps 3a – 3c) will be discussed below. 
Step 3a: Determine and Calculate Baselines (Carbon and SD) 
Determining the baseline levels of a project area is a crucial component in the certification 
process. As discussed in Chapter 3, a baseline attempts to represent the proposed BAU 
scenario if an offset project was not implemented. This allows for the number of credits 
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generated from a project to be determined. The difference between the BAU scenario and the 
emissions reduction resulting from a project equals the amount of credits generated from the 
project (Kollmuss et al., 2008), and as such the amount of offsets allowed to be traded.   
The different forms of carbon baseline methodologies have been extensively discussed in 
Chapter 3 and for a South African specific voluntary carbon standard it is proposed that 
project specific baseline methodologies will be used to determine the carbon sequestration for 
landscape restoration projects. This has been done for two reasons: 1) they provide the 
context specific information, as highlighted by Moura Costa et al. (2000) and Murray and 
Sommer (2004) and 2) they have been widely developed within other certification systems 
for LULUCF projects (e.g. CDM, VCS, CAR etc.) and are publicly available. 
Baseline methodologies so far have mainly focussed on the carbon aspect of projects. 
Standards such as the CCBS, CarbonFix, SC and GS have aimed to introduce and ensure that 
the baselines and monitoring of co-benefits are taken into account, but this has gained little 
acceptance within larger fully fledged standards such as the VCS. It is imperative that these 
begin to gain more prominence in the voluntary carbon standards. There needs to be a 
monitoring process instilled within the co-benefit assessment methodology that allows for the 
evaluation of a projects contribution to the generation of co-benefits over time. One way to 
achieve this is through setting and calculating a pre-project baseline of the holistic project 
situation, i.e. of both carbon and SD benefits. This is consistent with the standards 
overarching goals and principles of ensuring and integrating the generation of SD benefits 
throughout the certification process. However within the standard the development of the 
carbon and SD benefit baseline methodologies and monitoring plans will take different paths. 
Carbon Baselines 
Developing and selecting baselines methods to calculate the carbon BAU scenario is a critical 
step in the process. There are three proposed options within this step: i) selecting a pre-
approved baseline methodology, ii) developing or altering a new baseline methodology, or 
iii) adapting an existing methodology. 
i) Selecting a pre-approved baseline methodology 
There have been a wide variety of baselines developed and approved by existing standards 
and they have become freely available for any project to use. The majority of voluntary 
carbon standards have taken this route and allowed for the use of the methods approved under 
 129 
 
different frameworks. This standard will allow for the same process. While these methods 
would still have to be reviewed and accepted by the final certification body according to the 
standards criteria and principles, the potential of utilising these existing methods will allow 
for the expediting of projects and the avoidance of the unnecessary development of 
methodologies that already exist. These methodologies will have to be screened to ensure that 
they abide by the principles of the standard and are applicable to South African conditions 
before they are accepted and allowed to be used. Initially this will focus on landscape 
restoration methods but it has the potential to extend into other areas once the standard has 
been adequately developed. 
This however is not the only way in which methodologies will be approved by the standard. 
There is a trend amongst voluntary carbon standards for the development of a standardised 
methodology approach (CAR, CarbonFix), that is baseline methods designed and approved 
internally by the standard and then released for use by project developers.  
This is a dual methodology pre-approval process is a novel and unique approach that has not 
been fully explored within current voluntary carbon standards. Through following this 
approach it will provide the standard with a comprehensive list of methodologies that can be 
used for a wide variety of projects. It will also make the standard more attractive to project 
developers due to the ability to use a pre-approved methodology, rather than developing their 
own, and thus reducing costs and increasing efficiency.  
iii. Developing and submitting a new baseline methodology 
If a suitable carbon baseline assessment method does not exist it is the up to the project 
developer to design the appropriate method. The new method will then be submitted and 
approved by the certification body that will ensure it abides by the principles and criteria that 
govern the standard. If the method does not meet the requirements of the standard it will be 
rejected and the project developer will need to resubmit with the necessary corrections. As 
highlighted in the RIN, the project developer’s intention to submit a new methodology will 
have to be indicated and motivated. If accepted then the methodology review process will 
have to be followed before the submission of the RDD to allow for the baselines to be 
calculated during the RDD phase. 
Currently the submission and approval process of new baseline methods within some 
voluntary standards, and the CDM, has been criticised for their stringent, rigorous and time 
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consuming methodology review and acceptance processes. This has often times stalled and 
limited the acceptance of new project types and the associated methodologies. This has arisen 
from overly stringent and comprehensive review systems, such as the VCS double-review 
process.  
To overcome this, the proposed South African voluntary carbon standard will have to set up a 
methodological technical review panel with the specific mandate to review the applicability 
of new methodologies within a set time period from submission, in order to provide the 
project developer with clear direction. If the methodology is rejected by the technical review 
panel, the project developer will be allowed to appeal the decision, in which case the 
methodology will be submitted to an external third party reviewer. The third party reviewer 
will then make the final decision with regards to the acceptance of the methodology. This 
process is unique and will allow for the efficient and effective acceptance of new 
methodologies. 
iv. Adapting an existing methodology 
The third option relates to adapting an existing baseline methodology to the condition of the 
current location of the project. This is particularly evident in methodologies designed for 
projects situated in wetter areas and then attempted to be applied in more semi-arid areas 
(Powell, 2011, pers. comm, 10 Nov). While the majority of the methodological design is 
suitable there are adjustments that need to be made in order to be practically applied in other 
locations. It is for this reason that the proposed standard will allow for the altering of 
methodologies accepted in other standards. 
There does need to however be a cautious approach and it needs to be debated surrounding 
how many alterations are made until a methodology becomes a new one and has to enter into 
the process outlined in option i above. 
Sustainable Development Baselines 
To assess the SD baselines of projects the standard will follow the standardised approach 
developed in Chapter 5. The Gold Standard, CCBS and SC all follow this same process and 
have been lauded for their integration of SD considerations into the certification process. The 
baseline is calculated through doing an initial assessment of the pre-project BAU scenario 
using the standard developed SD assessment tool in Chapter 5. This then allows for the 
monitoring and reporting of the SD benefits of the project based on the same evaluation 
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system. This also allows for a consistent and transparent assessment of a projects contribution 
to ensuring positive SD benefits throughout a project’s lifetime. 
Step 3a.1: Formulate Monitoring Plan (Carbon and SD) 
i. Carbon 
An efficient and accurate monitoring plan is integral to the success and integrity of the carbon 
offsets produced by the project. While it has been incorporated into the overall baseline 
methodology design previously, it is required within this standard as a separate section. This 
is envisioned to allow for the accurate evaluation of the proposed monitoring methodology. 
This will allow for judgements and recommendations to be made individually between 
baseline and monitoring methodologies. The monitoring methodology will be required to be 
submitted alongside the baseline methodology. 
ii. Sustainable Development 
The SD assessment and monitoring framework has already been discussed in Chapter 5 and it 
will follow a standardised approach. The SD credentials will be assessed and monitored 
according to the developed SD evaluation system. 
Step 3b: Determine Additionality 
The concept of additionality is crucial to the development and acceptance of carbon offsetting 
projects as it adds legitimacy and transparency. While this concept has been touched on 
throughout this thesis (especially in Chapter 3) there needs to be a critical examination of its 
theoretical development that will aid in the development of a proposed additionality tool for a 
proposed South African voluntary carbon standard.   
i.  Theoretical Development 
Since the beginning of the development of the official carbon market through the creation of 
the CDM there has been the debate about how to ensure the environmental integrity of the 
offsets within the market. Key to this was determining that credits are issued to projects that 
are reducing or mitigating emissions that would not have occurred without the development 
of the CDM and carbon markets. Article 12.5(c) of the KP made this formal through 
declaring that “emissions reductions made through the CDM project activities in non-Annex 
1 countries cannot be reductions that would have occurred in the normal course of activities 
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(cannot be BAU). This has become to be known as additionality and is ascertained by 
requiring projects to demonstrate their compliance through a number of tests. However, as 
outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, this process has become highly controversial and the 
interpretations and implementation of the additionality test has become highly varied between 
CDM projects, DOEs and DNAs (UNEP, 2008). This has led to concerns around the 
credibility of additionality testing amongst new CDM methodologies and a move by the 
CDM EB to standardise the additionality testing methodology.   
The current CDM additionality tool has been designed for large scale, bureaucratic, 
government funded CDM projects and to be used across all different project types; it is 
within this that the tool has become distorted and complicated (Houdashelt et al., 2006). It is 
inherent that projects such as renewable energy and landscape restoration projects face 
different challenges and constraints to additionality determination and assessing them within 
the same framework has introduced the subjectivity, impracticality and complexity currently 
associated with the current additionality tool. The relatively new additionality testing 
guidelines developed by the CDM methodology panel provided examples of how a new 
methodology could assess why the proposed CDM project activity is less likely to occur than 
one or more of the other possible scenarios. These recommendations formed the basis of the 
development of the current additionality determination tool. This tool incorporates a pre-
approved multi-step additionality determination process and has become the most widely 
accepted additionality determination process, with it being mandatory for CDM projects and 
incorporated into many voluntary standards. The use of this tool has become to be seen as a 
‘safe option’ by many standards and project developers and thus has created the ‘precedence 
effect’, under which this additionality tool has become preferred over other additionality tests 
(Houdashelt et al., 2006). 
This tool has however not escaped criticism. It has been derided for its subjectiveness, 
impracticality and for being overly detailed (Schneider, 2009). The inclusion of the various 
stages required to determine additionality, especially the financial additionality, call into 
questions the motives of the CDM EB and the actual purpose of imposing these multi-step, 
mandatory additionality processes. There is a strong call emerging, for only the emissions 
and environmental additionality of projects to be tested, in that all projects that contribute to 
the reduction or mitigation of emissions should have the option to be considered additional 
(Schneider, 2009; Alexeew et al., 2010). Financial additionality is the major key criticism of 
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the current additionality tool. It was initially developed to assess whether Annex 1 countries 
were using their already budgeted official developmental assistance money, given to non-
Annex 1 countries, to fund CDM projects and, as such, receive the CDM credits for funding 
they would have provided anyway (Dutshke and Michaelowa, 2006). It has now arisen that 
through using financial information to make an assessment of a project’s additionality makes 
it possible for the unwarranted consideration of a project, especially those that are developed 
by the private sector. 
One of the other additionality tests allows the CDM EB to determine and analyse the actual 
initial intent of the project. It is argued that this is an area that cannot be assessed in an 
impartial, consistent and objective manner, and intent of the project is not something the KP 
actually requires. The current CDM additionality tool is making unfair judgements on 
projects and this has led to the potential exclusion of a number of projects in developing 
countries which are actually additional and could provide SD benefits to these countries. 
Financial additionality is not the only additionality step facing criticism, the other steps such 
as barriers to implementation and common practice tests have also been highlighted for their 
shortcomings (Houdashelt et al., 2006). These two tests introduce unnecessary complexity 
and subjectivity and do not address the original additionality intention of ensuring 
environmental integrity. Requiring projects to prove that they face a significant barrier to 
implementation allows them to obtain an easy step in additionality testing as most projects 
face one or other of the wide ranging, broad barriers on the implementation list 
(www.cdmrulebook.org). It also has the potential to encourage project developers to 
understate their actual project details to simply pass through this step. While the common 
practice step, which ensures that credits are not generated by projects that are using a 
standard practice in a given area, is valid it is short sighted. It is potentially limiting for future 
offset projects within a specific area as the question has to be asked: at what threshold, such 
as time, does landscape restoration or wind power become a common practice or technology 
that cannot generate credits anymore even though it is contributing to decreasing or 
mitigating GHGs. There needs to be a review of these additionality tests with the goal of 
removing the subjectivity and complexity associated with them. 
Due to the ‘precedence effect’ discussed earlier (see pages 131-132) the CDM additionality 
mechanism has been widely adopted by the voluntary carbon market today, but it has been 
transformed and moulded to meet its requirements. This has however allowed for the 
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permeation of the pitfalls and shortcoming into the voluntary market and voluntary carbon 
standards. While the current additionality thinking and methodologies are valid and vital 
starting points, additionality should not be such a significant barrier to project development, 
as it currently is. Complexity and subjectivity of proving additionality introduces major forms 
of costs, both monetary and opportunity, for all participants in the market from project 
developers and certifiers to investors. Its widespread acceptance within the voluntary carbon 
markets has led to the exclusion of many smaller, truly additional projects as they simply 
cannot afford the costs associated with the CDM and the current voluntary standards 
(Houdashelt et al., 2006). It is not the explicit mandate of a voluntary carbon standard to 
assess the financial soundness and intent of the project in the additionality testing phase, 
neither is it within their mandate to make a subjective assessment of the actual intent of the 
project using the barriers to entry or common practice tests. The development of new 
voluntary carbon standards offers the opportunity to address these pitfalls and develop new 
simpler, less excluding additionality determination tests and tools. 
There have been many new forms of additionality testing proposed and introduced to counter 
just this; including additionality benchmarking, technology lists and a baseline approach. 
While the current CDM tool has focussed at a project specific level of additionality testing, 
these new additionality processes focus at a broader performance level approach (Houdashelt 
et al., 2006). While the broader level additionality tests are the eventual end goal for many 
standards, at the moment they are limited due to the uncertainties and complexities associated 
with determining an accurate wide-ranging baseline scenario or benchmark (Murray and 
Sommer, 2004). Until the appropriate research, data and methodologies have been generated 
to determine the accurate and appropriate performance-based additionality tests for different 
projects, locations and technologies, there has to be a new approach.  
Additionality testing faces the challenge of assessing the hypothetical future scenarios that 
would have happened if the current project had not gone ahead, and it is for this reason that 
the process needs to be as straight forward as possible. To develop a new additionality tool it 
is vital to go back to the original intent of additionality testing, and that is to ensure the 
environmental integrity of projects and not their financial credibility or intent. While latter 
are valid tests to ascertain overall project integrity, the additionality framework is not the 
correct area to incorporate them in. They rather should be incorporated into other areas of the 
certification process such as assessing the financial considerations of a project to ascertain its 
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permanence credentials. This is especially relevant in the voluntary markets and amongst 
voluntary carbon standards which have the opportunity and flexibility to develop new and 
innovative techniques to additionality testing. As has been said previously, this has not 
happened and the opportunity exists for a re-examination of additionality within the voluntary 
market certification context.  
It is essential avoid the pitfalls of the current additionality tool and that entails redesigning 
the approach to ensure a straight forward, cost-effective tool that will ensure the evaluation of 
the environmental integrity of projects. It will also encourage and assist the development of 
projects through streamlining the process. To achieve this it is vital to borrow from existing 
standards, such as CarbonFix (see Chapter 3). This standard only certifies LULUCF projects 
and it utilises a dual approach to additionality determination. Project developers can either 
utilise the CDM tool or a more straightforward, simplified, standard specific process. It is this 
second additionality determination process that is unique. It provides for specific, project 
based (e.g. landscape restoration) additionality criteria to be established. This provides for a 
simplified approach to additionality determination and understanding for project developers, 
certifiers and potential voluntary offsets buyers. It allows for the removal of the subjectivity 
and impracticality of other additionality test. This tool does however still include elements of 
the financial and common practice tests and as such makes unfair judgements on the project’s 
intent.  
There is a growing trend amongst voluntary standards, one that has been pioneered by the GS 
micro-scale scheme, which offers a streamlined approach to certification for micro-scale 
renewable energy projects. This includes granting micro-scale projects automatic 
additionality as they face significant and varied barriers to implementation of projects, but are 
mainly financial and expertise. This is a novel way of encouraging small scale, community 
based offsetting projects through reducing complexity and the costs associated with 
determining additionality.  
ii. Standard Process 
To design a South African voluntary carbon certification standard the additionality process 
needs to be refined and reviewed. It is vital to ensure the environmental integrity of projects 
whilst at the same time addressing all the concerns highlighted above. To fully address the 
subjectivity and complexity associated with the CDM additionality tool it is vital to make it 
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as straightforward as possible and this is where the South African specific, sectoral 
additionality tool needs to be developed. This process allows for the differing additionality 
requirements of each project type to be individually met, thus if biogas projects require a 
multi-step additionality approach it can be developed within the standard, while if wind 
power is best served with a baseline or benchmark approach this too can be incorporated into 
the same standard. As the initial project type that the standard will focus on is landscape 
restoration projects within South Africa, this will be the first additionality tool developed by 
the standard. Due to the complexities associated with landscape restoration projects and the 
lack of such projects within South Africa it is necessary to develop a project specific 
additionality tool that can be easily interpreted, applied and understood.  
The determination of additionality is inherently based within and on hypotheticals, as it is 
relatively impossible to prove that which has not happened yet or will happen in the future. 
This tool aims to incorporate the current innovation and best practice. It encourages the 
participation of small scale projects through providing them with automatic additionality. The 
argument of size classes and scale however is crucial to the determining the viability of the 
project and as such the need for additionality testing. Scale has becoming a driving factor in 
both increasing attractiveness of the offsets and decreasing the costs of producing each offset. 
The size classes within various standards have generally followed this format (Peters-Stanley 
et al, 2011): 
 Micro (less than 5,000 tCO2e/year)  
 Small (5,000 to 19,999 tCO2e/year)  
 Medium (20,000 to 99,999 tCO2e/year)  
 Large (100,000 to 500,000 tCO2e/year)  
 Very large (greater than 500,000 tCO2e/year) 
Automatic additionality has generally been applicable to projects at the micro-scale. However 
Powell (2011, pers. comm., Nov 10) calculated that in the sub-tropical thicket biome of the 
Eastern Cape, South Africa projects of up to 1000 hectares would fall into the micro-scale 
(when using an estimate accrual rate of 1 tC/hectare/year over a 30 year period). While these 
are the micro-scale projects that the standard aims to incorporate, the transaction costs of 
establishing a landscape restoration on such small scales has the potential to not be 
financially feasible, Mills et al. (2009) maintain that a project of 10 000 hectares in the sub-
tropical thicket is only financially viable.  
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There is increasing recognition for the need for scale in LULUCF projects, both to capitalise 
on the economies of scale for such projects to reduce costs (Mills et al., 2009), but also to 
ensure broader SD benefits that accrue from actively working to restore large areas of 
landscape functioning. Thus this size classification needs to be restructured for the South 
African situation and reconsidered in order to encourage the development of projects of a 
larger scale. 
It is proposed that the size classes for South African landscape restoration projects be 
broadened to the following: Small (less than 10,000 tCO2e/year), which translates to a project 
are of 2500 hectares using a sequestration rate of 1 tC/hectare/year; Medium (10,000 – 
29,999 tCO2e/year), Large (30,000 – 49,999 tCO2e/year) and Mega (greater than 50,000 
tCO2e/year). This will allow for in the inclusion of a wide scape of projects and reduce the 
costs and time associated with additionality determination  for bot project developers and 
certifiers. 
The multi-step tool developed also focuses primarily on the environmental integrity of the 
project in the additionality determination phase, through focussing on the current and 
historical land-use scenarios. It is envisaged that constructing this tool will make it more 
efficient and cost-effective while reducing subjectivity and complexity in the certification 
application and verification process for all parties. Other facets that have been raised in the 
literature surrounding additionality determination, such as financial considerations, will be 
examined in other sections of the standard, as they have been deemed to be more relevant in 
such sections. 
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The landscape restoration sector requires a project specific multi-step approach to 
additionality determination. The initial design for the South African landscape restoration 
sectoral additionality tool is outlined in the Box 6.2. 
 
 
 
 
Box 6.2. Additionality Criteria 
Additionality 
Project Size Determination: 
Small - < 10,000 tCO2e/year 
Medium – 10,000 – 29,999 tCO2e/year  
Large - 30,000 – 49,999 tCO2e/year 
Mega - > 50,000 tCO2e/year 
If a project is small, they are considered automatically additional. If a project is classified as 
medium, large or mega then they have to follow the steps outlined below: 
Evidence must be given that the project would not occur under the baseline scenario by: 
1) Providing a description of the current and most likely future land-use within the 
project area in lieu of the project. 
2) Providing proof that woody biomass would not increase rapidly (within 30 years) 
without human intervention within the project area; 
 
3) Proof that project activity is not required by any South African law, statute or 
regulatory framework 
 
4) Proof that there are no similar projects that exist within the immediate area (still to 
be determined) that are viable without generating VERs; 
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Step 3c: Determine and Calculate Leakage and Permanence 
Step 3c.1: Leakage 
i.  Theoretical Development 
As discussed in Chapter 3 leakage is defined as an increase or decrease in GHG emissions 
that occurs outside a projects boundary but is measurable and attributable to the project 
activities Moura Costa et al. (2000) state that leakage assessment must include the indirect 
impacts which may arise from the implementation of a GHG offsetting project, and must 
therefore include both positive and negative leakage externalities.. The complexity of 
determining and calculating leakage is highlighted in that a key characteristic of projects 
(especially landscape restoration projects) is that they are location and sector specific, 
however, leakage can spill out both within a sector and across sectors. Accounting for 
potential leakage is one of the most prominent concerns often raised by environmental 
advocacy groups surrounding LULUCF carbon sequestration projects (Murray et al., 2007). 
Two pre-dominant forms of leakage have been identified for landscape restoration projects, 
these are: 1) activity shifting from the project area, 2) combustion emissions associated with 
fossil fuel use in site preparation and management. There have been criticisms surrounding 
what forms of leakage should be directly attributable to the project and as such taken into 
account in the calculation of the projects GHG offsets. While combustion emissions are 
relatively straightforward to understand, activity shifting has become the major contested area 
within leakage assessment. It was originally designed to take into account and assess both the 
physical and market related aspects of the project activity (Murray et al., 2007). Physical 
aspects relate to the actual displacement or movement of the stakeholders affected by the 
project, e.g. afforesting land that would have been used for agriculture may force farmers to 
move to an area outside the project boundaries and as such degrade and release CO2 from that 
land, thus negating the offsets of the project (Garcia-Oliva and Masera, 2004). Market related 
leakage is the more controversial form of activity shifting, both in terms of identification and 
accurate calculation. It is defined by the CDM EB (UNFCCC, 2005) as: “leakage which may 
include the increase in GHG emissions occurring outside the project boundary, attributable to 
effects of price, supply or demand of goods affected by the market impact of the project 
activity.” It has traditionally been attempted under the CDM to calculate country and sector 
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wide leakage; however the lack of accurate data has made calculation extremely difficult and 
led to its exclusion from leakage calculation requirements by the CDM EB.   
Identifying all sources of leakage is essential to accurately calculating the true offsetting 
potential of a project, but it is incredibly complex to identify and account for all sources in 
practice (Murray et al., 2004). There are two approaches for accounting and monitoring 
leakage; these could either be project-specific or a standardised approach. Project-specific 
leakage design has to include careful site selection, good project design and establishing 
control plots in areas independent from the project area (Auckland et al., 2003). Standardised 
approaches include the use of discount or an adjustment co-efficient developed by project 
type or region (Brown et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2004).  
This issue has been incorporated and addressed differently by all the current voluntary 
certification standards. Some provide detailed carbon pools and activities (e.g. CarbonFix and 
CAR) that have to be assessed, calculated and subtracted (negative) or added (positive) to the 
overall emissions reductions of the project where other voluntary standards require that the 
project identifies and reports on leakage sources that they have identified and calculated (e.g. 
VCS, ACR and CCBS). Other standards have deemed that leakage is insignificant and thus 
does not need to be taken into account (e.g. GS, VER+, CCX). One similarity that exists 
amongst all voluntary carbon standards that calculate leakage is that they take a project-
specific approach to leakage determination. This allows for the context specific, accurate 
calculation of the projects leakage assessment.    
ii. Standard Process 
The proposed South African voluntary carbon standard will also follow this project-specific, 
approach to leakage determination. This will not only add accuracy to the overall project 
offsets calculation but also add to the legitimacy and environmental integrity of the project. 
Leakage determination runs the risk of introducing complexity and increased costs through a 
lack of direction on what is required to obtain certification. The leakage guidelines have to be 
as clear and straightforward as possible to allow for ease of interpretation by the project 
proponent and assessment by the validator. The proposed South African voluntary carbon 
standards landscape restoration leakage requirements will focus on, and account for, the 
leakage from 1) physical activity shifting, 2) combustion emissions associated within the 
project boundary and 3) carbon lost through soil erosion.  
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While activity shifting and combustion emissions are well documented forms of leakage and 
discussed above, carbon lost from erosion has been neglected within current standards 
especially relating to LULUCF projects. Mills et al (2005) state that in the sub-tropical 
thicket biome of the Eastern Cape, South Africa for every 20cm of topsoil lost it carries about 
50% of the carbon stored in the landscape. This has to be taken into account when designing 
a project in South Africa, especially in areas of high erosion potential and as such could lead 
to high levels of leakage. 
A crucial determination in the leakage calculation is the definition of the GHG assessment 
boundary (both physical and social), defining the boundaries too broadly adds unnecessary 
costs and inefficiencies to the process, while limiting the boundaries understates the leakage 
from the project and thus is not an actual representation of the projects emissions reductions.  
To address these issues, the proposed leakage assessment methodology for the proposed 
South African voluntary carbon standard will be outlined in Box 6.3. 
 
Leakage 
Project Proponents are required to assess, account for, mitigate and report on all the forms of 
negative leakage within the GHG assessment boundary outlined below: 
GHG Assessment Boundary – is defined as the physical boundaries of the project and social 
extent of actors officially employed or remunerated by the project. The physical boundaries 
relate to the geographic location and activities of all those involved in the project. The social 
extent relates to all entities involved in the project from land owners and labourers to 
managers, consultants and certifiers, but only relating to their emissions as a result of direct 
involvement in project activities. 
Leakage has to be reported on activities that directly relates to or are caused by the project: 
Leakage Pools  
 Activity shifting 
 Shift of livestock farming out of project area. 
 Shift of fuel wood harvesting from project area. 
Box 6.3. Leakage Criteria 
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 Resettlement of people from project area. 
 Combustion emissions 
 Transport associated with project activities. 
 Flights directly associated with the project activities. 
 Vehicle trips (suppliers, consultants, employees etc.). 
 Tools and machinery involved in project activities. 
 Use of fertilizers within project area. 
 Soil carbon 
 Report on annual top soil loss within project area. 
All identified leakage pools need to be described and if not relevant need to be motivated 
why not. 
 Leakage pools need to be recorded and monitored from the proposed project start date 
throughout the lifespan of the project. 
 Leakage needs to be mitigated as far as possible, if not possible then subtracted from 
the overall offsets calculations. Leakage must be calculated according to the IPCC 
2006 Good Practice Guidelines for LULUCF projects (http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gpglulucf/gpglulucf.html). 
 For combustion emissions a project can use a standard approved carbon calculator 
such as Food and Trees for Africa (http://www.trees.co.za/).  
This standard takes a unique approach to calculating and offsetting emissions from activities 
associated with a project’s activities and participants. While many standards argue that the 
emissions from fossil fuels are negligible, under this proposed standard they are required to 
offset these. This is done to ensure the ethical and environmental integrity of the standard and 
that the projects certified maintain these high levels of integrity. Accordingly a project is 
required to demonstrate its own yearly carbon neutrality throughout the life span of the 
project through mitigating its own leakage. This will in turn provide more legitimacy to the 
carbon offsets generated from a project and the principles and aims of the certification 
process. 
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It is envisioned that this simplified and straightforward approach to leakage assessment will 
assist the project developers in the development of the RDD and the continued monitoring of 
an essential criteria of a voluntary carbon standard. 
Step 3c.2: Permanence  
i. Theoretical Development 
As discussed in Chapter 3, permanence is an issue that relates directly to LULUCF carbon 
projects and has been defined as the potential reversibility of the carbon sequestered within 
the biosphere (UNEP, 2008). Unlike the mitigation or avoidance of GHG emissions (in 
energy efficiency or renewable energy projects) only those projects related to LULUCF 
activities entail the sequestration of carbon from the atmosphere into the biosphere, a process 
which is inherently non-permanent. The risk of the reversal of the carbon sequestered relate 
to various possibilities such as fire, natural hazards, pests, land-use decisions and poor 
management (UNEP, 2008). LULUCF projects have gained a poor reputation based on the 
issue of delivering permanent emissions reduction and buyers in a compliance-based trading 
system do not want to take on the extra liability and risk associated with such projects. Under 
current CDM practice CERs generated through forestry activities are only temporary and 
must be replaced by the Annex 1 country either at the projects end date or upon re-release of 
the captured carbon. The risk of the permanence of the offsets is one of the main reasons why 
landscape restoration projects have not gained traction and prominence worldwide and have 
not been accepted in the world’s largest compliance market, the EU ETS (Streck et al., 2009). 
The purchase of temporary credits or (tCERs) currently does not make financial sense to 
potential investors; it is the equivalent to postponing compliance with reduction obligations to 
a future period where potentially the price per CER is higher. 
To counter this current negative perception of risk and liability associated with LULUCF 
type projects, the voluntary market has developed new and innovative techniques to deal with 
the issue of permanence. It is vital that environmental integrity and long-term reliability 
credits generated from landscape restoration projects are safeguarded; through reducing their 
inherent risk and make them more competitive and appealing to potential investors. Financial 
risk management instruments have been adapted for the voluntary carbon markets (UNEP, 
2008). The main tool is the standard specific deployment of a self-insurance mechanism with 
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an aim to guarantee the permanence of carbon sequestrated. The tool is a simple yet effective 
tool and has been called the buffer pool approach. 
The advantage of the buffer pool lies in its simplicity. It allows a project to produce 
permanent credits regardless of project type. It works in the following way:  a portion of the 
carbon credits generated from each project are withheld and added to a common buffer pool, 
so that the rest of the projects credits can be sold as permanent credits. If a project does 
collapse and its bio-sequestrated carbon released back into the atmosphere then a 
corresponding amount of the withheld credits would be debited from the common insurance 
pool to replace the credits lost in the project (UNEP, 2008). In this way the risk associated 
with individual projects is mitigated using a portfolio approach. This approach follows a 
similar approach to conventional insurance schemes, and the credits withheld can be loosely 
viewed as the conventional risk premium while the portfolio of projects allows for the 
smoothing out of variations in the claims.  
The buffer pool approach is not without its critics. The major criticism that has been levelled 
at the opportunity cost of utilising a buffer pool approach. This comes in that restored land 
that could be potentially used for monetary gain is otherwise unused (UNEP, 2008). The 
second criticism, but one that has not been fully explored in the current literature, is the moral 
hazard problem in the risk determination process and the true assessment of the risk profile of 
the project. Currently the risk determination process is carried out by the project developer 
and then assessed by validators in the validation phase. However, they are only able to 
validate the risk on the information that they have been provided. The moral hazard problem 
is prevalent in some cases, especially those where the buffer pool is determined according to 
the outcomes of the risk assessment tool. The project developer has an incentive to downplay 
the risk associated with the project and therefore understate the potential risk of reversal, or 
overstate the effectiveness of the risk mitigation activities which they undertake. This will 
then reduce their buffer pool contribution and thus they are able to sell a higher number of 
possible offsets. Validation of the PDD is then undertaken on the information that is provided 
to the validators by the project developers. It is within this that there is information 
asymmetry and the possibility of the understated risk determination to be validated and a 
lower amount contributed to the buffer pool. This lower contribution then means that the 
remaining risk associated with the project is then de-facto transferred to the other projects in 
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the portfolio, as their buffer pool contributions would have to subsidise the projects offsets if 
it did lead to a reversal.  
Some standards avoid this situation by prescribing that all projects have to contribute a set 
percentage (e.g. 30%) to the buffer pool. This, however, can once again result in 
understatement or overstatement of a project’s risk profile. Mignone et al. (2009) argue in 
favour of explicitly calculating project based reversal risk as it reflects the true nature of the 
specific risk. As a carbon offset is an inherently risky asset this has to be done transparently 
and along a continuum to allow for the process to adjust risk valuations and reflect the 
projects risk context in the broader carbon market (Mignone et al., 2009). To ensure that this 
process is transparent, Mignone et al. (2009) state that the valuation process has to be done by 
a central authority (e.g. the voluntary carbon standard body). This would encourage lower 
compliance costs and objectivity without violating the environmental integrity of the entire 
system.  
The majority of current voluntary carbon standards (VCS, VER+, CAR, ACR, CarbonFix, 
CCX, Plan Vivo and PS) utilise this buffer pool approach as their main permanence tool. This 
tool has been combined with other tools such as ‘project implementation agreements’ (PIA) 
and other legally binding commitments to ensure the long-term commitment of both finance 
and land to the project. While the carbon credit buffer pool is the most widely used 
permanence tool it has been implemented in many different ways. Standards differ in their 
buffer pool determination process. Some require a complete risk assessment process (VCS) 
and then the buffer is determined according to a project’s risk profile, while others 
(CarbonFix, CCX, VER+) require a set amount of offsets to be placed in the buffer pool, 
regardless of their risk profile. Not one standard utilises the central risk determination process 
as suggested by Mignone et al. (2009).  
In addition to the development of risk assessment and buffer pool approaches there has been 
the development of PIAs. These relate to the imperative to prove that the tenure of the land 
on which the project is based on is secure and legally binding. They also relate a legal 
commitment to ensure that the carbon is stored for a set length of time, ranging from 30 to 
100 years depending on the standard. A combination of these tools is will contribute to 
ensuring the permanence and associated trust of a land based carbon offsetting project, 
however it needs to be designed to address the criticism associated with the current 
permanence approaches. To achieve this a permanence tool specifically suited to South 
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African conditions will be designed for this proposed South African voluntary carbon 
standard.  
ii. Standard Process 
As a key issue in the determination of offsets integrity it is imperative that the permanence of 
landscape restoration projects is thoroughly investigated in a project’s design phase. This 
permanence approach developed is an amalgamation of the best practices identified 
throughout the current voluntary carbon standards. 
It aims to address the criticisms levelled through using an adapted approach from the one 
suggested by Mignone et al. (2009) and a combination of both the standardised and variable 
buffer pool determination approaches. It is envisioned that the buffer pool process will be a 
driving risk mitigation process within the standard, but this will take a unique form. It is 
proposed within this standard the goal of a variable buffer with rebates for proof of risk 
minimisation and mitigation.  
Each project will initially be prescribed a default base level contribution of a set percentage 
of the projects credits to the buffer pool (e.g. CarbonFix, VER+). While this level still needs 
to be determined it will account for the risk associated with at a  project start up and the 
inherent risk of reversal involved in landscape restoration projects. This contribution will 
then be evaluated according to the proposed field verification timeframes (every five years, 
see step 7).  If a project demonstrates successful risk mitigation and minimisation activities 
they will then be returned a proportional amount of credits and their buffer pool reduced 
accordingly. If a project fails to prove the success of its risk reduction activities, the buffer 
pool contribution will remain at the base percentage. The consistent and effective 
management and monitoring of a projects risk profile will allow for a project to potentially 
reduce its buffer pool contributions over time and thus maximise its sale of offsets. This 
mechanism will provide a positive incentive for projects to actively manage the reduction of 
their risk.  
To ensure objectivity and transparency provision is made for the project proponent to obtain 
the evaluation of an external third party; this is for cases where the project proponent 
completely disagrees with the standards risk profile evaluation.   
Permanence of a project relies on secure land tenure and the identification of a managing 
body or institution. To obtain certification, projects will need to demonstrate secure tenure 
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and what the category of land the project fits into as defined by the Green Paper (Department 
of Land Reform and Rural Development, 2011). It is also essential for projects (especially 
those on private lands) to prove that the land is not under any legal ownership challenge or 
legal processes at the time of project development.  
In particular to South Africa’s historical and political situation is the issue surrounding land 
tenure and reform. South Africa faces a number of challenges surrounding its land tenure 
system. South African legislation recognises four forms of land ownership: private, public, 
state and communal. The South African Green Paper on Land Reform released in 2011 
organises these into a single 4-tier tenure system (Box 6.4.): 
 
 
(a) State and public land: leasehold. 
(b) Privately owned land: freehold, with limited extent.  
(c) Land owned by foreigners: freehold, but precarious tenure, with obligations and 
conditions to comply with. 
(d) Communally owned land: communal tenure, with institutionalised use rights. 
 
While the actual risk determination and calculation process is still to be defined and falls 
outside of the scope of this thesis, it will abide by the same principles that guide the standard. 
Coupling all these approaches and providing a transparent and efficient permanence 
determination process will greatly assist all parties involved in understanding the true risk 
associated with the project and will add integrity to the offsets generated for both potential 
investors and buyers. Box 6.5 below outlines the proposed permanence approach: 
 
Permanence  
Project developers are required to submit their risk assessment valuation along with all of the 
required documentation to the certification body that will allow them to conduct an 
independent risk assessment evaluation of the project during the validation phase. 
Box 6.4. South African 4-tier land tenure system 
Box 6.5.: Permanence Criteria 
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 If not satisfied, the project developer can request for the risk assessment process to be 
carried out by an independent certification body.  
 The two risk assessments will then be compared and a contribution to the buffer pool 
will be determined. 
 Permanence will be reassessed at every verification stage and the projects buffer pool 
account will be adjusted accordingly. 
To ensure and determine the permanence of a project, the project must demonstrate a long-
term sustainable future. This will be done in three ways: 
1) Buffer Pool Approach 
The buffer pool approach will follow that of a variable approach. At start up project will be 
assigned a default contribution to the buffer pool but based on the risk profile and 
management this will be adjusted accordingly with rebates for risk reductions.  
The standard specific risk assessment tool will be developed at a later stage and is not within 
the scope of this thesis. 
The areas to be considered for the risk assessment framework are: 
 Management capacity –management staff of the project must have the sufficient 
experience, qualifications and sound management structure and processes to ensure 
the success of the project. 
 Financial structure – evidence must be given that the project has the project has 
sufficient capital and cash-flow so as to ensure the sustainable financing of the 
project. 
 Environmental risk – all external environmental risks such as floods, wind, fire, 
diseases, temperature, animals etc. need to be investigated, assessed and mitigated for 
risk to the project. 
2) Secure Land Tenure 
Evidence must be given that the project area has long-term secured land tenure and that it is 
not under any legal challenge or within a land restitution or redistribution process. 
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Proof must be provided that all legal permits necessary for project implementation and 
management are secured over the long term. 
3) PIA 
The project developers have to sign a legally binding PIA with the ‘certification body’, which 
obligates the retirement of offsets to compensate for partial reversals of GHG reductions and 
removals. 
If a reversal is unavoidable, or not, due to the project developers negligence or intent, then 
the corresponding amount of offsets will be removed from the projects buffer pool 
contribution. 
If the reversal is due to the project developers’ negligence or wilful intent, e.g. harvesting, 
livestock reintroduction or land development, then the project developer must retire an 
amount of offsets equivalent to the amount lost, through either: 
Retiring the amount lost from the remaining project offsets; or from purchasing and retiring 
the offsets of the same vintage from another offsetting project. 
Step 4: Public Participation 
i. Theoretical background 
As has been highlighted in Chapter 3 and 4, public participation is key component of 
successful and meaningful planning and a key step in precautionary decision making 
(O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). It has emerged as an essential step to ensure the transparency and 
credibility of an offsetting project. While involving all stakeholders as participants in 
environmental and project planning processes is integral to its success, the stringency and 
extent of consultation and involvement needs to be investigated.  
To understand the nature of carbon offsetting projects, especially LULUCF projects, and the 
public participation processes that are suggested for projects, the projects have to be looked at 
in context of the processes that govern public participation and land-use and management 
within South Africa. The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA, Act 107 of 
1998) dictates the detailed public participation requirements for all projects during the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process, and if a project requires an EIA then these 
have to be followed stringently. In most cases landscape restoration projects within South 
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Africa are granted an exemption from undertaking the EIA process (Powell, 2011, pers. 
comm.). As a result they do not need to undertake any form of legal public participation 
process. It is for this reason that the proposed South African voluntary carbon standard will 
include its own public participation requirements to ensure that the views and opinions of 
stakeholders are taken into account in the project design and validation phases. In the design 
of an effective public participation process it is vital to understand and incorporate the 
projects and projects participant’s geographical, social and historical context (Beierle and 
Crayford, 2002). It is central in this sense to understand the public participation difference 
between projects on private and public land and the extent of stakeholders’ participation in 
theses differing projects.  
Land tenure rights in South Africa are a complex and challenging issues, especially 
surrounding the distinction and debate around communal owned land (Sjaastad and Cousins, 
2008). Taking these complexities into account is important in the development a South 
African voluntary carbon standard as the form of land ownership and tenure will 
fundamentally affect the land on which a landscape restoration project is situated. The easiest 
distinction to make within the 4-tier tenure system (Box 5.4) is between state and public 
tenure (a) and private tenure (b and c) 
Projects on private and public land in South Africa face different challenges and requirements 
when it comes to stakeholder engagement and consultation. This is best illustrated with a 
hypothetical situation to place the issue into context, especially with regards to a project on 
private land. Landscape restoration is a potentially new form of economically productive (as 
a result of potential income generated from the carbon markets) land-use and as such can be 
seen as being in competition with other agricultural land use types on private land. If a 
landowner is currently engaged in agricultural activities, i.e. crop farming, and decides to 
change the crop produced, they do not need to enter into an extended public and stakeholder 
engagements process under South African regulations. It is argued that landscape restoration 
projects for the purpose of carbon ‘farming’ fall into this same category. Thus, on private 
land under the proposed standard, there should be no need to undertake an extensive and 
costly public participation and stakeholder consultation process.  
Projects on public or state owned land are different however, as by definition they require 
extensive and comprehensive inclusion of all stakeholders and public participation in the 
decision making process, but they still have a recognised body responsible for managing the 
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land. The other form of public ownership is communal land tenure. South Africa has had 
historical challenges surrounding this, and is highlighted by the nullification of the 
Communal Land Rights Act (Act no. 11of 2004) by the constitutional court of South Africa. 
The complexity involves the institutionalised use rights of communal land and, as a result, the 
complexity of determining ownership or control of the land when there are a wide variety of 
stakeholders are involved (Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008).  
ii. Standard Process 
Current voluntary carbon standards have generally outlined and required the same public 
participation approach for projects on both private and public land without consideration for 
communal land. While public participation has been incorporated into some of the current 
voluntary standards it has been done in varying degrees. The GS has outlined an extensive 
public consultation process that allows for both a local and global consultation requirements, 
while the VCS follows the requirements set out in ISO 14604 – 2. Other standards such as SC 
require the co-benefits data to be collected in a participatory manner, and thus ensuring 
effective stakeholder engagement. It is a combination of these that will be incorporated and 
used for the public participation process in a proposed South African voluntary carbon 
standard. Key and unique to the development of this public participation process will be the 
distinction between projects on private, public and communal land. Distinguishing between 
these forms of land ownership within a local stakeholder consultation process context brings 
with it its own challenges, and as such a local stakeholder needs to be defined for each. 
The definitions for stakeholders within each context are different, as private land can have a 
much narrower focus of stakeholders than project on public and it is for this reason that the 
definitions need to be adjusted. In the voluntary carbon standards context a local stakeholder 
- private land, which is adapted from Post et al. (2002), can be defined as: ‘the participants 
and individuals that contribute to, or are, involved directly in a projects activities and are 
therefore its potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers’. The definition for local stakeholders 
- public land is much broader than the previous definition and incorporates stakeholders that 
are both directly and indirectly affected by the project. Therefore in the context of the 
proposed voluntary carbon standard local stakeholders - public land can be defined as: ‘the 
participants, individuals, constituencies and communities who are directly or indirectly 
affected by the projects activities and are therefore the potential beneficiaries and/or risk 
bearers.’ 
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While there is some direction being provided by the South African government regarding the 
determination of communal land tenure rights, it is an area that will need to be addressed in 
the future development of the proposed standards public participation process. For the 
purpose of this thesis, communal land will be addressed within the ‘Public Land’ section of 
Box 6.6. 
 
 
Public Participation 
 Public participation differs in terms of a) Private land and b) Public land. Within both 
of these there are requirements will be for both a local and national stakeholder 
consultation process.  
 A comprehensive local stakeholder process has to be conducted (for both private and 
public land) if national laws require it. In case no legal requirement exists, the 
following is required: 
a) Private Land 
 Local stakeholders (as defined by local stakeholder-private land) need to be identified 
and informed during the PDD development phase regarding the nature of the project, 
its broader goals, timelines and the phases of the project. Questions and comments 
arising from this process need to be recorded and the responses reported in the PDD.  
 Local stakeholders also need to be consulted during the SD benefits baselines, 
monitoring and assessment phases (where required) and recorded in the RDD or 
annual reports. 
National Stakeholder Consultation 
 At the validation phase, the RDD will be published online for 30 days before 
validation to allow for broader stakeholders to comment; these will be documented 
and used to assist during the validation phase.  
b) Public Land 
 Evidence of a comprehensive process to identify all local stakeholders (as defined by 
local stakeholder – public land) and that an adequate process has been undertake to 
 
Box 6.6. Public Participation Criteria 
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inform all stakeholders during the RDD development phase regarding the nature of 
the project, its broader goals, timelines and the phases of the project.  
 An open space and opportunity for local stakeholder to pose questions and comments 
to the developer arising from this process. These need to be recorded and the 
responses reported in the RDD and the annual reports.  
Local stakeholders also need to be consulted during the SD benefits baselines, monitoring 
and assessment phases (where required) and recorded in the RDD and annual reports. 
National Stakeholder Consultation 
 Prior to the validation phase, the RDD will be published online for 30 days to allow 
for broader stakeholders to comment; these will be documented and used to assist 
during the validation phase.  
Step 5: Project Validation 
i.  Theoretical Development 
Validation is the first part of the auditing process and aims to ensure that a projects offsets are 
real, reliable and permanent. The main aim of this stage is to confirm that all aspects of the 
project have been planned for before implementation and that potential pitfalls and 
contingencies have been identified. This step involves critically analysing all the documents 
and data presented in the PDD, before a project has been implemented and aims to confirm 
that a project has complied with standards’ certification standards procedures, rules and 
regulations. Deaton et al. (2010) defines a third-party certifier as a private or public 
organisation responsible for accessing, evaluating and certifying quality claims based on a set 
of standards and compliance methods. Within current voluntary carbon standards it has 
become the role of standard accredited third-party auditors to perform this function. Hatanaka 
et al. (2005) argue that private standards, such as voluntary standards are ineffective without 
adequate enforcement mechanisms. Third-party auditing and validation has emerged as the 
key institution for this that is both independent from project developers and governments (as 
it is a private, non-regulated transaction). It has been argued that the appointment of a third-
party certified increases legitimacy through an independent, unbiased, expert-driven 
evaluation of the projects development and processes (Hatanaka, 2005).   
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The use of third-party auditors within certification standards is not without its critics and 
negatives. These have been identified from the analysis of existing certification schemes in 
section 4.4.4. The main pitfall and negative has been associated with utilising different third-
party auditors for different projects under the same standard. In this case the auditor’s 
subjective interpretation, understanding and application of the standards rules, procedures and 
processes will differ, even slightly, leading to a differing judgement and assessment of the 
project. This process could lead to the unfair acceptance or rejection of projects based. The 
second criticism is the cost implications associated with obtaining a third-party auditor. Krey 
(2005) found that validation costs constitute the main share of the transactions costs involved 
in a CDM project, ranging from US$ 6,000 – US$ 80,000. The costs vary as validation 
generally depends on the projects complexity and size (Krey, 2005).  In a developing 
countries context, such as South Africa’s, these are a major consideration in the development 
of a project. Since the majority of the certified auditors for the various voluntary carbon 
certification schemes are situated in the global north, it adds large costs to obtain their 
auditing services for projects within developing countries. To address this issue  the 
development of the standard focuses on reducing the major costs components, of which 
validation is key one.  
Current voluntary carbon standards have generally failed to address these issues of 
subjectivity and transaction costs, through utilising the status quo of third party validators and 
certifiers. These are crucial issues to address so as to encourage the adoption of a proposed 
South African Voluntary carbon standard. Through providing a stringent and thorough 
certification process at a cost competitive rate will make the standard more attractive to 
potential project developers. CarbonFix has developed and pioneered a new model of pre-
validation which is conducted by the CarbonFix Technical Board. Projects submit all their 
documents to the CarbonFix technical board which evaluates whether the project is likely to 
meet the standards criteria. This process of internal validation aims to reduce both costs and 
time through a rapid assessment to identify any project pitfalls. However, CarbonFix still 
requires a comprehensive third party certification process, with the associated costs, and only 
uses pre-validation as a screening process. To fully reduce transaction costs and subjectivity 
this process needs to be refined. 
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ii. Standard Process 
The proposed process for a South African voluntary carbon standard aims to increase 
efficiency and cost- effectiveness for the certification of projects and internalising the project 
validation process into the certification body is a crucial step to achieve this. The 
internalization of the validation process will allow for an objective assessment of a project 
and how it conforms to the criteria of the standard. It is argued that the integrity and 
legitimacy of the certification process will still remain intact as the validation process is 
inherently associated with assessing the project development process based on the 
certification guidelines. The certification body is perfectly suited to make these judgements 
as the designers and custodians of the standard. While it might be argued that the standard 
will benefit from validating all projects that apply, due to increased revenue in the short term, 
it is the long term outcomes that will act as a regulating mechanism for stringent and 
objective evaluation by the standard body. Integral to the standards success and longevity is 
the reputation and trust associated with the eco-labels integrity. It is imperative that the 
certification body maintains the image of the standard to be one of trust and integrity for both 
investors in projects, consumers of the offsets that bear the mark and for project developers. 
If the standard validates projects that do not meet the standard requirements it will lead to an 
erosion of the trust in the brand name in the long term through potential project failure and in 
turn a failure for the reputation of the carbon standard. 
 
Validation Process 
It is envisioned that the validation phase will take six months from the submission of all the 
required documents. During this process the project will be evaluated against all the project 
criteria outlined in the standard. To validate a project there will be a series of:  
 Desktop reviews, field visits and interviews.  
Following the completion of the validation phase, a project will be given either: 
a) A validation certificate indicating that the project has complied with the 
certification requirements; or  
b) A list of corrective action requests   
 The project developer can then either:  
Box 6.7. Validation Process 
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a) Comply with the requests and subsequently alter the project, or  
b) They can appeal the corrective action requests.  
 If an appeal is lodged then a third party auditor, that is appointed by the standard (at 
the costs of the project developer), will conduct an independent project validation.  
 To gain certification the project is required to abide by any corrective action requests 
stipulated. 
This is a unique process developed for the South African voluntary carbon standard. It allows 
for a local, cost effective and efficient validation process while still integrating a third party 
auditing component. This validation process will be a critical area for the proposed South 
African voluntary carbon standard to both increase efficiency and reduce costs. 
Step 6: Registry 
The use of a registry for the tracking and identification of project specific offsets is a crucial 
process in the transaction of credits. There is currently no single registry for all credits, 
however they all function similarly. In this case there are two paths for the proposed South 
African voluntary carbon standard certification body to investigate. The first path is the use 
of an existing registry, such as Markit (http://www.markit.com/en/products/registry/markit-
environmental-registry.page). The second path entails developing a standard specific registry 
on which all credits from projects using the standard are registered and traded. While the 
development or choice of registry is not within the scope of this thesis, it is recognised as an 
essential component of the final certification development. 
Step 7: Field Verification 
i. Theoretical Development 
Field verification is the second component of the carbon offset project auditing phase. It 
involves confirming that the project is performing to its projected outcomes. It aims to 
confirm the actual emissions offset from a project and assesses and monitor the SD benefits 
of a project. Crucial to this phase is the use of field visits and the independent measurements 
of the carbon offsets and SD benefits. Field verification is a key regulatory process to ensure 
the oversight of a project (Hatanaka et al., 2005) and in turn the legitimacy of a project’s 
claims. This traditionally has been conducted by third-party auditors at differing time scales 
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and frequencies as determined by the standard, e.g. VCS only requires one field visit during a 
projects life time, while others require a visit up to every five years during a project’s 
lifetime. It has to be noted that the increased frequency of field verification visits increases 
the associated costs for the project and thus there is an inherent trade off through ensuring 
integrity of a project’s claims and the associate costs for projects.  
ii. Standard Process 
For landscape restoration projects, there is in general, a lag time between project 
implementation and a viable amount of offsets produced. In recognising this field verification 
is not required within the first year of project implementation. To ensure that a project is 
abiding by its agreed and certified PDD and that the correct amount of carbon offsets and SD 
benefits are being generated, the verification process will be undertaken by either the 
certification body, or a third-party auditor accredited by the certification body. To ensure the 
continued verification of a project, throughout its lifetime, it is suggested that the following 
field verification process is followed in Box 6.8: 
 
Field Verification  
The following rate of field verification is required: 
 Initial certification – within 2 years of project start date. 
 Fixed certification – every 5 years after the initial certification. 
To ensure that a project remains on course and within the framework of the PDD, the project 
developer will be required to submit a progress report every year (after the initial certification 
process) that a project does not undergo field verification. This report will have to include 
information such as: 
 Area planted in the year as well as survivorship stats. 
 Offsets generated that year. 
 Offsets sold and serial numbers of these offsets. 
 Any reversals, extent of such reversals and description of why and how. 
 New planting areas, if any, to be certified. 
 SD benefits reporting (Outcome Indicators). 
Box 6.8. Field Verification 
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 These progress reports will be made available to all stakeholders and will increase 
transparency within the project as well as assist in the field verification process. 
6.4. Conclusion 
The proposed standard incorporates and simplifies a number of currently considered complex 
and limiting approaches. A main feature of the standard is the simplification of the RDD 
process through the establishment and requirement of the submission of a detailed, robust 
RIN document that will be used to compliment the RDD. This will serve a scoping phase in 
order to determine project eligibility before the costly RDD is developed and submitted. This 
will allow for the simplification and focus of the RDD on the actual project design through 
reporting on the requirements surrounding the actual baseline calculations of carbon and SD 
benefits. The process is also streamlined through using the simplified additionality 
determination process, through providing an amalgamation of permanence determination 
approaches and the use of local specific leakage requirements.  
The second key approach to this standard is the incorporation and focus of the proposed 
standard to ensuring the generation of net SD benefits and placing them at the same level as 
carbon within the RDD design and project development validation and verification. The full 
and effective integration of these has been missing within current fully fledged voluntary 
carbon standards, as they often rely on a mixture of project design standards to achieve this. 
Offering the inclusion of all components into one standard, specifically designed for South 
Africa, will not only assure SD credentials but also increase the transparency and 
understanding, and reduce costs. 
The revised public participation approach that distinguishes between private and public land 
is also key to the reduction of costs and aims to inform stakeholders and involve them in the 
evaluation and monitoring of co-benefits, while keeping down costs for private land 
developers. Crucial to the success of this standard is the reduction in both physical and 
opportunity costs for South African offset projects, as such it is determined that this 
simplified process will contribute to this. Integral to this is the reduction of costs associated 
with activities such as validation and verification and thus the emphasis on local, standard 
based validation and verification.   
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While non-essential criteria such as project location (only in South Africa) and project types 
(only landscape restoration) have been addressed throughout this section, more focus will be 
needed to be put on these areas and others such as ensuring transparency and the detailed 
costs of certification to make the standard truly viable and marketable.  
While not every issue or area is, and can be addressed in this initial proposal of a South 
African voluntary carbon standard. It has not been designed to achieve this, rather it has been 
deigned to detail the thoughts and ideas that could be contained within a proposed standard. 
This can then be used as a basis to communicate with, gather opinion and open debate with a 
structured approach surrounding the major ideas and processes. It is anticipated that the 
processes outlined within this chapter will contribute to lowering the cost of certification 
within South Africa and also reduce the certification timelines. It is also hoped that these 
proposals outline above will maintain the integrity of offsets certified under the proposed 
standard. It is envisioned that combining these proposals and that off the SD assessment 
framework in Chapter 5 that offsets certified are recognised for their SD and environmental 
integrity and are additional, real, reliable, and permanent. 
While the proposed South African voluntary carbon standard is nowhere near completion or 
final acceptance, this process has highlighted the position and path that it is envisioned to 
take. The development of this preliminary draft ‘straw dog’ standard has explored and 
interrogated some of the essential components of current voluntary carbon certification 
standards and altered, simplified and applied and adapted them with the aim to allow them to 
work more efficiently within South African conditions. If the standard is ever to be truly 
operationalized there is need for significant debate surrounding the contents of this proposal, 
as well as the indicators obtained within the SD indicator framework outline in Chapter 5. 
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Part 3:  
General Conclusion 
 
 
Chapter 7: 
 
General Discussion, Research Implications and 
Conclusion 
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7.1. Voluntary Carbon Markets and the Development of Standards  
A substantial amount of time has passed since the first voluntary carbon market deal through 
the initiation of the AES tree planting project. After this the notion of climate change, carbon 
offsetting and trading has become mainstream within global political and market rhetoric. It 
has spawned the development of many market players and the institutionalisation of carbon 
offsetting and trading within the global sphere amongst business leaders, political decision 
makers, economists and scientists. This has led them to become a key mechanism within the 
KP, through the CDM and JI, and potentially within any future global, legal, binding 
commitments to GHG reductions.  
The carbon market however has become distorted and confused by the dual path it has taken 
to development, with the mandatory and voluntary markets both playing similar but different 
roles. The uncertainty that currently exists amongst mandatory market participants 
surrounding the future of the post 2012 climate negotiations, various countries’ GHG 
reduction commitments and the KP has led to a decline in confidence in the role of carbon 
markets. This is coupled with political impasse in the globes two largest and most influential 
economies and GHGs emitters, that of the USA and China, and persistent economic turmoil 
and hardships has led to a stalling and decline of the value of the CDM market at US$ 142 
billion in 2010 (Linacre et al., 2011). In contrast the voluntary market registered its highest 
ever volume of trade in 2010 with 131.2 Mt CO2e, which is a 34% increase from 2009 
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2011). In value terms this is US$ 424 million, with the majority of trade 
taking place in the OTC market.  
Carbon credit supply has been largely dominated by developing countries especially 
members of the new BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in both the CDM and 
voluntary markets. This has however historically been mainly from HFC-23 projects in the 
CDM and EU ETS, and methane destruction and renewable energy projects in the voluntary 
market (Hamilton et al., 2010). This however has changed within the voluntary markets of 
late and in 2010 land-based projects supplied the largest volume of credits. This has been 
stimulated from increased recognition, market signals and commitments to developing and 
eligibility of these land based projects in global markets. While these project types are still 
not explicitly acknowledged or purchased within mandatory markets they have found a home 
within the voluntary markets and amongst voluntary carbon standards. Project types such as 
landscape restoration and REDD plus have been the major drivers of growth for the voluntary 
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market and have gained prominence due to their environmental integrity and contribution to 
sustainable development. This growth has also facilitated the development of new project 
methodologies specifically focussed at land based projects, such as the VCS REDD 
methodology and the refinement and applicability of a number of other methodologies. This 
trend has also seen the increasing emergence of geographic-specific and project-specific 
voluntary carbon standards such as Brazil’s Mata Viva (BMV) and China’s PS, which were 
both formally released in 2010.  
These standards are tailored to close the loop between local supply and demand but also to 
ensure the sustainable development contributions of projects within their countries. They are 
not a new concept with the USA (having a version for a while), but they have been refined 
with the continuing developments within the voluntary market. This trend of embedded 
standards is now being accelerated by the developments taking place in some of the largest 
developing countries (China and Brazil), and in both cases they initially focus their 
methodologies on land based project. These countries have realised the potential to capitalise 
on the sustainable development benefits from LULUCF carbon offsetting projects, but also 
ensuring the development of a suitable standard which will allow a country can to unlock 
local capital and channel funds from local purchasers to local projects. This does not exclude 
international investors in the projects but the local embedded standards aim to offer local 
purchasers the increased incentives from buying and investing in local offsets. This is evident 
in that nearly all the offsets produced by projects certified under the local standards (BMV or 
Panda Standard) were sold to local investors in Brazil or China respectively (Peters Stanley et 
al., 2011). 
7.2. The Development of a New Voluntary Carbon Standard – Is It Muddying the Waters?  
In 2007 the development of the current voluntary carbon standards were spurred by a global 
regulatory vacuum (Gillenwater et al., 2007).This has seen the rise of a variety of competitors 
in the marketplace and increased confusion for both project developers and purchasers around 
the standards and what they contain and purport to achieve and do. The voluntary carbon 
market is still attempting to establish itself as a recognised force in global carbon markets that 
can provide secure, legitimate and long term offsets in to a market. There has been a marked 
division between standards that focus purely on carbon offsets and those that incorporate 
sustainable development benefits. These variations and applications are all the signs of a 
developing market, and due to its young age this can be expected and should not be derided. 
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To date however not one standard has managed to answer and address the three main 
challenges of certification; 1) project eligibility and additionality; 2) monitoring and third 
party verification procedures; and 3) enforcement of ownership (especially on public land).  
This has led to not a single dominant standard, but rather a variety of large standards (VCS, 
CCBS and GS) that fluctuate in market share due to the development of new methodologies, 
certified projects and political direction. These standards have however gained initial 
acceptance due to their affiliations with large market players or organisations such as the 
WEF (who support the VCS) or WWF (who support the GS). This gave these standards the 
initial impetus to establish themselves as dominant recognised players in the market, even 
though they do not necessarily encompass the best practices, most effective or cost efficient 
certification procedures. There has been confusion within the marketplace surrounding the 
‘best’ standard and this has served to alienate some potential consumers of certified offsets. 
Current voluntary carbon standards are by no means perfect and more work is needed into the 
critical evaluation of a projects submitted PDDs and the successful comparisons and 
evaluation of compliance with the original standards baseline requirements, especially with 
standards that do not require independent long term field verification (such as the VCS). 
While the markets and standards are still evolving and developing with new projects and 
methodologies arising yearly, if not quarterly, there still has not been enough time for many 
of the standards to prove their effectiveness and practicality. This is especially relevant in 
project types such as landscape restoration that have lag times from project implementation to 
offset generation and the variety of  SD benefits that they can provide. 
Gillenwater et al. (2007) argues that environmental commodity markets are inherently more 
susceptible to market failures that traditional markets because the commodity, in this case 
carbon, is both intangible and a public good. Without clear standards for quality assurance 
competitive pressure will force sellers to minimize quality and limit transparency. This has 
been evident in the initial stages of the voluntary carbon market development and introduced 
large amounts of distrust that have followed the market in its growth. It is for this reason that 
standards need to continue to innovate and understand the role they play and that of others in 
the market. Failure to capitalise and build knowledge around new, robust ideas and the 
streamlining of existing processes will result in the failure of the market through inducing a 
stagnation and lack of trust in certified offsets, or through the certification of projects that fail 
to meet the aims and requirements of the market. 
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The lack of development and acceptance of many of the existing standards in developing 
countries, especially within Africa, is a clear market signal that innovation is needed to 
overcome these stumbling blocks. If a new voluntary carbon standard is developed without 
this in mind and aims to compete with the large global voluntary standards at that scale it will 
serve to confuse the marketplace even more. But the development of smaller scale, embedded 
standards can be effective at overcoming these challenges and creating local level markets 
within areas where the broader, larger standards have been less effective or non-existent, such 
as South Africa. Tailoring these voluntary carbon standards and the certification procedures 
to local level conditions will not only provide the standard with more legitimacy, credibility 
and cost-effectiveness to local level offset producers but also greater monitoring and 
assurance of credits for local offset purchasers as well as adding assurance for corporate 
social responsibility buyers. 
7.3. Voluntary Carbon Standards – Predicted Future Developments 
The development of voluntary carbon standards has a vital role to play in the future 
innovation of third party carbon offset quality assurance mechanisms within both the 
mandatory and voluntary markets. As the voluntary market develops there will be the 
inevitable preference of some standards over the others, as was seen in 2009, but in 2010 this 
was reversed with the prevalence and growth of the various country specific embedded 
standards. This flux has been brought about by the continued competition amongst individual 
voluntary carbon standards for market share, particularly around the development and 
certification of new methodologies and project types. Uncertainty also exists around the 
various voluntary carbon standards and their potential role in a post-2012 regulatory climate 
change landscape and also in various other mandatory carbon trading schemes, such as pre-
compliance purchasing under the proposed California Cap and Trade System (ARB 32) 
(California Air Resources Board, 2011), even though participants can not currently purchase 
offsets produced outside of the USA.  
It is inevitable that the voluntary market will eventually select one or a number of the 
standards as preferential and that these will take the lead and continue, in the future, to evolve 
and develop more robust certification processes and procedures. The current standards are not 
in that position currently and this critical assessment, especially through identifying current 
standard best practices, of their components and their development are highly relevant and 
vital to the continued improvement and streamlining of current standards and the 
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development of a potentially new one. It is envisioned with the continued development of the 
voluntary market and the increasing evidence of a standard’s robustness and effectiveness 
will in future guide and contribute to the development of any potential future mandatory 
mechanisms or see voluntary standards eligible within the mandatory markets. These 
voluntary standards also have the potential to become more recognised and incorporated into 
developing mandatory market frameworks, especially surrounding the bureaucracy and costs 
associated with CDM certification.  
It is anticipated that the voluntary carbon markets will take a similar path to sustainable 
forestry management certification, especially the PEFC process. That is to say that the 
voluntary market will see the increased development of standards focussed within a particular 
geographic location but in the near future will be organised under an umbrella organisation 
that ensure that all standards abide by an overarching set of principles and aims. This will 
allow for the standards to still focus on developing efficient and effective local level 
certification processes and ensuring the certification of legitimate carbon offsets and 
sustainable development, but also gain legitimacy in global markets through being recognised 
by their association to a global body with recognised aims and principles. 
7.4. Developing the South African Voluntary Offset Market  
The concept of embedded standards has opened up a new and exciting path for the 
development of the voluntary market and the proposed South African voluntary carbon 
standard aims to capitalise on this development. A project in a specific country faces 
differing challenges to obtaining certification than other projects in other locations, and South 
Africa is no different. This is evident in the lack of current certified voluntary offsetting 
projects and the limited participation in the mandatory market. While there are a number of 
local level South African examples, such as Elemental Equity (http://elementalequity.org/) 
and Food and Trees for Africa (www.trees.co.za), these are informal and there is no 
independent guarantee of the integrity of the offsets generated and sold. These challenges to 
certification relate to a variety of institutional, economic and political barriers that have 
limited South Africa’s access to a share of the global carbon markets through the supply of 
credits to the markets. 
The South African market for carbon offsets however is poorly developed, with the majority 
of carbon offset purchases being from foreign sources due to a lack of a local supply of 
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offsets. The participation of South African companies in carbon offsetting has been limited 
but there is some scope for investment and a willingness to purchase certified credits from 
South African projects. The development of a voluntary carbon standard has the potential to 
act as this ‘market making’ intermediary in South Africa.  
7.5. Conclusion - Future of the Proposed South African Voluntary Carbon Standard 
The work undertaken within this thesis has served as a critical evaluation of the development 
of the voluntary carbon market and in particular the development of the various voluntary 
carbon standards, with a particular focus on LULUCF and landscape restoration projects. 
This thesis has served to contribute to the main facets of voluntary carbon standard 
development through: 1) a critical analysis of voluntary carbon standard development and 
current market best practices; and 2) the development of new and innovative processes for a 
proposed South African voluntary carbon standard. This has been centred and demonstrated 
within the initial goal of developing a preliminary ‘straw dog’ voluntary carbon standard 
aimed particularly at certifying landscape restoration projects within South Africa. Central to 
this notion has been ensuring the sustainable development benefits of projects and hence the 
focus on the development of SD indicators and the IOOI framework in Chapter 5 and 6. 
While the proposed carbon standard has focused on certifying landscape restoration projects 
within South Africa, it cannot be the only project type accepted if the standard is to be truly 
viable. While the basic building blocks of the standard have been developed there needs to be 
increased development of new baseline methodologies from other areas, especially REDD 
plus and renewable energy projects that can be accepted within the standard and thus allow it 
to diversify away from landscape projects and become more competitive. A lot of work and 
time has been spent on developing the baseline methodologies for landscape restoration 
projects within the subtropical thicket biome of the Eastern Cape, South Africa (Powell, 
2009) and these are primed to be the first initial methodology accepted under the standard if it 
is developed further. 
A significant investment, especially in terms of time, has been put into generating the ideas 
and knowledge contained within this thesis. This proposed voluntary standard contained in 
Chapter 6 is, however, nowhere near a viable standard for practical application as yet; it 
needs a lot of focus on mainstreaming the standard and the processes. This will be achieved 
in part through gaining wider stakeholder input and support for the standards principles, aims 
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and content of the standard. Without the buy-in from a variety of local stakeholders and a 
champion to drive the future development process the ideas and objectives contained within 
this thesis will falter at this hurdle and remain in concept form only.  
The trade of carbon offsets within South Africa cannot however be seen as a panacea to 
reversing landscape degradation and moving towards a ‘green’ economic growth path, but it 
is one option to changing the current economic systems to focus on the benefits of 
environmental goods and services. The development of a local, embedded voluntary carbon 
standard can significantly enhance this process and ensure that the ‘greening’ of South 
Africa’s economy is done internally and that vital funding is channelled to certified carbon 
offset projects that directly contribute to building sustainable development within South 
Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 168 
 
References 
Adger, W.N., Brown, K., Fairbrass, J. ,Jordan, A., Paavola, J., Rosendo, S. and Seyfang, G., 
2003. Governance for sustainability: towards a ‘thick’ analysis of environmental decision-
making. Environmental Planning, A35, 1095 – 1110.  
Agnew, D., Grieve, C.,Orr, P., Parkes, G. and Barker, N. 2006. Environmental benefits 
resulting from certification against MSC principles and criteria for sustainable fishing. 
MRAG UK Ltd and Marine Stewardship Council, London.   
Alexeew, J., Bergset, L., Meyer, K., Petersen, J., Schneider, L. and Unger, C. 2010. An 
analysis of the relationship between the additionality of CDM projects and their contribution 
to sustainable development. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 10: 233 – 248.  
Aliber, M.A. 2003. Chronic poverty in South Africa: incidence, causes and policies. World 
Development, 31: 473 – 490. 
Arnold, J.G. and Allen, P.M. 1999. Automated methods for estimating baseflow and ground 
water recharge from streamflow records.  Journal of American Water Resources Associated, 
2: 411 – 424.  
Auckland, L., Moura Costa, P. and Brown, S. 2003. A conceptual framework and its 
application for addressing leakage: the case of avoided deforestation. Climate Policy, 3: 123 
– 136.  
Auld, G. 2007. The origins and growth of social and environmental certification programs in 
the fisheries sector. 11th Annual conference of the international society for New Institutional 
Economics, Reykjavik, Iceland. 
Auld, G., Gulbrandsen, L.H. and McDermott, L. 2008. Certification Schemes and the Impacts 
on Forests and Forestry. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 33: 187 – 211.  
Ayers, H., Burns, P., Church, T., Davis, S. and Swaffield, S.R. 2010. Development of a 
conceptual framework for sustainability indicators used in structure planning. Land, 
Environment and People Research Report, no.13.  Lincoln University, New Zealand.  
Balderas Torres, A., Marchant, R., Lovett, J.C., Smart, J.C.R and Tipper, R. 2010. Analysis 
of the carbon sequestration costs of afforestation and reforestation agroforestry practices and 
 169 
 
use of cost curves to evaluate their potential for implementation of climate change mitigation. 
Ecological Economics, 69: 469 – 477.  
Beierle,T.C. and Cayford, J. 2002. Democracy in Practice: Public Participation in 
Environmental Decisions.  RFF Press, Washington. 
Bell, S. and Morse, S. 2003. Measuring sustainability: learning by doing. Earthscan 
Publication Ltd, London.  
Bezuidenhout, A., Bischoff, C., Buhlungu, S. and Lewins, K. 2008. Tacking progress on the 
implementation and impact of the employment equity act since its inception (online) 
Available: http://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/documents/research-
documents/Employment%20Equity_DoL_Report%20SWOP%20Final%2031102008.pdf 
(Accessed 5 May 2011). 
Bhorat, H. and Kanbur, R. 2005.  Poverty and Well-being in Post-Apartheid South Africa: An 
overview of data, outcomes and policy (online). Available: 
www.dpru.uct.ac.za/WorkingPapers/PDF_Files/WP_05-101.pdf (Accessed 8 September 
2011). 
Bond, P., Dada, R and Erion, G. 2007. Climate change, carbon trading and civil society: 
Negative returns on South African investments. University of KwaZulu Natal Press, Durban.  
Bossel, H. 2000. Assessing viability and sustainability: a systems-based approach for 
deriving comprehensive indicator sets. Conservation Ecology, 5: 12. 
Bowen, R.E. and Riley, C. 2003. Socio-economic indicators and integrated coastal 
management. Ocean & Coastal Management, 46: 299 – 312. 
Boyd, E and Schipper, E.L. 2002.  The Marrakech Accord - At the crossroads to ratification: 
Seventh conference of the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.  The Journal of Environment and Development, 11: 184 – 190.  
Broekhoff, D. 2007. Voluntary Carbon Offsets: Getting what you pay for (online). Available: 
http://pdf.wri.org/20070718_broekhoff_testimony.pdf (Accessed 20 October 2010) 
Brown, K and Corbera, E. 2003. Exploring equity and sustainable development in the new 
carbon economy. Climate Policy, 31: 46 – 56.  
 170 
 
Brown, S., Hall, M., Andrasko, K., Ruiz, F., Marzoli, W., Guerrero, G., Masera, O., Dushku, 
A., DeJong, B. and Cornell, J. 2007. Baselines for land-use change in the tropics: application 
to avoided deforestation projects. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 
12: 1001 – 1026.  
California Air Resources Board. 2011. Cap-and-trade Program (online). Available: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (Accessed 09 April 2012). 
Camp, R.C. 1989. Benchmarking: The Search for Best Practices that lead to superior 
performances. ASQC Quality Press, Milwaukee. 
Carmin, J., Darnall, N. and  Mil–Homens, J. 2003. Stakeholder involvement in the design of 
U.S. voluntary environment programs: Does sponsorship matter? Policy Studies Journal, 31: 
527 – 543. 
Carothers, L., Schmitz, H., Clark, W.C., Jackson, R.J. and Matson, P.A. 2010. Certification 
of Sustainable Products and Services: A Workshop. National Academic Press, Washington. 
CO2now.org. 2010. Atmospheric CO2 for May 2010 (online). Available: http:// CO2now.org/ 
(Accessed 25 June 2010). 
Corbera, E., Brown, K. and Adger, W.N. 2007.  The equity and legitimacy of markets for 
ecosystem services. Development and Change, 38: 587 – 613.  
Costanza, R., d'Arge,R ., de Groot, R., Farber, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., Limburg, K., 
Naeem, S., O'Neill, R.V.,Paruelo, J., Raskin, G.R., Sutton, P. and van der Belt, M. 1997. The 
value of the world's ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature, 387: 253 – 260.  
Costanza, R. and Daly, H.E. 1992. Natural capital and sustainable development. 
Conservation Biology, 6: 37 – 46.  
Cosbey,A., Parry,J.E., Browne,J., Dinesh,B., Bhandari,P., Drexhage,J. and Murphy,D. 2005. 
Realising the Development Dividend: Making the CDM work for Developing Countries 
(online). Available: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/climate_realizing_dividend.pdf  (Accessed 
05 March 2011) 
Curran, P. and Shackleton, S. 2009. Assessing Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of the 
Manufacturing Sector towards Climate Change and Bio-sequestration Initiatives in the 
 171 
 
Eastern Cape, South Africa. Unpublished Honours Dissertation, Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown.  
Daily,G.C., Alexander,S., Ehrlich,P.R., Gouldet,L., Lubchenco,J., Matson, P.A., 
Mooney,H.A., Postel,S., Schneider,S.H., Tilman,D. and Woodwell,G.M. 1997. Ecosystem 
Services: Benefits supplied to human societies by natural ecosystems. Issues in Ecology, 2: 1 
– 18.  
Davies, R. and Thurlow, J. 2010. Formal – Informal economy linkages and unemployment in 
South Africa. South Africa Journal of Economics, 78: 437 – 459.  
Deaton, B.J., Busch, L., Samuels, W.J., Thompson, P.B. 2010. A note on the economy of 
qualities: attributing production practices to agricultural products. Journal of Rural Sciences, 
25: 99 – 110.  
Department of Energy. 2011. Designated National Authority: PDDs (online). Available: 
http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/kyoto/kyoto_frame.html (Accessed 20 August 2011) 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 2004. National Action Plan to Combat 
Land Degradation and Alleviate Poverty (online). Available: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=61430 (Accessed 4 August 2011). 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 2006. South Africa Environment 
Outlook. A report on the state of the environment: Executive summary and key findings. 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Pretoria. 42 pp. 
Department of Minerals and Energy, 2010. Designated National Authority: South African 
CDM projects (Online). Available: http://www.dme.gov.za/dna/dna_project_portfolio.stm 
(Accessed15 June 2010). 
Department of Land Reform and Rural Development, 2011.  Green Paper on Land Reform 
(online). Available: www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=151707 (Accessed 24 
October 2011). 
Dickens, C.W.S. and Graham, P.M. 2002. The South African Scoring System (SASS) version 
5 rapid bio-assessment method for rivers. African Journal of Aquatic Sciences, 27: 1 – 10.   
 172 
 
Doody, D.G., Kearney, P., Barry, J., Moles, R. and O’Regan, B. 2009. Evaluation of the Q-
method as a method of public participation in the selection of sustainable development 
indicators. Ecological Indicators, 9: 1129 – 1137.  
Drew, S. 1997. From knowledge to action: the impact of benchmarking on organizational 
performance. Long Range Planning, 30: 427- 441. 
Durst,P.B., McKenzie,P.J., Brown,C.L. and Appanah,S. 2006. Challenges facing certification 
and eco-labelling of forest products in developing countries. International Forestry Review, 
8: 1 – 12.  
Dutschke, M. and Michaelowa, A. 2006. Development assistance and the CDM – how to 
interpret ‘financial additionality’. Environment and Development Economics, 11: 235 – 246.  
Ecosystem Marketplace. 2010.  Forest Carbon News (Online). Available: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com (Accessed 30 September 2010). 
Ehrlich, P.R. and Ehrlich, A.H. 1981. Extinction: the causes and consequences of the 
disappearance of species. Random House, New York. Pp? 
Engel, S., Pagiola, S. and Wunder, S. 2008. Designing payments for environmental services 
In theory and practice: an overview of the issue. Ecological Economics, 65:  663 – 674. 
Engelbrecht, A., Golding, A., Hietkamp, S and Scholes, B. 2004. The potential for 
sequestration of carbon dioxide in South Africa. (online). Available : www.dme.gov. 
za/pdfs/energy/coal/carbon_dioxide.pdf  (Accessed 25 June 2010). 
Filou, E. 2009. Carbon credits: Voluntary solutions for climate change (online). Available: 
http://www.theafricareport.com (Accessed 24 June 2010). 
Fischer, C., Aguilar, F., Jawahar, P. and Sedjo, R. 2005. Forest Certification: Towards 
Common Standards? (online). Available: www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-05-10.pdf 
(Accessed 15 December 2010). 
Fisher, W.S. 2001. Indicators for human and ecological risk assessment: a US EPA 
perspective. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, 7: 961 – 970.    
Fraser, E.D.G., Dougill, A.J., Mabee, W.E., Reed, M. and McAlpine, P. 2006. Bottom up and 
top down: Analysis of participatory process for sustainability indicator identification as a 
 173 
 
pathway to community empowerment and sustainable environmental management. Journal of 
Environmental Management, 78: 114 – 127.  
Galatowitsch, S.M. 2009. Carbon offsets as ecological restoration. Restoration Ecology, 17: 
563 – 570. 
Gallopin, G. 1997. Indicators and Their Use: Information for Decision Making in 
Sustainability Indicators: A Report on the Project on Indicators of Sustainable Development. 
Chichester: John Wiley. Pp? 
Gambarelli, G. and Bucher, A. 2002. Mainstreaming adaptation to climate change in 
agriculture and natural resources management projects (online). Available: 
http://climatechange.worldbank.org/climatechange/content/mainstreaming-adaptation-
climate-change-agriculture-and-natural-resources-management-project (Accessed 3 August 
2011). 
Garcia – Oliva, F. and Masera, O.R. 2004. Assessment and Measurement Issues Related to 
Soil Carbon Sequestration in Land-Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) Projects 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Climatic Change, 65: 347 – 364.  
Gavronski, I., Ferrer, G. and Paiva, E.L. 2008. ISO 14001 certification in Brazil: motivations 
and benefits. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16: 87 – 94.  
Gillenwater, M., Broekhoff, D., Trexler, M., Hyman, M. and Fowler, R. 2007. Policing the 
voluntary carbon market. Nature Reports Climate Change, 6: 85 – 87.  
Giovanucci, D. and Ponte,S. 2005. Standards as a new form of social contract? Sustainability 
initiatives in the coffee industry. Food Policy, 30: 284 – 301. 
Gomez-Baggethun, E., de Groot, R, Lomas, P.L. and Montes, C. 2010.  The history of 
ecosystem services in economic theory and practice: From early notions to markets and 
payment schemes. Ecological Economics, 69: 1209 – 1218. 
Goodland, R. and Daly, H. 1996. Environmental Sustainability: Universal and Non-
Negotiable. Ecological Applications, 6: 1002 – 1007.  
Gough, A.D., Innes, J.L. and Allen, S.D. 2008. Development of common indicators of 
sustainable forest management. Ecological Indicators, 8: 425 – 430.  
 174 
 
Goyert,W., Sagarin,R. and Annala,J. 2010.  The promise and pitfalls of Marine Stewardship 
Council certification: Maine lobster as a case study. Marine Policy, 34: 1103 – 1109.  
Grubb, M., Vrolijk, C. and Brack, D. 1999. The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment. 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs: London. 
Gullison, R. 2003. Does forest certification conserve biodiversity. Oryx, 37: 153 – 165.   
Gustavson, K.R., Longergan,S.C. and Ruitenbeek, H.J. 1999. Selection and modelling of 
sustainable development indicators: a case study of the Fraser River Basin, British Columbia. 
Ecological Economics, 28: 117 – 132.  
Gustavvson, L., Karjalainen,T., Marland, G., Savolainen, I., Schlamadinger, B., and Apps, M. 
2000. Project-based greenhouse-gas accounting guiding principles with a focus on baselines 
and additionality. Energy Policy, 28: 935 – 945.   
Guy, G.B. and Kibert, C.J. 1998. Developing indicators of sustainability: US experience. 
Building Research and Information, 26: 39 – 45.  
Hamilton, K., Sjardin, M., Peters-Stanley, M. and Marcello, T. 2010. Building Bridges: State 
of the Voluntary Carbon  Market 2010 (Online). Available: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/resources.library.page.php?page_id=
7585&section=our_publications&eod=1. (Accessed 25 June 2010) 
Hamilton, K., Sjardin, M., Shapiro, A. and Marcello, T. 2009. Fortifying the Foundation: 
State of the Voluntary Carbon Market 2009 (online).Available: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/resources.library.page.php?page_id=
7082&section=our_publications&eod=1 (Accessed 03 April 2010) 
Hamilton, K., Sjardin, S., Peters-Stanley, M., and Marcello, T. 2010. Building Bridges: State 
of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2010 (online). Available: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com (Accessed 20 June 2010) 
Hanson, A.J. 2003. Measuring progress towards sustainable development. Ocean and Coastal 
Management, 46: 381 – 390.  
Hardi, P. and Zdan, T. 1997. Assessing sustainable development: principles in 
practice. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Canada. 
 175 
 
Hatanaka, M., Bain, C. and Busch, L. 2005. Third-party certification in the global agrifood 
system. Food Policy, 30: 354 – 369.  
Heink, U. and Kowarik, I. 2010. What are indicators? On the definition of indicators in 
ecology and environmental planning.  Ecological Indicators, 10: 584 – 593.  
Hickey, G.M. and Innes, J.L. 2008. Indicators for demonstrating sustainable forest 
management in British Columbia,Canada: an international review. Ecological Indicators¸ 8: 
131 – 140.  
Hodes, G.S. 2007. Financial aspects of CDM and carbon finance (Online). Available: 
http://cd4cdm.org/aharan%20Africa/Tanzania/Second%20National%20Workshop/Financials
CDMCarbonMarket_Hodes.pdf (Accessed 05 July 2011). 
Houdashelt, M., Schmidt, J., Lee, J. and Helme, N. 2006. Alternative tools for the 
demonstration of additionality: an assessment of proposals (online) Available: 
http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources  (Accessed 03 June 2010).  
Hunt, C. 2008. Economy and ecology of emerging markets and credits for bio-sequestered 
carbon on private land in tropical Australia. Ecological Economics. 66: 309 – 318. 
Hyland, P. and Beckett, R. 2002. Learning to compete: the value of internal benchmarking. 
Benchmarking: An International Journal, 9: 293 - 304. 
IPCC. 2007. Climate Change 2007 - The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working 
group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Jacquet, J., Pauly, D., Ainley, D., Holt, D., Dayton, P. and Jackson, J. 2010. Seafood 
stewardship in crisis. Nature, 467: 28 – 29.   
Jindal, R., Swallow, B and Kerr, J. 2008. Forestry- based carbon sequestration projects in 
Africa: Potential benefits and challenges. Natural Resources Forum, 32: 116 – 130.  
Kerr, R.A. 2007. Global warming is changing the world. Science, 316: 188 – 190 
Kiekens, J. 2003. Forest certification in North America: selected developments. 12th World 
Forestry Congress, Canada. 
 176 
 
Egenhofer, C., van Schaik, L.G. and Cornland,D. 2005. Improving the Clean Development 
Mechanism. Report of the European Climate Platform, CEPS and Clipore. 
Kneeshaw, D.D., Leduc, A., Drapeau, P., Gauthier, S., Paré, D., Carignan, R., Doucet, R., 
Bouthillier, L.  and Messier, C. 2000. Development of integrated ecological standards of 
sustainable forest management at an operational scale. The Forestry Chronicle, 76: 481–493. 
Kollmuss, A., Zink, H. and Polycarp, C. 2008. Making sense of the voluntary carbon market: 
a comparison of carbon offset standards. WWF, Germany.  
Kosoy, N. and Corbera, E. 2010. Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism. 
Ecological Economics, 69: 1228 – 1236.  
Krey, M. 2005. Transaction costs of unilateral CDM projects in India – results from an 
empirical survey. Energy Policy 33: 2385 – 2397.  
Lackner, S.K. 2003.  A guide to CO2 sequestration. Science, 13: 1677 – 1678.  
Laise, D. 2004. Benchmarking and learning organisations: ranking methods to identify ‘best 
in class’. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 11: 621 – 630. 
Lal, R. 2002. Soil carbon dynamics in cropland and rangeland. Environmental Pollution, 116: 
353 – 362. 
Lamb, D., Erskine, P.D and Parrotta, J.A. 2005. Restoration of degraded tropical forest 
landscapes. Science, 310: 1628 – 1632. 
Laurance, W.F. 2008. Can carbon trading save vanishing forests? Bioscience, 58: 286 – 287. 
Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, A. and Argent, J. 2010. Trends in South African Income 
Distribution and Poverty since the fall of Apartheid. OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers, No. 101, OECD Publishing.  
Lindenmayer, D.B., Margules, C.R. and Botkin, D.B. 2000. Indicators of biodiversity for 
ecological sustainable forest management.  Conservation Biology, 14: 941 – 950.  
Linacre, N., Kossoy, A. and Ambrosi, P. 2011. State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2011 
(online). Available: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/StateAndTrend_Low
Res.pdf (accessed 25 September 2011). 
 177 
 
Lopes, P. 2009. Review of forestry carbon standards – a development tool for organisations 
to identify the most appropriate forestry carbon credit. Unpublished MSc. thesis, Imperial 
College London. 
Lucertini, M., Nicolo, F. and Telmon, D. 1995. Integration of benchmarking and 
benchmarking of integration. International Journal of Production Economics, 38: 59 – 71.  
Lundberg, K., Balfors, B. and Folkeson, L. 2009. Framework for environmental performance 
measurement in a Swedish public sector organisation. Journal of Cleaner Production, 17: 
1017 – 1024.  
MacDonald, J.P. 2005. Strategic sustainable development using the ISO 14001 Standard.  
Journal of Cleaner Production, 13: 631 – 643.   
Macfarlane, D.M., Kotze, D.C., Ellery, W.N., Walters, D., Koopman,V., Goodman, P. and 
Goge, C. 2008. WET-Health (online). Available: 
http://www.o5demo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/08%20-%20WET%20Health.pdf (accessed 
6 August 2010). 
Malhi, Y., Meir, P. and Brown, S. 2002. Forests, carbon and global climate. In: Swingland, 
I.R. (ed.).  Capturing carbon and conserving biodiversity: The market approach. The Royal 
Society, Earthscan Publications, London. Pg 15 – 41. 
Mander, M., Blignaut, J., van Niekerk, M., Cowling, R., Horan, M., Knoesen, D., Mills, A., 
Powell, M. and Shulze, R. 2010. Baviaanskloof – Tsitsikamma Payment for Ecosystem 
Services: A Feasibility Assessment (online). Available: 
http://www.capeaction.org.za/uploads/Baviaans-
Tsitsi_PES_Synthesis_Report_FINAL_8_April_2010.pdf (accessed 13 June 2011). 
Marais, C., Woodworth, P., de Wit, M., Craig, J., Holl, K.D. & Gouza, J. 2007. Overcoming 
socio economic obstacles to restoring natural capital. In: Aronson, J., Milton, S. & Blignaut, 
J. (eds). Restoring Natural Capital: Science, Business and Practice. Society for Ecological 
Restoration, Island Press. Washington. Pg. 256–264. 
Marechal, K. and Hecq,W. 2006. Temporary credits: A solution to the potential non-
permanence of carbon sequestration in forests? Ecological Economics, 58: 699 – 716.  
 178 
 
Mascarenhas, A., Coelho, P., Subtil, E. and Ramos, T.B. 2010. The role of common local 
indicators in regional sustainability assessment. Ecological Indicators, 10: 646 – 656. 
Massa, S. and Testa, S. 2004. Innovation or imitation? Benchmarking: a knowledge-
management process to innovative services. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 11: 
610 – 620. 
McCool, S.F. and Stankey, G.H. 2004. Indicators of sustainability: challenges and 
opportunities at the interface of science and policy. Environmental Management, 33: 294 – 
305.  
Meadows, D.H. 1998. Indicators and information systems for sustainable development: a 
report to the Balaton Group. Sustainability Institute, Vermont.  
Meppem, T. and Gill, R. 1998. Planning for sustainability as a learning concept. Ecological 
Economics, 26: 121 – 137. 
Merger, E. and Williams, A. 2008. Comparison of carbon offset standards for climate 
forestation projects participating in the voluntary carbon market (online) Available: 
http://www.fore.canterbury.ac.nz/research/ (accessed 07 March 2010). 
Merger, E. and Pistorius, T. 2011. Effectiveness and legitimacy of forest carbon standard in 
the OTC voluntary carbon market. Carbon Balance and Management, 6: 4 – 35.  
Merry, D.F. and Carter, D.R. 1996. Programs and markets for ecologically certified wood 
products. Southern Forest Economics Workshop, Gatlinburg, Tennessee.  
Mignone, B.K., Hurteau, M.D., Chen, Y. and Sohngen, B. 2009. Carbon offsets, reversal risk 
and US climate policy. Carbon Balance and Management, 4: 3 – 10.  
Mills,A. J., O’Connor,T.G., Donaldson,J.S., Fey,M.V., Skwono,A.L., Sigwela,A.M., 
Lechmere-Oertel,R.G. and Bosenberg,J.D. 2005. Ecosystem carbon storage under different 
land uses in three semi-arid shrublands and a mesic grassland in South Africa.  South African 
Journal of Plant Soil, 22: 183 – 190.  
Mills,A., Blignaut,J., Cowling,R., Knipe,A., Marais,C., Marais,S., Powell,M., Sigwela,A. and 
Skwono, A. 2009. Investing in Sustainability: Restoring degraded thicket creating jobs, 
capturing carbon and earning green credit (online). Available: 
 179 
 
http://www.rncalliance.org/WebRoot/rncalliance/Shops/rncalliance/4B45/777F/46E7/8C2D/
D572/C0A8/D218/F935/Final_CAP_Thicket_Restoration.pdf (accessed 06 January 2011)  
Mittermeier,R.A., Truner,W.R., Larsen,F.W., Brooks,T.M. and Gascon,C. Global 
biodiversity conservation: The critical role of hotspots. In: Zachos,F.E. and Habel, J.C (eds). 
Biodiversity Hotspots: Distribution and Protection of Conservation Priority Areas. Springer, 
Berlin. Pg 3 – 23.   
Moura Costa, P., Stuart, M., Pinard, M. and Phillips, G. 2000. Elements of a certification 
system for forestry based carbon offset projects. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for 
Global Change, 5: 39 – 50.  
Muradian, R., Corbera, E., Pascual, U., Kosoy, N. and May, P. 2010. Reconciling theory and 
practice: An alternative conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental 
services. Ecological Economics, 69: 1202–1208.  
Murray, B.C., McCarl, B.A. and Lee, H. 2004. Estimating leakage from forest carbon 
sequestration programs. Land Economics, 80: 109 – 124.  
Murray, B.C., Sohngen, B. and Ross M.T. 2007. Economic consequences of consideration of 
permanence, leakage and additionality for soil carbon sequestration projects. Climatic 
Change, 80: 127 – 143.  
Murray, B and Sommer, A. 2004. Project specific or perfomance-standard baseline? Testing 
the alternatives for a forest carbon sequestration standard (online). Available: 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/04/carbon-seq/101.pdf (accessed 23 
September 2010). 
Nasi, R. and Frost, P.G.H. 2009. Sustainable forest management in the tropics: Is everything 
in order but the patient still dying? Ecology and Society, 14: 40. 
National Planning Commission. 2011.  Diagnostic Report (online). Available: 
www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=147192 (accessed 26 July 2011). 
Nawrocka, D. and Parker, T. 2009. Finding the connection: environmental management 
systems and environmental performance.  Journal of Cleaner Production, 17: 601 – 607.  
Neef, T., Ashford, L., Davey, C., Durbin, J., Fehse, J., Hedges,  A., Herrera, T., Janson-
Smith, T., Moore, C., Mountain, R., Panfil, S., Tuite,  C. and Wheeland, M. 2010. The forest 
 180 
 
carbon offsetting report 2010 (online). Available: http://www.ecosecurities.com/Standalone/. 
Forest_carbon_offsetting_report_2010/default.aspx (accessed 05 May 2010).  
Niesten, E., Frumhoff, P.C., Manion, M and Hardner, J.J. 2002. Designing a carbon market 
that protects forests in developing countries. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 
360: 1875 – 1888. 
O'Faircheallaigh, C. 2010. Public participation and environmental impact assessment: 
Purposed, implications and lessons for public policy making. Environmental Impact 
Assessment Review, 30: 19 – 27.  
Olander, L.P., Gibbs, H.K., Steininger, M., Swenson, J.J. and Murray, B.C. 2008. Reference 
scenarios for deforestation and forest degradation in support of REDD: a review of the data 
and methods. Environmental Research Letters, 3: 1 – 11.  
Olsen, K. 2007.  The clean development mechanism’s contribution to sustainable 
development: a review of the literature. Climatic Change, 84: 59 – 73.  
Pagiola, S. 2008. Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. Ecological Economics, 
65:  712 – 724. 
Pagiola, S., Arcenas, A. and Platais, G.  2005. Can payments for environmental services help 
reduce poverty? An exploration of the issues and the evidence to date from Latin America. 
World Development, 33: 237 – 253. 
Pearce, D.W. 2001. The economic value of forest ecosystems. Ecosystem Health, 7: 284 – 
196.  
Perera, P. and Vlosky, R.P. 2006. A History of Forest Certification. Working paper #71. 
Louisiana Forest Products Development Centre, LSU Agricultural Centre: Research and 
Extension.  
Peskett, L., Luttrell, C. and Iwata, M. 2007. Can standards for voluntary carbon offsets ensure 
development benefits? ( online). Available: www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/11.pdf 
(accessed 28 April 2010). 
Peterson, M.J., Hall, D.M., Feldpausch-Parker, A.M. and Peterson, T.R. 2010. Obscuring 
ecosystem function with application of the ecosystem services concept. Conservation 
Biology, 24:113 – 119. 
 181 
 
Peters-Stanley, M., Hamilton, K., Marcello, T. and Sjardin, M. 2011. State of the voluntary 
carbon markets 2011 ( online). Available: 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/resources.library.page.php?page_id=
8351&section=our_publications&eod=1 (accessed 26 July 2011). 
Pickens,J.F., Cherry,J.A., Grisak,G.E., Merrit,W.F. and Risto,B.A. 1978. A multilevel device 
for ground-water sampling and piezometric monitoring. Ground Water, 16: 322 – 327.  
Ponte, S. 2008. Greener than thou: The political economy of fish eco-labelling and its local 
manifestations in South Africa.  World Development, 36: 159 – 175.  
Post, J.E., Preston, L.E. and Sachs, S. 2002. Redefining the Corporation: Stakeholder 
Management and Organisational Wealth. Stanford University Press, Paolo Alto. Pp? 
Potts, T. and Haward, M. 2007. International trade, eco-labelling and sustainable fisheries – 
recent issues, concepts and practices. Environment, Development and Sustainability, 9: 91 – 
106.  
Powell, M.J. 2009. Restoration of degraded subtropical thickets in the Baviaanskloof 
Megareserve, South Africa. Unpublished MSc. Thesis, Rhodes University, South Africa.  
Rametsteiner, E. and Simula, M. 2003. Forest certification – an instrument to promote 
sustainable forest management? Journal of Environmental Management, 67: 87 – 98.  
Rametsteiner, E., Pulzl,H., Alkan-Olsson, J. and Frederiksen, P. 2011. Sustainability 
indicator development – Science or political negotiation. Ecological Indicators, 11: 61 – 70.  
Redford, K.H. and Adams, W.M. 2009. Payments for ecosystem services and the challenge of 
saving nature. Conservation Biology, 23: 785–787. 
Reed, M.S., Fraser, E.D.G. and Dougill, A.J. 2006. An adaptive learning process for 
developing and applying sustainability indicators with local communities.  Ecological 
Economics, 59: 406 – 418. 
Rees, H.L., Boyd, S.E., Schratzberger, M. and Murray, L.A. 2006. Role of benthic indicators 
in regulating human activities at sea. Environmental Science and Policy, 9: 496 – 508.  
 182 
 
Rees, H.L., Hyland, J.L., Hylland, K., Mercer Clarke, C.S.L., Roff, J.C. and Ware, S. 2008. 
Environmental Indicators: utility in meeting regulatory needs, an overview. ICES Journal of 
Marine Science, 65: 1381 – 1386. 
Rempel, R.S., Andison, D.W. and Hannon, S.J. 2004. Guiding principles for developing an 
indicator and monitoring framework. The Forestry Chronicle, 80: 82 – 90.  
Richards, K.R. and Stokes, C. 2004.A review of forest carbon sequestration cost studies: a 
dozen years of research. Climatic Change, 63: 1 – 48. 
Righelato, R. and Spracklen, D.V. 2007. Carbon mitigation by biofuels or by saving and 
restoring forests? Science, 317: 902. 
Rivera, J.E. and de Leon, P. 2008. Voluntary Environmental Programs: Are Carrots without 
Sticks Enough. The Policy Studies Journal, 36: 61 – 63. 
Rondinelli, D. and Vastag, G. 2000. Panacea, Common Sense, or just a Label? The value of 
ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems. European Management Journal, 18: 499 – 
510.  
Sambasivan, M. and Fei, N.Y. 2008. Evaluation of the critical success factors of 
implementation of ISO 14001 using analytic hierarchy process (AHP): a case study from 
Malaysia. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16: 1424 – 1433.  
Sandor, R.L., Bettelheim, E.C. and Swingland, I.R. 2002.  An overview of a free - market 
approach  to climate change and conservation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society, 360: 1607 – 1620. 
Sathaye, J.A. and Andrasko, K. 2007. Land use change and forestry climate project regional 
baselines: a review. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 12: 971 – 1000. 
Schneider, L. 2009. Assessing the additionality of CDM projects: practical experiences and 
lessons learnt. Climate Policy, 9: 242 – 254.  
Segnestam, L. 2002. Indicators of Environment and Sustainable Development: Theories and 
Practical Experience. Environmental Economics Series, 88. The World Bank, Washington. 
 183 
 
Shackleton, C.M., Shackleton, S.E., Gambiza, J., Nel, E., Rowntree, K., Urquhart, P., 
Fabricius, C. and Ainslie, A. 2010. Linking ecosystem services and poverty alleviation in the 
arid and semi-arid lands of southern Africa. Nova Publishers, New York.  
Sharif, A.M. 2002. Benchmarking performance management systems. Benchmarking: An 
International Journal, 9: 62 – 85. 
SocialCarbon. 2003. SocialCarbon History (Online). Available: 
http://www.socialcarbon.org/Who-Are-We/SOCIALCARBON-History/  (Accessed 23 
October 2010). 
Statistics South Africa. 2011. Key Indicators (Online). Available: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/keyindicators.asp (Accessed 24 August 2011). 
Streck, C., Tuerk, A. and Schlamadinger, B. 2009. Forestry offset in emissions trading 
schemes: a link between systems? Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 
14: 455 – 463.  
Sudha,P., Subhashree,D., Khan,H., Hedge,G.T., Murthy,I.K., Shreedhara,V. abd 
Ravindranath,N.H. Development of regional climate mitigation baseline for dominant agro-
ecological zone of Karnataka, India. Mitigation and Adaption Strategies for Global Change, 
12: 1051 – 1075.  
Sutter, C. 2003. Sustainability check-up for CDM projects: How to assess the sustainability 
of international projects under the Kyoto Protocol. Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin.  
Sutter, C and Parreno, J.C. 2007. Does the clean development mechanism deliver it 
sustainable development claim? An analysis of officially registered CDM projects. Climatic 
Change, 84: 75 – 90.  
Sjaastad, E. and Cousins, B. 2008. Formalisation of land rights in the South: An overview. 
Land Use Policy, 26: 1 – 9.  
Taiyab, N. 2005. The Market for voluntary carbon offsets: A new tool for sustainable 
development (Online). Available: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ierp/pdfs (Accessed 26 March 
2010). 
Tangen, K. and Hasselknippe, H. 2005. Converging Markets.  International Environmental 
Agreements, 5: 46 – 64. 
 184 
 
Templet, P.H. 1995. Grazing the commons: an empirical analysis of externalities, subsidies 
and sustainability. Ecological Economics, 12: 141 – 159.  
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A 
Framework for Assessment (online). Available: 
http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.48.aspx.pdf (Accessed 23 August 2010) 
Thomas, D.S.G. and Twyman, C. 2004. Good or bad rangeland? Hybrid knowledge, science, 
and local understandings of vegetation dynamics in the Kalahari. Land Degradation and 
Development, 15: 215 – 231.  
Thomas, S., Dargusch, P., Harrsion, S., and Herbohn, J. 2010. Why are so few afforestation 
and reforestation Clean Development Mechanism projects? Land Use Policy, 27: 880 – 887.  
Tongway, D. and Hindley, N. 2004. Landscape function analysis: a system for monitoring 
rangeland function. African Journal of Range and Forage Science, 21: 109 – 113.  
Turnhout, E., Hisschemoller, M. and Eijsackers, H. 2007. Ecological Indicators: between the 
two fires of science and policy. Ecological Indicators, 7: 215 – 228.  
UNDP. 2006. The Clean Development Mechanism: An Assessment of Progress (online). 
Available: http://www.uncclearn.org/clean_development_mechanism_assessment_progress 
(Accessed 14 June 2010).   
UNEP. 2008. CDM PDD Guidebook: Navigating the Pitfalls (2nd Edition) 
(Online).Available: www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/PDDguidebook2ndEdition.pdf (Accessed 
13 March 2011). 
UNFCCC. 2005. Tool for the Demonstration and Assessment of Additionality (version 02) 
(online). Available: http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/022/eb22_repan8.pdf (Accessed 24 April 2010). 
UNFCCC. 2010a. CDM projects by Scope (Online). Available: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/RegisteredProjByScopePieChart.html (Accessed 
08 April 2010). 
UNFCCC. 2010b. The Copenhagen Accord (Online). Available: 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf (Accessed 12 April 2010). 
 185 
 
United Nations Economic Commissions for Europe (UNECE). 2010.  Forest Products: 
Annual Market Review (Online). Available: http://timber.unece.org/index.php?id=2 
(Accessed 15 January 2011). 
United Nations. 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: 
Our Common Future (Online) Available: http://www.energy.kth.se/courses/4A1613/2008-
2009/1987-brundtland%20pp%201-17.pdf (Accessed 23 May 2011).  
United Nations. 2001. Indicators of Sustainable Development: Frameworks and 
Methodologies (Online). Available: www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csd9_indi_bp3.pdf 
(Accessed 04 March 2011) 
Van Kuijk, M., Putz, J. and Zagt, R. 2009. Effects of certification on forest biodiversity. 
Report commissioned by Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. Tropenbos 
International, Wageningen, the Netherlands.  
Van Wilgen, B.W. and De Lange, W.J. 2011. The costs and benefits of biological control of 
invasive alien plants in South Africa. African Entomology, 19: 504 – 514.  
Walter, M. and Kahlert, G. 2010. Forest Carbon Standards: a WWF assessment guide 
(Online). Available: http://assets.panda.org/downloads/forest_carbon_assessment_guide.pdf 
(Accessed 23 July 2010).  
Walz, R. 2000. Development of Environmental Indicator Systems: Experiences from 
Germany. Environmental Management, 25: 613 – 623.  
Ward,T.J. 2008. Barriers to biodiversity conservation in marine fishery certification. Fish and 
Fisheries, 9: 169 – 177. 
Watanabe, R. and Robinson, G. 2005. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). Climate Policy, 5: 10 – 15.  
Westman, W. 1977.How much are nature's services worth? Science, 197, 960 – 964.   
Wood, P. 2000. A comparative analysis of selected international forestry certification 
schemes (Online). Available:  www.for.gov.bc.ca/het/certification/WoodReportOct00.PDF 
(Accessed 10 November 2010). 
 186 
 
World Bank, 2010.  BioCarbon Fund (Online). Available: http://wbcarbonfinance.org 
(Accessed 26 June 2010). 
Wunder, S. 2005. Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts. Occasional 
paper No 42. CIFOR, Bogor 
 
